A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra allowed the criminal appeals and set aside the conviction and death sentence imposed for the rape and murder of a child aged 3 years and 9 months. Proceeding on a record built entirely on circumstantial evidence—last seen together, extra-judicial confession, and an FSL soil-similarity opinion—the Court found the investigation shabby, perfunctory, and tainted.

The statements of key “last seen” witnesses were recorded belatedly; their conduct was unnatural; and their depositions bore wholesale improvements. The supposed confession surfaced only after leading questions and contradicted the witness’s earlier s. 164 CrPC statement. The recoveries were doubtful; the DNA and serology reports were inconclusive; and the soil-similarity opinion lacked source-specificity. Reiterating the Sharad Birdhichand Sharda tests for conviction on circumstantial evidence, the Court held the chain incomplete and exonerated the appellant after twelve years’ incarceration, including six years under a confirmed threat of capital punishment.

The judgment sharply censures investigative lapses, draws adverse inferences for withholding material scientific reports, and underscores that courts cannot bridge evidentiary gaps with conjectures merely because the crime is heinous. Held: conviction and sentence unsustainable; appeals allowed; appellant acquitted.

Keywords: last seen together; extra-judicial confession; circumstantial evidence; DNA profiling; soil comparison; s. 302 IPC; s. 376(2) IPC; POCSO ss. 4 & 8; death sentence; investigative lapses.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The prosecution narrative arose from the disappearance, on 30 September 2013, of a three-year-nine-month-old child from Thane, followed by the recovery of her body from a muddy pond about one kilometre from a watchmen’s chawl on 02 October 2013. An FIR under s. 363 IPC was registered; by trial’s end, charges had expanded to ss. 302, 376(2)(i), 201 IPC and ss. 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act, 2013.

The case rested exclusively on circumstantial links: (i) last seen together based on PW-9, PW-14, PW-15; (ii) an alleged extra-judicial confession before PW-17; and (iii) an FSL opinion (Exh. 105) that soil stuck to the appellant’s shoes was similar in characteristics to soil at the pond where the body was found.

The trial court convicted and imposed death under s. 302 IPC, with additional sentences under s. 376(2)(i) IPC, s. 363 IPC, and s. 201 IPC, later affirmed by the High Court. On special leave, the Supreme Court re-examined the evidentiary scaffolding through the lens of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, emphasizing that circumstances must form a complete chain consistent only with guilt and excluding every hypothesis consistent with innocence.

The Court recorded grave defects: late recording of pivotal statements under s. 161 CrPC; absence of test identification parade; no timely documentation of the so-called last-seen facts in the spot panchnama (Exh. 30); contradictions between s. 164 CrPC and in-court testimony on the alleged confession; inconclusive DNA and serology; and questionable recoveries under s. 27 Evidence Act. The Court thus held the chain broken, found the investigation perfunctory, and acquitted.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant PW-1, a painter residing at Old Waghbil Gaon, Banjari Chawl, Thane (W), left home around 10:30 a.m. on 30.09.2013; his mother had gone to fetch water; the child was alone and came out to play with the family dog. On returning at 10:45 a.m., PW-1 did not find the child or dog, initiated a frantic search, and visited the adjacent watchmen’s chawl, where the dog was seen but not the child.

Suspicion of kidnapping triggered a report at PS Kasarvadavali and registration of Crime No. I-306/2013 under s. 363 IPC. API Lokre (PW-16) prepared a spot panchnama (Exh. 30) on 01.10.2013 (07:30–08:45 a.m.), recording, inter alia, names of persons who reportedly saw the child with the dog at sequential times that morning, yet without any mention that the child was seen with the appellant.

On 02.10.2013, the child’s decomposed body was recovered from a muddy pond behind Unnati Woods; an inquest and seizure of pond water and earth were drawn; the corpse was sent to Civil Hospital, Thane and then to J.J. Hospital for autopsy by a board led by PW-11, which noted extensive genital and anal injuries, contusions on the skull, and liquefaction of brain matter; the injuries were ante-mortem and head injury sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death (Exh. 58). On 03.10.2013, DSP Dharmadhikari (PW-18) took over investigation and arrested the appellant; medical examination noted an abrasion on the foreskin.

