A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

In Renuka Prasad v. The State represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police, the Supreme Court of India set aside a High Court conviction under s.302 read with s.120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860, restoring the Trial Court’s acquittal where 71 of 87 witnesses, including the eye-witnesses, turned hostile. The Court held that the High Court impermissibly built guilt on the testimony of investigating officers that merely echoed s.161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 statements, contrary to s.162 CrPC. It reiterated that what surfaces in investigation must be proved at trial by admissible evidence and cannot be substituted by an investigating officer’s narrative or by “voluntary statements” of accused barred by ss.25–26, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, save the narrow carve-out of s.27 Evidence Act which is confined to information distinctly relating to a discovered fact. On facts, alleged recoveries of cash, clothes, and machetes were either unlinked to the crime or flowed from a co-accused’s disclosure that did not connect the objects to the assailants.

The alleged sites of conspiracy and money transfer pointed out by A1 yielded no discovery and were therefore inadmissible. The Court emphasized that TIP failures and in-court non-identification by PW8 (the deceased’s son) and other proximate witnesses left the prosecution without foundational proof. Relying on Pulukuri Kottaya, Kashmira Singh, Haricharan Kurmi, Chandrappa, and allied precedents, the Court concluded that there were not even “two views” from the evidence; only one—the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Convictions based on IO testimony founded on s.161 statements and on inadmissible confessional material were declared unsustainable.

Keywords: Appeal against acquittal; s.161–162 CrPC; ss.25–27 & 30 Evidence Act; hostile witnesses; conspiracy; recovery and discovery; standard for appellate reversal of acquittal; presumption of innocence.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The decision addresses a recurring prosecutorial impasse where hostility of witnesses at trial collides with investigative narratives. The Trial Court acquitted A1–A7 after most lay witnesses, including those marshalled to prove motive, conspiracy, and preparation, resiled from s.161 CrPC statements. The High Court, reversing the acquittal, convicted A1–A6 for murder under s.302 read with s.120B IPC, relying predominantly on investigating officers’ depositions that repeated what witnesses allegedly stated during investigation and on “voluntary statements” of accused that were treated as corroborative.

The Supreme Court framed the review within Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, emphasizing that appellate courts may reappraise evidence but must remain circumspect; the presumption of innocence fortified by acquittal cannot be displaced by conjecture or by inadmissible materials masquerading as proof. The Court also confronted the misuse of s.27 Evidence Act, clarifying—on the strength of Pulukuri Kottaya, Navjot Sandhu, Om Prakash, and Damu—that only information distinctly relating to a discovered fact is provable, and even then, the discovered object must be linked to the crime by independent evidence.

The alleged recoveries of cash, clothes, machetes, and a motorcycle/pick-up van failed this test; the sites of conspiracy pointed out by A1 yielded no discovery at all, attracting the bar of ss.25–26 Evidence Act. The TIP returned no identification, and PW8—the teenage son who saw his father fall—did not identify the assailants in court. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal, holding that there were not two views but only one: non-proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The homicide occurred at about 7:45 pm on 28.04.2011. The deceased, earlier employed with an educational institution that later fell to A1’s share after a family division, had resigned and joined PW4’s institution, allegedly stoking sibling rivalry between A1 and PW4. The prosecution theory was that A1, aided by employees A2–A4 and through A7 (an advocate), hired A5 and A6 as contract killers. It was alleged that A5 and A6 emerged from bushes, hacked the deceased in front of his son PW8, and fled on foot; the victim died at 8:40 pm in hospital. PW8 lodged the first information statement (FIS). The investigation invoked an expansive witness list (87 witnesses), but 71—including eye-witnesses and panch witnesses—turned hostile. PW8 identified only the deceased’s spectacles (MO6) and mobile (MO7), but failed to identify either assailant or the weapons, and no TIP or in-court identification succeeded. PW1 and PW9, who reached the spot immediately, gave truncated accounts at trial; PW1 denied presence, and PW9 saw one person running but made no identification.

