A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 462 : 2025 INSC 55. The Supreme Court examined whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by a husband automatically disentitles the wife from maintenance under Section 125(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that mere passing of a restitution decree and the wife’s non-compliance do not ipso facto attract the disqualification in Section 125(4). The entitlement to maintenance remains a fact-sensitive exercise; the Magistrate must assess whether the wife had sufficient and valid reasons to refuse cohabitation despite the decree.

On the facts, the wife had suffered ill-treatment culminating in a miscarriage which the husband failed to address or even bear medical expenses for; the husband secured a restitution decree in April 2022 but made no genuine effort thereafter to execute the decree or reconcile, creating a stalemate reflecting lack of bonafides. The High Court’s reliance on the restitution decree to deny maintenance was reversed and the Family Court’s order directing maintenance of ₹10,000 per month (with arrears and an installment schedule) was restored.

The judgment clarifies:

(i) the civil nature and social-welfare purpose of Section 125,

(ii) the limited evidentiary effect of civil decrees in maintenance proceedings, and

(iii) that refusal under Section 125(4) requires an absence of sufficient reason and is not established by mere non-compliance.

Keywords: restitution of conjugal rights, Section 125 Cr.P.C., maintenance, refusal v. failure, mental cruelty, judgments in rem / personam.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute arises from two parallel strands: a civil suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 filed by the husband and a maintenance petition under Section 125, Cr.P.C. filed by the wife. The Family Court at Ranchi granted a decree for restitution on 23.04.2022 after the wife ceased cohabitation in August 2015; separately, a Family Court at Dhanbad had earlier allowed the wife’s maintenance petition on 15.02.2022 directing monthly maintenance of ₹10,000. On revision, the Jharkhand High Court set aside the maintenance order reasoning that the restitution decree and the wife’s failure to comply attracted Section 125(4) which disqualifies a wife who without sufficient reason refuses to live with her husband.

The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the novel question whether a restitution decree and non-compliance automatically defeat maintenance rights. The backdrop involves allegations of cruelty, a miscarriage on 28.01.2015, denial of basic facilities in the matrimonial home and the husband’s alleged demand for dowry — facts material to the assessment of whether the wife had just cause to stay away. The Bench saw a wider legal theme: reconciling the welfare-oriented purpose of Section 125 with civil decrees, and resolving conflicting High Court precedents on the evidentiary effect of restitution judgments in maintenance proceedings.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The parties married on 01.05.2014 and separated in August 2015 when the wife returned to her parental house. The husband filed suit for restitution on 20.07.2018; the wife contested, alleging torture, demand of ₹5 lakh for a car and that the husband had extramarital relations. She further asserted that she suffered a miscarriage on 28.01.2015 and that the husband did not bear her medical expenses nor visit her; instead her brother provided care. The Family Court granted restitution on 23.04.2022 after observing insufficient evidence from the wife (who failed to pursue witnesses in that forum).

Separately, the wife filed a maintenance petition on 03.08.2019; the Family Court, on evidence including the husband’s pay-slip (net ₹43,211), found he had means and the wife was dependent, awarding ₹10,000 monthly from the date of application. The husband obtained the restitution decree but did not execute it or seek divorce, and thereafter sought to rely on the decree to defeat the earlier maintenance order. The High Court accepted that approach, disqualifying the wife under Section 125(4).

On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the cumulative facts the miscarriage, the husband’s non-involvement, the denial of basic amenities in the matrimonial home, gaps in reconciliation efforts, and the husband’s post-decree inactivity to evaluate whether the wife had sufficient reason to refuse cohabitation.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by the husband, and the wife’s subsequent non-compliance with that decree, ipso facto attracts the disqualification in Section 125(4), Cr.P.C., thereby defeating her claim for maintenance?

2. What is the evidentiary value of a civil decree for restitution in separate proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

3. Whether maintenance proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. should be treated as criminal, civil, or sui generis for the purpose of the effect of prior civil findings?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the Family Court’s maintenance award was based on evidence showing the wife’s dependence and the husband’s means; that the wife had been subjected to ill-treatment and mental cruelty (including denial of basic amenities and indifference after miscarriage) which constituted sufficient reasons to stay away. It was contended that a restitution decree cannot be mechanically applied to defeat maintenance; the nature and object of Section 125 being social justice requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and independent adjudication by the Magistrate.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the restitution decree dated 23.04.2022 recorded that the wife withdrew from the husband’s society without reasonable excuse and did not return despite the decree; reliance on Section 125(4) was therefore proper to deny maintenance. It was argued that civil findings in a contested restitution suit, especially where the wife did not appeal, should carry decisive weight in maintenance proceedings and that allowing maintenance would enable circumvention of judicial orders.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 125(1)–(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (maintenance and disqualification).
ii. Section 9 & Section 13(1A)(ii), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (restitution and divorce).
iii. Sections 40–43, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (relevance and effect of prior judgments).
iv. Sections 34–37, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (corresponding provisions on prior judgments).

