A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal arises from convictions by the trial court and the High Court of Ravi for the murder of his first wife Jamni allegedly by strangulation on 22.08.2014. The prosecution relied principally upon a Zero FIR lodged by the deceased’s brother, contemporaneous panchnama noting ligature marks and a post-mortem opinion of asphyxia caused by hanging, together with investigative recovery of a rope. However, three material witnesses the complainant (Chaina Ram), a neighbouring sister (Rajo) and a cousin (Deep Chand) turned hostile, leaving only formal witnesses: the post-mortem doctor and investigating officers.

The doctor conceded in cross-examination that the cause of death could also be attributable to chronic tuberculosis and that ligature marks might result from post-mortem handling during transport. The investigating officer admitted the recovered rope was of a common, market-available type. Applying the panchsheels of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra and the guidance on s.106 Evidence Act from Anees v. State Govt. of NCT, the Supreme Court found the prosecution had not established a complete chain of circumstances excluding every hypothesis of innocence.

The courts below had also overlooked the appellant’s s.313 CrPC statement that the deceased suffered chronic tuberculosis and had been treated at Beas Hospital a fact the prosecution did not probe by re-examining the post-mortem doctor. Given the presence of two plausible, conflicting inferences, benefit of doubt was held to lie with the appellant; the convictions were set aside and the appellant ordered released.

Keywords: Murder, Circumstantial evidence, Burden of proof, Strangulation, Hostile witness, Section 313 CrPC, Section 106 Evidence Act.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The criminal proceedings centre on the death of Jamni on 22.08.2014 while she was residing with her husband Ravi, his second wife Soma, and their children in a jhuggi at Rayya Mandi (Amritsar). A computerized Zero FIR was lodged the same day by the deceased’s brother alleging murder by the husband with the second wife’s connivance, and that a neighbouring sister (Rajo) had witnessed the act. The dead body was transported by the husband to the brother’s native place, with the panchnama and post-mortem thereafter indicating ligature marks and a cause of death recorded as asphyxia due to hanging.

Trial courts convicted the husband on circumstantial evidence. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the prosecution’s oral narrative weakened as three key witnesses recanted or disclaimed knowledge and were declared hostile. The prosecution’s remaining proof comprised the post-mortem doctor’s opinion and investigative recovery of a rope. The doctor, however, conceded possibilities inconsistent with homicidal asphyxia specifically that chronic tuberculosis could cause death and that ligature marks might arise from transport. The investigating officer accepted that the recovered rope was a commonly available item.

The appellant’s s.313 CrPC statement explicitly pleaded that the deceased had chronic tuberculosis and had been treated at Beas Hospital; this point was not tested by re-examination or independent medical proof. The Court’s task therefore became one of evaluating whether the circumstantial matrix excluded all reasonable hypotheses of innocence and whether the prosecution had discharged its initial onus before any presumption under s.106 Evidence Act could operate. Bench authorities on circumstantial proof and caution in invoking s.106 framed the analytical lens.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Jamni lived with the appellant Ravi, his second wife Soma, and two sons in a jhuggi at Rayya Mandi for more than a decade. On 22.08.2014 she was found dead; the deceased’s brother Chaina Ram lodged a Zero FIR alleging that the husband had murdered her by strangulation with a rope, in conspiracy with the second wife, and that Rajo, a neighbouring sister, had seen the killing but was threatened into silence. The husband transported the dead body to the brother’s village in a truck; panchnama noted ligature marks and tongue protrusion.

Post-mortem by Dr. Mohan Lal Meena recorded ligature marks and opined death by asphyxia caused by hanging, with a time-since-death estimate of two to five days. At trial, Chaina Ram admitted signing the computerized FIR but claimed ignorance of contents and testified that the sister died of illness, thereby becoming hostile. Rajo likewise denied witnessing foul play and attributed death to breathing problems. Deep Chand (cousin) disclaimed knowledge. These three recantations left only the doctor and investigating officers as substantive witnesses. In cross-examination the doctor conceded that chronic tuberculosis could cause the observed asphyxia and that ligature marks might be an artefact of transport.

The investigator recovered a rope per appellant’s disclosure but acknowledged such ropes were commonly sold. The appellant, in his s.313 statement, asserted the deceased’s long-term treatment for chronic tuberculosis at Beas Hospital. The prosecution did not re-examine medical or hospital records to verify that claim. The High Court convicted; this appeal challenged the adequacy and conclusiveness of circumstantial proof and the lower courts’ alleged failure to consider the s.313 answer and the hostilities.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the prosecution, relying on circumstantial evidence, had established a chain of facts excluding every reasonable hypothesis of the appellant’s innocence?

2. Whether the recantation/hostility of primary witnesses fatally undermines the prosecution’s case when only formal witnesses remain?

3. Whether the testimony of the post-mortem doctor, conceding alternate medical causes and transport-related marks, could sustain a conviction for homicidal strangulation beyond reasonable doubt?

4. Whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act could shift any burden to the appellant in the absence of a prima facie case made out by the prosecution?

5. Whether the courts below erred in ignoring or not testing the appellant’s s.313 CrPC statement that the deceased suffered from chronic tuberculosis?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial material which failed the panchsheels test. They emphasized that three vital witnesses turned hostile and formally contradicted the allegations; consequently the remaining evidence the post-mortem and police testimony was insufficient and equivocal. It was contended that the post-mortem doctor himself admitted in cross-examination that chronic tuberculosis could explain death and ligature marks might result from transport, thereby negating a conclusive finding of homicidal asphyxia.