The prosecution claimed room no. 2 of the chawl as the crime scene, cited recoveries from room no. 4 (lungi, banyan, uniform, shoes) on 08.10.2013, and relied on Exh. 105 opining similarity between soil on shoes and pond soil; DNA and serology (Exh. 99), however, were inconclusive or could not fix source.

The State projected three links—last seen, confession to PW-17, and soil match. The defence highlighted investigative gaps and contradictions, particularly the late s. 161 statements of PW-9 and PW-14 on 03.10.2013, absence of TIP, doubtful recoveries, and withholding of FSL reports of other watchmen’s samples.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances consistent only with the appellant’s guilt under ss. 302, 376(2)(i), 363, 201 IPC and ss. 4 & 8 POCSO, applying the fivefold tests in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda (1984) 4 SCC 116?*

ii. *Whether the “last seen together” evidence of PW-9, PW-14, PW-15—recorded belatedly and marked by improvements—could be relied upon without a test identification parade and in the face of omissions in the spot panchnama (Exh. 30)**?

iii. Whether the alleged extra-judicial confession to PW-17—contradicted by the witness’s earlier s. 164 CrPC statement—could singularly or cumulatively support conviction?

iv. Whether the FSL “soil similarity” opinion and inconclusive DNA/serology sufficed to link the appellant to the crime scene, especially when the State withheld other watchmen’s comparison reports, inviting an adverse inference?

v. Whether the investigative lapses—delayed statements, doubtful recoveries under s. 27 Evidence Act, absence of scene-of-crime logic—vitiated the prosecution case and mandated acquittal?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the entire edifice is circumstantial and crumbles against the Sharad Birdhichand Sharda matrix. The “last seen” theory is unbelievable: PW-9 and PW-14 knew of the disappearance on 30.09.2013, saw police presence on 30.09., 01.10., 02.10., yet disclosed nothing until 03.10.2013, when PW-18 first recorded their s. 161 CrPC statements.

The spot panchnama (Exh. 30)—drawn early on 01.10.2013—does not capture any assertion of the child being seen with the appellant, only that she was seen with a dog, undermining the State’s last-seen claim. No TIP was conducted; conduct is unnatural; depositions show “wholesale improvements,” particularly PW-14 vis-à-vis his s. 164 CrPC (Exh. 94) statement which never mentioned seeing the child with the appellant.

The alleged extra-judicial confession is even weaker: PW-17’s s. 164 statement (Exh. 78) shows no confession; only after leading questions did he speak of a “mistake,” an equivocal assertion insufficient in law. Scientific evidence is exculpatory: DNA/serology (Exh. 99) do not connect the appellant; FSL soil-similarity (Exh. 105) is merely suggestive, not source-specific, and soil of that kind could be prevalent locally.

Reports for the other watchmen’s samples—admittedly taken—were withheld, inviting an adverse inference. Recoveries on 08.10.2013 are doubtful: the appellant remained free until 03.10., making it implausible he preserved incriminating clothing; PW-16 had already visited the chawl on 01.10.—if the items were present, they would not have escaped notice. The arrest lacked foundation; the State cannot substitute suspicion for proof, particularly in a capital case.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State urged that the chain is complete. Motive is inferable from opportunity and circumstances; the child was last seen near the chawl; PW-9 and PW-14 placed the appellant proximate in time and space; PW-15 noticed the tied dog and heard a pointed query addressed to the appellant—“the dog is here, where is the child?”—supporting a nexus.

The extra-judicial confession to PW-17, though a weak form, gains strength cumulatively with other links. The scientific material is corroborative: the soil adhering to the appellant’s shoes matched, in physio-chemical and spectro-chemical characteristics, soil at the pond where the body was discovered; recoveries were made pursuant to information admissible to the extent permitted by s. 27 Evidence Act; the abrasion on the appellant’s foreskin is consistent with sexual assault.