The supposed motive, evidenced by an alleged letter (MO40) by PW4 to his father about A1’s conduct, was denied by PW4 when confronted. The State relied on recoveries: cash from A2–A6, and, based on A3’s disclosure, seizure of machetes (MO10, MO11) and clothes (MO12–MO15) alleged to belong to A5 and A6, from Amarajyothi Farms connected to A1; but ownership of the farm was not proved and no independent link to the crime emerged. A1 purportedly pointed to two sites where conspiracy and money transfer allegedly occurred, but nothing was discovered therefrom.

The post-mortem indicated death by ante-mortem cutting wounds, and FSL found O-group blood on seized clothes/weapons; yet no fit-verification of clothes for A5/A6 was performed and the FSL results were not linked to identified assailants. The Trial Court acquitted all; the High Court convicted A1–A6 under s.302/120B IPC; the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and restored acquittal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal by relying on investigating officers’ testimony that merely reproduced witnesses’ s.161 CrPC statements, contrary to s.162 CrPC?

ii. Whether the alleged recoveries and disclosures satisfied the strict requirements of s.27 Evidence Act and were independently connected to the crime and the accused, especially A5–A6?

iii. Whether confessional materials or pointing-out of sites by A1, absent discovery, could be used either as substantive evidence or through s.30 Evidence Act against co-accused?

iv. Whether, on the totality of admissible evidence, this was a case of “two reasonable views,” warranting deference to the acquittal per Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka?

v. Whether hostility and non-identification by PW8, PW1, and PW9 fatally undermined the prosecution’s case on identity and participation?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants contended that the High Court’s conviction rests on an impermissible pedestal—IO testimony that recites alleged s.161 statements and “voluntary statements” of accused, despite the clear embargo under s.162 CrPC and ss.25–26 Evidence Act. They stressed that PW8, the crucial eye-witness and son of the deceased, failed to identify the assailants in TIP and in court, and PW1–PW9 did not connect any accused; hence identity was unproved. The alleged motive through MO40 (PW4’s purported letter) lacked proof when PW4 denied authorship in court; marking through an IO could not cure proof deficits. On recoveries, counsel argued that cash seizures were mere s.102 CrPC seizures without bank-source tracing, proper inventory, or linkage to the alleged conspiracy.

The clothes and machetes flowed from A3’s disclosure—A3 was an alleged conspirator, not an assailant—and there was no independent evidence that A5–A6 handed those objects to A3. No fit verification of clothing was undertaken; the FSL report showing O-group blood could not by itself implicate A5–A6 absent identity proof. They invoked Pulukuri Kottaya to maintain that s.27 admissibility is confined to information distinctly relating to discovery and does not render narratives of past user/history admissible; even discovered objects require aliunde evidence to link them to the crime.

They also relied on Kashmira Singh and Haricharan Kurmi to rebut the High Court’s use of s.30 Evidence Act without other independent evidence capable of sustaining guilt. Finally, Chandrappa was pressed to argue that reversing an acquittal demands scrupulous adherence to presumption of innocence, and where witnesses have turned hostile, mere investigative narratives cannot substitute trial-level proof beyond reasonable doubt.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State urged that despite hostility, the Court may rely on credible police testimony, invoking State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh to assert that recoveries and seizures need not be distrusted merely because independent panch witnesses turned hostile. It argued that cash seizures from A2–A6, coupled with A1’s pointing-out of conspiracy and money-exchange sites, and A3’s disclosure leading to machetes/clothes recovery, formed a cogent chain of circumstantial evidence indicative of conspiracy under s.120B IPC and murder under s.302 IPC. The FSL report finding O-group blood on clothes and machetes was said to align with O+ group of the deceased in the post-mortem, and the absence of matching by DNA or group subgrouping was urged to be non-fatal when considered with circumstantial links.

The State relied on Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, Raja v. State of Haryana, and John Pandian v. State to buttress that recoveries under s.27 and incriminating circumstances may sustain conviction even if pancha witnesses turn hostile, provided police testimony is otherwise trustworthy. The State also suggested that wholesale hostility might reflect accused-driven influence, and urged that the appellate court could justifiably rely on IO evidence in the absence of civilian cooperation, particularly where Tip failures can occur due to trauma or fear and do not ipso facto exculpate.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. s.302 r/w s.120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Punishment for murder; criminal conspiracy linkage for common design.

ii. ss.161–162, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Police statements of witnesses; embargo on substantive use save contradiction; limited exceptions.