The appellant’s s.313 statement that the deceased had been treated at Beas Hospital for tuberculosis was a specific factual plea that the prosecution ought to have tested by re-examining the doctor or producing hospital records. Reliance on a recovered rope was weak because the rope type was common and its forensic link to the alleged offence was not established. It was argued that s.106 Evidence Act could not be deployed to make up for the prosecution’s failure to prove essential elements and that, on the totality, benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the presence of ligature marks, the post-mortem opinion of asphyxia, the transport of the dead body by the appellant to the complainant’s village and the recovery of a rope on disclosure cumulatively pointed towards guilt. It was argued that where the occurrence takes place within the four walls of a dwelling (a jhuggi), s.106 Evidence Act places a corresponding burden on the person in occupation to explain suspicious circumstances; accordingly the appellant ought to have given a cogent explanation. The State urged that hostile recantations by eyewitnesses did not obliterate the documentary and medical evidence which supported conviction in a circumstantial case.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 106, Evidence Act, 1872 — burden of proving fact especially within knowledge of party.
ii. Section 313, CrPC, 1973 — power to question accused on case-related facts; answers may be considered.
iii. Principles from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 — five panchsheels of circumstantial proof.
iv. Guidance from Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT (2024) SCC OnLine SC 757 — caution in invoking s.106; prosecution must first make out a prima facie case.
v. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — relevant sections for homicide (criminal culpability; specific section not reproduced in record).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed admissible evidence after discounting the three hostile witnesses and found the remaining proofs inadequate to exclude every hypothesis of innocence. The post-mortem evidence was read with caution: though the doctor opined asphyxia caused by hanging and documented ligature marks, he admitted that similar appearances could result from chronic tuberculosis and that ligature marks could be produced or accentuated by the long journey the corpse undertook. The investigator’s testimony established recovery of a rope but conceded such ropes were commonly available, and there was no forensic linkage proving it was the instrument of crime.

The Court reiterated the five tests from Sharad Sarda and observed that the circumstances did not coalesce into a complete and unbroken chain; rather they permitted competing inferences. On burden, the Court relied on Anees to stress that s.106 Evidence Act operates only after the prosecution has prima facie established facts from which guilt may be inferred; it cannot fill evidentiary gaps left by the prosecution.

The appellant’s s.313 answer disclosed a concrete medical explanation (chronic tuberculosis at Beas Hospital) that the prosecution failed to probe by re-examining the post-mortem doctor or producing hospital records a lapse fatal to the prosecution’s case. Taking these factors cumulatively, the Court concluded that convictions could not be sustained beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court judgment was set aside, the appeal allowed, and the appellant released from custody after noting prolonged detention.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle applied is that in circumstantial cases the prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances excluding all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence as per Sharad Sarda. Where primary eyewitnesses turn hostile, remaining formal evidence must itself be cogent and conclusive; equivocal medical opinion or unreliably sourced physical evidence will not suffice.

Section 106 Evidence Act cannot be invoked to shift the onus onto the accused unless the prosecution first makes out a prima facie case. An accused’s specific statement under s.313 CrPC asserting an alternative medical cause for death imposes a duty on the prosecution to test that assertion by appropriate re-examination or independent proof; failure to do so weakens the case materially. Given these, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed, as guidance, that computerized Zero FIRs bearing signatures require careful scrutiny when the signer disclaims knowledge of contents. The Bench commented that post-mortem findings must be probed in light of transport, decomposition and comorbid medical conditions; courts must treat such forensic evidence with circumspection when alternative medical causes are plausible. The Bench also emphasised judicial appreciation for the difficulties of prosecutions where witnesses turn hostile and recognised the limits of relying upon s.106 to remedy investigative deficiencies.

c. GUIDELINES

i. Where witnesses originally supporting prosecution turn hostile, courts must reassess whether remaining evidence independently sustains conviction.
ii. A post-mortem opinion that acknowledges alternative causes of death requires corroborative medical or documentary proof before supporting a finding of homicidal asphyxia.
iii. s.106 Evidence Act should be applied only after prosecution establishes facts from which guilt is a reasonable inference.
iv. If an accused, in s.313 CrPC, provides specific factual averments (e.g., prior illness, hospital treatment), the prosecution should re-examine medical witnesses or produce hospital records to counter that averment.
v. Recovery of commonplace objects (e.g., common ropes) requires forensic linking to the offence; mere recovery on disclosure is weak without such linkage.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision underscores rigorous application of circumstantial-evidence principles and caution against convicting on equivocal forensic testimony or common-place recoveries unsupported by scientific linkage. The Court carefully balanced the risk of wrongful conviction against public interest in punishment by insisting upon exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The ruling reiterates procedural fairness obligations: when an accused raises a specific factual explanation in s.313 CrPC, the State must actively test that explanation; passive reliance on initial medical reports without follow-up weakens the prosecution’s case.

From a policy perspective the judgment promotes forensic diligence (forensic linkage, hospital records, re-examination) and judicial skepticism where key eyewitnesses recant. Academically, Ravi v. State of Punjab is a compact exposition on interplay among s.313 CrPC, s.106 Evidence Act and the Sharad Sarda panchsheels; it will aid practitioners in framing investigative steps to shore up circumstantial prosecutions and inform defence strategy when hospital treatment and natural disease are plausible alternative causes. The order to release the appellant after prolonged incarceration also reflects the remedial role of the courts in correcting potential miscarriages of justice when evidence proves equivocal.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116.
ii. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681.
iii. Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 757.
iv. Ravi v. The State of Punjab, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 526 : 2025 INSC 170 (present judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860.
ii. Evidence Act, 1872 (esp. s.106).
iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (esp. s.313).