The investigation, while imperfect, was materially fair: search operations were immediate; photographs and wireless alerts issued; the post-mortem and seizure of scene articles were prompt. Concurrent findings by the trial court and High Court, affirmed on re-appreciation, should not be disturbed in Art. 136 jurisdiction; the crime’s heinousness and the vulnerability of the victim justify the death penalty under the “rarest of rare” doctrine.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860—ss. 302 (murder), 376(2)(i) (aggravated rape), 363 (kidnapping), 201 (causing disappearance of evidence).
ii. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2013—ss. 4 (penetrative sexual assault), 8 (punishment for sexual assault).
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—ss. 161 (examination by police), 164 (recording of confessions/statements).
iv. Indian Evidence Act, 1872—s. 27 (discovery statement), principles governing extra-judicial confession (judge-made law).
v. Constitution of India—Art. 136 (special leave to appeal).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Court prefaced its analysis by restating the Sharad Birdhichand Sharda (1984) 4 SCC 116 five-condition test for convictions based solely on circumstances: each incriminating circumstance must be fully established; the totality must point unerringly to guilt, exclude every other hypothesis, and form a complete chain. Applying this, the Court dismantled the State’s three links.

On last seen, the conduct of PW-9 and PW-14 was decisive: both knew of the search and police presence on 30.09., 01.10., and 02.10., yet neither disclosed their crucial assertions until 03.10.2013 when PW-18 first recorded their s. 161 statements. The spot panchnama (Exh. 30), prepared at 7:30–8:45 a.m. on 01.10.2013, names persons who saw the child with a dog but does not mention the child with the appellant, a telling omission. PW-14 made “blatant wholesale improvements”: his s. 164 CrPC (Exh. 94) statement never mentioned seeing the child with the appellant, yet his in-court testimony did.

PW-15 did not depose to seeing the child with the appellant; the unidentified “long-haired person” remark lacked probative anchor. No test identification parade was held. The Court held the “last seen” pillar vacillating, shaky, and unworthy of credence. On extra-judicial confession, the Court noted PW-17’s s. 164 (Exh. 78) contained no confession; only on leading questions did he speak of a “mistake,” which, in any case, is equivocal and bereft of particulars.

His delay in informing police further eroded reliability. On scientific evidence, DNA/serology (Exh. 99) were inconclusive and did not incriminate the appellant. The soil-similarity (Exh. 105) opinion was not source-specific and could not exclude other proximate soils; crucially, the State withheld comparison reports of other watchmen’s samples, inviting an adverse inference.

The Court also found the arrest’s foundation lacking; the recoveries—lungi, uniform, shoes on 08.10.2013—were implausible given earlier searches and the appellant’s liberty until 03.10.. In sum, findings of guilt by the courts below were conjectural. Given twelve years’ incarceration and six years under the Damoclean threat of death, the Court quashed conviction and sentences and acquitted the appellant.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

First, where a case rests wholly on circumstantial evidence, conviction is permissible only if each circumstance is proved to the hilt and the chain excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence; mere suspicion, however grave, is no substitute for proof.

The Court expressly relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, extracting the canonical five tests and then applying them to hold the chain incomplete.

Second, “last seen together” is a weak circumstance when unaccompanied by proximity in time, unbroken continuity, and unimpeachable witness conduct; unexplained silence at first opportunity, belated s. 161 statements, and material improvements are fatal.

Third, extra-judicial confession is, at best, a slender reed; contradictions with a witness’s s. 164 CrPC statement and absence of immediate disclosure render it unsafe to base conviction.

Fourth, forensic opinions such as soil-similarity, absent a rigorous source-exclusion methodology and corroborative data (e.g., comparison with other environmental samples), cannot carry the prosecution over the “must be, not may be” threshold, particularly where DNA and serology are inconclusive.

Fifth, withholding material scientific reports invites an adverse inference; investigative lapses—failure to record timely statements, absence of TIP, doubtful s. 27 recoveries—impair the integrity of the case.

Sixth, while the crime’s heinousness shocks conscience, courts cannot fill evidentiary gaps with surmise; capital sentencing cannot rest on a tainted fact-finding foundation. On these combined principles, the appellant was entitled to acquittal.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The judgment contains strong observations that are not strictly necessary for the ultimate acquittal but guide future practice.

One, the Court deprecates the “overzealous approach” of courts below to ensure that “someone must be held responsible,” cautioning that the judicial function is not to search for a scapegoat in hard cases but to test the State’s proof against constitutional standards, especially where the death penalty under s. 302 IPC is in play.

