A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1172 of 2014) examines conviction for kidnapping from lawful guardianship and gang-rape where the prosecutrix a village girl was taken on the pretext of employment, held captive and repeatedly assaulted over a continuing two-month period.

The trial court convicted several accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(g) IPC; the High Court affirmed the convictions and sentences; the matter reached the Supreme Court by leave.

Central questions were:

(i) the prosecutrix’s age at the start of the continuing offence;

(ii) whether alleged consent negated rape charges;

(iii) effect of delayed FIR; and

(iv) probative value of medical findings describing the prosecutrix as “accustomed to sexual intercourse.”

The Court upheld the concurrent findings on credibility and minority, relying on dental age assessment, school records and guardian’s statements. It emphasised that once minority is established, consent is legally immaterial and that subjection to repeated acts under threats cannot amount to consent.

The Court rejected the defence reliance on absence of injuries and the medical phraseology as archaic moral stigma. Delay in lodging the complaint was held irrelevant given captivity. No mitigating circumstances justified reduction of sentence. The appeals were dismissed and appellants were directed to surrender to serve the unexpired portion of sentences.

Keywords: Gang rape; Kidnapping from lawful guardianship; Minor victim; Statutory rape; Delay in FIR.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The prosecution’s case describes a systematic offence wherein a village girl residing with her paternal aunt was induced to leave home on a false promise of employment, thereafter transported across multiple locations and repeatedly raped by several accused over approximately two months. The sequence began in June–July 2005 and culminated with the prosecutrix reaching police only after escaping/being assisted in September 2005.

Investigative steps included medical examination (vaginal smear) and dental age assessment, school records and statements from the guardian. Trial resulted in convictions for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(g) IPC with substantial terms; the High Court affirmed the convictions after re-considering charge framing and double punishment issues. On appeal before the Supreme Court, primary defence thrusts were that the prosecutrix was of majority age and consenting; that medical evidence (no injuries; “accustomed to sexual intercourse”) and delay in FIR undermined prosecution; and that gaps in proof warranted interference with concurrent findings.

The State relied primarily on the unshaken testimony of the prosecutrix, documentary/specialist evidence establishing minority, and the factual matrix of captivity which explained delay and rebutted consent. The Court framed the renewal of these issues against established principles: credibility of sole prosecutrix, role of corroboration, relevance of medical expressions, and the legal effect of proving minority on consent.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

A1 (Sheshmani) allegedly promised the prosecutrix employment and, on 06.07.2005, took her out without informing her guardian. She was taken to a house in Rewa where A2 (Indrapal), A3 (Raju) and later A5 (Surendra) were present and gang-raped her. From 06.07.2005 to 10.07.2005 she remained at that house and suffered repeated sexual assaults. On 10.07.2005 she was moved to Sidhi and then to a hotel where further rape allegedly occurred.

She was thereafter placed with a woman (Kalawati) till 14.07.2005. On 15.07.2005 she was again returned to Rewa and repeatedly raped; subsequently taken by train and handed to another woman who kept her near Delhi until 10.09.2005. During this entire period the prosecutrix was allegedly held under threats, with visits by A2 and A3 to the place of detention and recurrent sexual assaults. The prosecutrix reached Allahabad on 11.09.2005 and then proceeded to the Police Station at Laur; a missing person report had been earlier lodged by her guardian.

Medical examination produced vaginal smears opining the prosecutrix to be “accustomed to sexual intercourse”; dental examination opined her age as below 17 years. School register/transfer certificate recorded birth date 10.08.1988, making her under 17 when the continuing offence began. The Trial Court convicted multiple accused; the High Court largely affirmed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the prosecutrix was a minor at the commencement of the continuing offence and, if so, whether consent is immaterial?
ii. Whether prolonged detention and repeated intercourse under threats can be treated as consent?
iii. What is the probative value of medical opinion describing the prosecutrix as “accustomed to sexual intercourse”?
iv. Whether the delay in lodging FIR (approx. two months) vitiates prosecution when the prosecutrix alleges captivity?
v. Whether absence of external injuries undermines the charge of rape in prolonged sexual assault cases?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the prosecutrix left voluntarily and therefore consented; that her travel across towns and use of public transport indicated liberty inconsistent with captivity; that the medical report stating she was “accustomed to sexual intercourse” and lack of injuries supported consensual intercourse; that two months’ delay in lodging FIR was unexplained and infirmed the prosecution; and that the prosecutrix had reached majority age so statutory rape could not be made out. They further urged reduction of sentence given time on bail and the passage of years since conviction.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the prosecutrix’s testimony was consistent, unimpeached and its solitary nature does not vitiate conviction; that dental evidence, school records and guardian’s own statements establish minority; that prolonged detention under threats precluded any free consent and explained delay in complaint; that the medical phrasing is archaic and irrelevant to consent; and that absence of injuries is not determinative where the offence was continuous and medical examination occurred much later.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings. On age, the Court accepted dental surgeon’s opinion and documentary proof (school register, transfer certificate showing 10.08.1988 DOB) together with guardian’s statement; these established the prosecutrix to be under 17 at the start of the offence. Legally this placed the acts within statutory rape territory: once minority is proved, consent becomes legally irrelevant for Section 376(2)(g). On consent and captivity, the Court emphasised that repeated sexual intercourse effected by holding the girl captive and by threats cannot be equated with consent fear vitiates voluntariness.

