RAMJI LAL MODI vs. THE STATE OF U.P.

Case Analysis

RAMJI LAL MODI vs. THE STATE OF U.P.

May 2, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957 AIR 620, 1957 SCR 860) critically addressed the constitutional validity of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, a provision penalising malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings. The petitioner, Ramji Lal Modi, challenged his conviction under Section 295A, arguing that it infringed upon his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The central legal question was whether this restriction qualified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2). The Supreme Court held that Section 295A was constitutionally valid because it aimed at maintaining public order, which falls squarely under the permitted grounds for restriction under Article 19(2). The Court emphasized that only those acts done with a “deliberate and malicious intention” to outrage religious sentiments fall within the scope of the section. The Court further clarified that the statute, due to its narrow focus, could not be misused to suppress legitimate freedom of expression. Hence, the petition was dismissed and the constitutional legitimacy of Section 295A was upheld.

Keywords: Section 295A IPC, Freedom of Speech, Article 19(2), Religious Sentiments, Reasonable Restriction

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of Uttar Pradesh

ii) Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 252 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date: 5 April 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das C.J., Jafer Imam J., S.K. Das J., Govinda Menon J., A.K. Sarkar J.

vi) Author: Chief Justice S.R. Das

vii) Citation: AIR 1957 SC 620, (1957) SCR 860

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 295A IPC, Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Freedom of Expression, Religious Offences

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case emerged at a time when post-independence India was grappling with the scope of freedom of speech in the backdrop of religious sensitivities. The petitioner, Ramji Lal Modi, published an article in a magazine called Gaurakshak, allegedly containing offensive content against the Muslim community. The State charged him under Sections 153A and 295A of the IPC. He was acquitted under Section 153A, but convicted under Section 295A. The case reached the Supreme Court via a petition under Article 32, invoking the violation of fundamental rights. The petitioner asserted that Section 295A contravened his freedom under Article 19(1)(a) and could not be justified under Article 19(2) unless it directly aimed to protect public order. The Court had to determine whether the section was a “reasonable restriction” under the Constitution, especially after the first constitutional amendment which added “public order” as a valid ground for limiting free speech.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Ramji Lal Modi, was the editor, publisher, and printer of a magazine named Gaurakshak, which promoted cow protection. In November 1952, the magazine published an article interpreted as deliberately offensive towards Muslim religious sentiments. In response to a previous incident involving a cartoon in the newspaper Amrit Patrika, which led to protests by the Muslim community, the government ordered the petitioner’s prosecution under Section 295A IPC. The District Magistrate initiated the case in June 1953, and the Sessions Judge of Kanpur convicted the petitioner in November 1953, sentencing him to 18 months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging both his conviction and the validity of the legal provision under which he was prosecuted.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?

ii) Whether the section qualifies as a “reasonable restriction” under Article 19(2) in the interest of public order?

iii) Whether the impugned provision can be used arbitrarily, thereby invalidating its constitutional protection?

F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Section 295A IPC imposed a blanket restriction on freedom of speech. The petitioner contended that even though the impugned article may have offended religious feelings, it did not necessarily lead to public disorder. Therefore, the section exceeded the scope of permissible limitations under Article 19(2). They argued that mere insult to religion, without a proximate connection to public disorder, could not justify penal action. They invoked Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [(1950) SCR 594] and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi [(1950) SCR 605], where the Court had held that restrictions must be proximate and not remote to public order[1].

They further argued that the statute was overbroad and non-severable, thereby making it possible to use it beyond the scope of permissible constitutional limitations. They cited Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. [(1950) SCR 759], where the Court had struck down legislation on similar grounds of overbreadth[2]. The counsel submitted that the intention requirement in Section 295A was insufficient to prevent misuse.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that Section 295A IPC was narrowly tailored to criminalise only those acts done with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings. The State argued that the section falls squarely within the realm of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), especially after the constitutional amendment that inserted “in the interests of public order”.

They submitted that public order is deeply interlinked with religious peace, and publications intentionally offending religious sentiments could spark violence and riots. The State invoked Articles 25 and 26, which themselves are subject to public order, implying a legislative interest in maintaining religious harmony. The respondent also cited Debi Soron v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 Pat 254, to show that laws not directly aimed at public order can still be protected under Article 19(2) if they have a tendency to disturb it[3].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code: Penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings by insulting religion or religious beliefs of any class of citizens. Link

ii) Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution: Guarantees freedom of speech and expression.

iii) Article 19(2) of the Constitution: Allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions on speech in the interests of public order, decency, morality, and other grounds.

iv) Articles 25 and 26: Provide freedom of religion, subject to public order, morality, and health. Link

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that Section 295A IPC was constitutionally valid as it penalised only deliberate and malicious insults to religion, which have a clear tendency to disturb public order. The Court distinguished the present case from earlier precedents by emphasizing that intentionality was a built-in safeguard against arbitrary use.

The Court ruled that the expression “in the interests of” under Article 19(2) significantly widened the State’s power to restrict speech, compared to the phrase “for maintenance of public order.” Therefore, even if a law does not directly preserve order but aims at actions that can potentially disrupt it, it qualifies as a reasonable restriction[4].

The Court also noted that since Section 295A applied only to the aggravated form of speech—malicious and deliberate insults—it was not overbroad and hence not subject to severability concerns. Therefore, reliance on Romesh Thappar, Brij Bhushan, and Chintaman Rao was misplaced.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court observed that it would be absurd to suggest that insults to religion have no relation to public disorder, particularly in a pluralistic society like India. The judges emphasized that religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26 is itself subject to public order, which legitimizes penal provisions like Section 295A.

c. GUIDELINES

While the Court did not issue any separate guidelines, it clarified key interpretative thresholds for constitutional scrutiny:

The phrase “in the interests of public order” must be interpreted broadly.
The provision must involve deliberate and malicious intent to be valid under Article 19(2).
Not every restriction under a statute is unconstitutional if it includes safeguards against misuse.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court, in Ramji Lal Modi, laid down a landmark interpretation of freedom of speech in relation to religious sensitivities. By upholding the narrow construction of Section 295A IPC, the Court achieved a balanced approach—protecting both freedom of expression and religious harmony. This decision remains pivotal in shaping India’s jurisprudence on hate speech and blasphemy.

The judgment has enduring relevance in contemporary debates on religious intolerance, free press, and hate speech laws. It articulates the constitutional boundaries within which secular governance can operate in a multi-faith democracy. While the judgment confirms that expression is not absolute, it simultaneously insists on malicious intent as a necessary prerequisite for criminal liability, thus safeguarding legitimate dissent and critique.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594.
[2] Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, (1950) SCR 605.
[3] Debi Soron v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 Pat 254.
[4] Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., (1950) SCR 759.

b. Important Statutes Referred