Two, investigative agencies must contemporaneously document leads; when spot panchnamas name potential last-seen witnesses, officers must record their statements at the earliest; unexplained delay corrodes reliability.

Three, in cases involving child victims and sexual offences under POCSO, scientific collection and disclosure duties are heightened: if samples are drawn from multiple suspects (e.g., “15–20 watchmen”), all comparison reports should be placed on record; non-production undermines fairness and invites adverse inference.

Four, the Court underscores the importance of test identification where identity and opportunity are contested and witnesses are casual acquaintances.

Five, recoveries under s. 27 Evidence Act must be tested against the touchstone of plausibility and prior police access; the mere fact of recovery cannot supplant the absence of incriminating biological findings.

Six, prosecutorial reliance on equivocal phrases like “made a mistake” cannot be over-interpreted into confessions; criminal courts must resist embellishment. These dicta reinforce due-process values and prudence in capital prosecutions.

c. GUIDELINES 

The Court’s reasoning yields workable guidelines for investigators and trial courts in circumstantial and child-sexual-offence homicide cases:

(1) Immediate recording of statements: where spot panchnama (Exh. 30) names potential last-seen witnesses, their s. 161 CrPC statements must be recorded forthwith; unexplained delays will weigh against the prosecution.

(2) Document first opportunity conduct: courts should expressly evaluate whether a witness disclosed material facts at the earliest opportunity; non-disclosure without reason dilutes probative value.

(3) Avoid padding and improvements: prosecutors must confront and explain inconsistencies between s. 164 and in-court versions; “wholesale improvements” are red flags.

(4) Ensure TIP where identity/proximity is disputed: especially when witnesses know the accused only by face, failure to hold TIP is a serious infirmity.

(5) Forensics must be source-specific: opinions on soil similarity or analogous trace evidence should be supported by control samples from surrounding locales and robust methodology; failure to exclude other sources renders such opinions merely suggestive.

(6) Disclose all scientific reports: if samples are collected from multiple suspects, all FSL reports must be filed; selective production invites adverse inference.

(7) Corroborate s. 27 recoveries with biology: where biological traces are expected, absence of DNA/serology on recovered clothing or surfaces severely weakens the recovery’s value.

(8) Capital cases demand heightened scrutiny: courts must not allow heinousness to relax standards; conjectures cannot replace proof when s. 302 IPC death sentence is sought.

(9) Reasoned reliance on Sharad tests: judgments must map each circumstance to the five tests and record how alternative hypotheses are excluded. These guidelines, distilled from the Court’s analysis, promote investigative rigor and adjudicative discipline.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision is a rigorous reaffirmation that criminal law’s moral force derives from disciplined proof, not from the gravity of accusation. The Court does not trivialize the horror of the offence; it insists that horror cannot be allowed to warp standards. The State’s case failed on each axis that matters in circumstantial prosecutions.

The “last seen” story collapsed under the weight of human conduct and chronology—the very spot panchnama (Exh. 30) that should have captured a contemporaneous last-seen disclosure did not; PW-9 and PW-14 spoke late and inconsistently; PW-15 added no link. The extra-judicial confession was undone by PW-17’s s. 164 silence and by equivocation in court.

Science, the hoped-for neutral arbiter, did not assist: DNA/serology were inconclusive; soil similarity was methodologically thin and non-exclusionary; the unexplained non-production of other watchmen’s reports compelled an adverse inference. Recoveries were implausible and biologically barren.

In this setting, the Court’s insistence on the Sharad tests is not formalism; it is the constitutional guardrail against wrongful conviction, doubly vital in capital cases. The acquittal, following twelve years of incarceration and six years under the shadow of death, is a somber reminder that investigative shortcuts can cost liberty and nearly life.

The judgment offers a practical blueprint—early documentation, scientific completeness, and probative prudence—for future cases, particularly under POCSO where emotions run high and proof must be higher.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, [1985] 1 SCR 88; (1984) 4 SCC 116.
ii. Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra Etc., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 513; 2025 INSC 702.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860—ss. 302, 363, 376(2)(i), 201.
ii. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2013—ss. 4, 8.
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—ss. 161, 164.
iv. Indian Evidence Act, 1872—s. 27.
v. Constitution of India—Art. 136.