The Court dismissed the defence import attached to absence of injuries; it held medical absence of injuries to be unsurprising where the offending spanned two months and examination was delayed. Regarding the term “accustomed to sexual intercourse”, the Court condemned the phrasing as an archaic, morally loaded expression that tends to shame victims and cannot substitute for proof of consent; the Court refused to treat such wording as exculpatory.

On delay, the Court applied established principles that delay must be judged contextually; captivity explained the delay, and normal rules of delay in FIR do not rigidly apply to rape cases. The Court also affirmed the Trial and High Court assessments of credibility: the prosecutrix’s chief-examination narrative remained unimpeached despite lengthy cross-examination. On sentencing, the Court found no mitigating circumstances to reduce the minimum statutory terms and declined to apply leniency despite long interim bail periods. Concurrent findings were therefore unassailable and appeals dismissed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The legal core holding is that where the prosecution proves the victim was a minor at the relevant time, consent is legally irrelevant and the offence constitutes statutory rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC. Evidence of minority may be established by a combination of dental opinion, school records and guardian’s deposition.

Further, repeated sexual acts effected by detaining a girl under threats cannot be regarded as consensual; contextual factors (captivity, threats, frequency and duration of assault) negate voluntariness. For delay, captivity and inability to report lawfully excuse delay in lodging FIR. The medical phrase “accustomed to sexual intercourse” has no bearing on consent or guilt and must not be used to stigmatise or negate criminal responsibility.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court’s observations that terminology like “accustomed to sexual intercourse” is archaic and harmful constitute notable obiter. The bench underscored the social harm of moralising medical expressions and called for cautious, non-prejudicial interpretation of medical language.

The Court also observed, by way of guidance, that absence of external injuries should not be given undue weight where offences are continuous and medical examinations delayed. These remarks, while not strictly necessary for the result, urge courts and medical practitioners to contextualise forensic findings sensitively.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. Age determination should rely on contemporaneous documents (school records, transfer certificates) supported by specialist opinion (dental surgeon) where required.
ii. Once minority is established, the question of consent becomes legally immaterial for Section 376(2)(g).
iii. Medical terms with moral overtones must not be permitted to displace or diminish the probative value of testimony; courts must critically evaluate such phrasing.
iv. Delay in lodging FIR in sexual offence cases must be examined against the factual matrix — captivity, threats, or lack of means to report can justify delay.
v. Absence of visible injuries is not determinative; the temporal gap between assault and examination is crucial.
vi. Credibility of prosecutrix must be tested by overall consistency and probabilities; unimpeached chief-examination is powerful evidence.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is a reaffirmation of victim-centric principles in sexual offence jurisprudence: proof of minority converts the offence into statutory rape and excludes consent as a defence; factual captivity and threats eliminate any realistic inference of voluntary sexual relations; delayed FIRs must be understood through the victim’s circumstances. The Court’s rejection of the tainted medical phraseology is both legally and socially significant it discourages reliance on archaic notions of sexual “purity” to impeach credibility.

For trial courts, the decision reiterates the permissible harmonisation of documentary and medical evidence in age determination and the limited weight to be given to absence of injuries where offences are prolonged. Sentence confirmation signals a reluctance to temper punishments in serious sexual offences absent clear mitigating circumstances. The judgment thus strengthens doctrinal clarity on consent, minority and evidential assessment in gang-rape prosecutions and provides practical guidance for courts and forensic practitioners to avoid language and reasoning that demeans victims.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hiribhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 (referred in relation to the reliability of sole prosecutrix testimony).

ii. Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1821 : 2025 INSC 392 (judgment analysed).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g), 71.