iii. ss.25–27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Bar on confessions to police or in police custody, with narrow discovery exception under s.27 confined to information distinctly relating to a discovered fact.

iv. s.30, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Confession of co-accused is not “evidence” under s.3; can at best lend assurance where other evidence is otherwise capable of belief.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal. It held that the High Court erred in law and approach by treating as probative the IOs’ depositions which merely affirmed what witnesses purportedly stated under s.161 CrPC, in the teeth of s.162 CrPC, and by leveraging voluntary statements/confession-like assertions of accused in violation of ss.25–26 Evidence Act. The Court distinguished Sunil and Rizwan Khan as decisions on recovery/search credibility rather than substituting s.161 statements for trial evidence.

It reiterated that material revealed in investigation must be proved at trial through admissible oral or documentary evidence; an IO’s belief or narrative about what “came out” during investigation has no evidentiary weight unless witnesses testify to those facts in the witness-box. On identity, PW8, PW1, and PW9 failed to identify the assailants in TIP or in court, and the prosecution did not even confront PW8/PW9 with the recovered clothes MOs 12–15. On motive, MO40 was unproved since PW4 denied authorship; marking via IO could not establish its truth. On recoveries, cash seizures lacked provenance: no bank-source tracing, poor inventory, unidentified call data, and no nexus to the alleged money-for-murder.

The machetes and clothes were recovered on A3’s disclosure—A3 not being an assailant—and no independent link tied those objects to A5–A6; even fit verification of clothing was omitted. A1’s pointing-out of conspiracy/money sites yielded no discovery and thus fell to ss.25–26. The motorcycle/pick-up had no incriminating connection to the attack, especially when the eyewitness narrative was that assailants fled on foot.

The Court, anchoring in Pulukuri Kottaya, Navjot Sandhu, Om Prakash, Damu, Pandurang Kalu Patil, and Kashmira Singh/Haricharan Kurmi, concluded that s.27 had been misapplied and s.30 could not be invoked to bolster an otherwise unproven case. It finally declared there were not two views; only one—the prosecution failed to prove guilt against each accused beyond reasonable doubt.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

First, statements under s.161 CrPC are not substantive evidence, and s.162 CrPC strictly limits their use to contradiction of the maker; IO testimony that repeats or “affirms” such statements cannot substitute sworn trial testimony. Conviction based upon such material is legally unsustainable. Second, voluntary statements/confessions to police are inadmissible by ss.25–26 Evidence Act, and the s.27 exception is narrow: only that portion of the information which distinctly relates to a discovered fact is admissible; past user/history of discovered objects is not, and discovery must be independently connected to the crime to have inculpatory value.

Third, s.30 Evidence Act does not convert a co-accused’s confession (including s.27 portions) into substantive proof; at best, it may lend assurance to otherwise reliable evidence, which was absent here. Fourth, in appeals against acquittal, Chandrappa requires deference to the fortified presumption of innocence, and reversal is unjustified where the State’s case rests on inadmissible materials, hostile witnesses, and unproven links. Fifth, circumstantial evidence must forge an unbroken chain pointing only to guilt; here, cash bundles, clothes, machetes, and vehicles were not linked to the crime or accused by credible evidence.

Sixth, identity being unproved due to TIP failure and non-identification in court, and with PW8’s inability to identify, the bedrock of the case crumbled. On these combined principles, the High Court’s conviction was reversed and the Trial Court’s acquittal restored.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court recorded concern that widespread hostility of witnesses can owe to fear, pressure, social or political influence, or monetary inducement, but warned that judicial frustration cannot relax evidentiary rules: s.161 narratives remain inadmissible save for contradiction, TIP is only investigatory aid and cannot replace in-court identification, and IO predilections—however diligent—cannot construct guilt. The Court emphasized a cautionary approach to police-witness-only cases: while Sunil and Rizwan Khan discourage a colonial distrust of police, their ratios concerned seizure/recovery credibility; they do not license importing hearsay from investigation into the core of proof.