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Court held that Section 125 must be liberally construed as a social-welfare provision; the word “refuses” in Section 125(4) demands an imputable, voluntary refusal without sufficient cause and is different from mere failure. Judicial precedents were surveyed: while some High Courts treated a restitution decree as strongly persuasive, many decisions (e.g., Kirtikant D. Vadodaria, Amrita Singh, Babita, Subal Das) favour independent inquiry by the Magistrate into the wife’s reasons. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s mechanical application of the restitution decree to deny maintenance.

It emphasised that maintenance proceedings are civil in nature (albeit remedial provisions appear in the Cr.P.C.), and the evidentiary value of civil decrees is governed by Sections 40–43, Evidence Act they may be relevant but not necessarily conclusive except where Section 41 applies. Applying the cumulative facts ill-treatment, miscarriage, husband’s non-assistance and lack of reconciliation efforts the Court concluded the wife had sufficient cause to refuse cohabitation and thus was not disqualified under Section 125(4). The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and restored the Family Court’s maintenance award of ₹10,000/month with arrears payable in three installments.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling legal proposition is that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically negate a wife’s entitlement to maintenance under Section 125(1). The Magistrate must independently evaluate whether the wife’s refusal to live with the husband was without sufficient reason. The civil decree is relevant evidence but not conclusive; the social-welfare object of Section 125 mandates liberal construction to prevent destitution. Thus, where a wife demonstrates just cause cruelty, denial of basic amenities, medical neglect, absence of reconciliation efforts Section 125(4) cannot be invoked to deny maintenance.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that maintenance proceedings, though placed in the Cr.P.C., are summary civil proceedings designed for speedy relief and should not be treated as criminal for purposes of applying civil findings conclusively. The Bench noted practical abuse where a husband procures a restitution decree but refrains from execution or divorce to erect a procedural shield such stratagems undermine the remedial aim of Section 125 and reflect lack of bonafides.

c. GUIDELINES

1. A restitution decree is relevant but not determinative in maintenance proceedings; Courts must examine evidence afresh.

2. The word “refuses” in Section 125(4) requires an assessment whether the wife’s conduct was wilful and without reasonable cause.

3. Magistrates must consider cumulative facts (mental cruelty, denial of amenities, medical negligence) to infer sufficient reason.

4. If a husband secures restitution but takes no effective steps (execution or divorce) and thereby creates a stalemate, such conduct may negate his plea of entitlement to deny maintenance.

5. Findings in civil suits may be conclusive only in the narrow circumstances set out in Sections 40–43, Evidence Act; otherwise they are admissible as evidence of relevant facts.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment realigns the law with the protective purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. by rejecting a rule of automatic disentitlement based on civil decrees for restitution. Practically, it protects vulnerable spouses from procedural subterfuge and compels courts to examine the lived reality behind refusal to cohabit. The decision also clarifies the interplay between civil decrees and maintenance proceedings: civil findings carry evidentiary weight but cannot displace the Magistrate’s duty to assess sufficiency of cause for the wife’s absence.

The Court’s insistence on cumulative fact-based appraisal accords with precedents recognising mental cruelty and systemic ill-treatment as valid grounds to stay away. The order further signals that a husband’s passive strategy obtaining a decree but not enforcing it or seeking divorce will be scrutinised as lack of bonafides. For practitioners, the case is a useful authority to resist attempts to use Section 125(4) as a blanket defence post-restitution decree and to marshal medical and contemporaneous evidence showing neglect, cruelty or deprivation. The judgment thus preserves Section 125’s remedial thrust while ensuring civil decrees inform but do not conclusively determine maintenance claims.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, 2007 INSC 1190 : [2007] 12 SCR 577 : (2008) 2 SCC 316.

2. Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Others, 2014 INSC 490 : [2014] 8 SCR 858 : (2015) 6 SCC 353.

3. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Another, 2013 INSC 703 : [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188.

4. Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, 2020 INSC 631 : [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324.

5. Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan, 2015 INSC 283 : [2015] 4 SCR 137 : (2015) 5 SCC 705.

6. Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat and Another, [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 45 : (1996) 4 SCC 479.

7. Amrita Singh v. Ratan Singh and Another, (2018) 17 SCC 737.

8. Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and Others, [1978] 3 SCR 782 : (1978) 4 SCC 70.

9. K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police and Another, [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 350 : (2002) 8 SCC 87.

10. Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt.) and Others, 2000 INSC 115 : [2000] 2 SCR 58 : (2000) 3 SCC 180.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Chapter IX — Section 125).

2. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 9 and Section 13(1A)(ii)).

3. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (ss.40–43).

4. Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (ss.34–37).