The judgment also reaffirmed that Pulukuri Kottaya is locus classicus on s.27: discovery refers to place and knowledge of concealment, not the object’s past use; and unless the discovered object is connected to the crime through other admissible evidence, it remains a weak link. The Court underscored the ethic of investigation: rather than relying on compelled or barred confessional shortcuts, the police must “go about in the sun hunting up evidence”—echoing Kathi Kalu Oghad’s celebrated caution—not substitute laborious investigation with inadmissible confessions. This obiter, though not determinative, offers guidance on trial fairness, evidentiary discipline, and investigative best practices in cases plagued by hostile witnesses.

c. GUIDELINES

• Use of s.161 CrPC material: Trial and appellate courts must eschew reliance on s.161 statements except to contradict the maker per s.162 proviso; IO affirmation that such statements were made is not proof of their contents.

• Scope of s.27 Evidence Act: Admit only the fraction of information that distinctly leads to discovery; require independent linkage of the discovered object to the offence/accused; ignore past-use narratives embedded in disclosure.

• Confessional bars and co-accused: Treat ss.25–26 as absolute bars except the s.27 carve-out; apply s.30 narrowly—only to lend assurance where other evidence is otherwise credible, not as a primary plank.

• Identity proof discipline: Where TIP fails and in-court identification is absent, courts must resist filling gaps with investigative hearsay; prosecutors must confront eyewitnesses with recovered articles and undertake fit-verification or equivalent objective tests.

• Recoveries and seizures: For cash/seizure under s.102 CrPC, prove source, trail, and nexus; maintain inventories and pursue bank records/CDRs through admissible certification to weave a circumstantial chain.

• Appeals against acquittal: Apply Chandrappa rigorously—presumption of innocence is fortified; avoid reversal on surmise, conjecture, or inadmissible material.

• Investigative ethos: Prefer independent corroboration (forensic, electronic, neutral witnesses) over confessional shortcuts; ensure ownership/possession of sites/objects used to anchor recovery is proved by admissible evidence.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment exemplifies evidentiary discipline in criminal adjudication. It reinforces that investigation and proof are distinct planes: the former may uncover leads; the latter demands admissible, reliable, and cogent evidence tested in adversarial trial. The Supreme Court’s treatment of s.161–162 CrPC is exacting—IO testimony cannot elevate investigative hearsay into proof. Its s.27 analysis, anchored in Pulukuri Kottaya and reaffirmed by Navjot Sandhu, Om Prakash, Damu, and Pandurang Kalu Patil, curbs frequent overreach: discovery must be real, distinct, and connected. The Court resists the temptation to punish via conjecture where witnesses turn hostile and identification fails; presumption of innocence and the Chandrappa deference to acquittals prevail.

For prosecutors, the message is clear: build objective links—forensic ties, ownership proofs, electronic trails, and independent witnesses—and meticulously prove motive and identity. For trial courts, the judgment is a template to scrutinize IO-only cases and to demand fit-for-purpose forensic corroboration when witnesses defect. The case thus contributes to stabilizing the law on appeals against acquittal, admissibility of police-stage statements, and the narrow use of discovery confessions. It ultimately safeguards fair trial values by insisting that serious crimes must be proved by serious evidence, not by investigative narratives.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 — appellate principles on acquittal review.
ii. Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 — locus classicus on s.27 Evidence Act.
iii. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 — contours of s.27 and discovery.
iv. H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249 — admissibility limited to concealment; pointing-out seller not discovery.
v. State of Maharashtra v. Damu, (2000) 6 SCC 269 — discovery corroboration via physical fit (broken glass/tail lamp).
vi. Pandurang Kalu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 490 — fact discovered ≠ object produced.
vii. Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, (2013) 7 SCC 417 — discovery tied to medical evidence.
viii. Raja v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 43 — unexplained human blood on recovered items as incriminating.
ix. Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275 — use of co-accused confession only to lend assurance.
x. Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, [1964] 6 SCR 623 — co-accused confession is not “evidence” under s.3.
xi. State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652 — credibility of police testimony on recovery/search.
xii. Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 — no blanket distrust of police witnesses.
xiii. Ramesh v. State of Haryana, (2017) 1 SCC 529 — dynamics of witness hostility.
xiv. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, [1962] 3 SCR 10 — caution against substituting investigation for proof.
xv. Athappa Goundan, In re, 1937 SCC OnLine Mad 76 — approach later overruled in effect by Pulukuri Kottaya.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s.302, s.120B.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — ss.161–162; s.102.
iii. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — ss.25–27, 30.