A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Rohtas & Anr. v. State of Haryana authoritatively examines the legal permissibility of altering charges during the course of criminal proceedings, particularly when a prosecution initially framed under Sections 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 fails due to acquittal of some accused, resulting in the number falling below the statutory minimum of five persons constituting an unlawful assembly.

The Supreme Court analyses the scope and object of Sections 211–224, 386 and 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and clarifies that criminal courts are vested with wide discretion to modify or alter charges at any stage, including at the appellate level, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused and no failure of justice ensues. The Court further draws a doctrinal distinction between Section 149 IPC and Section 34 IPC, emphasizing that while both impose vicarious liability, the former is based on mere membership of an unlawful assembly, whereas the latter requires proof of common intention and active participation.

On facts, the Court finds that despite the collapse of the unlawful assembly charge, the evidence unmistakably established individual culpability of the appellants for the offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, read with Section 34 IPC. The judgment also addresses evidentiary principles relating to reliance on related witnesses and non-examination of independent witnesses in crimes occurring in private spaces. Finally, the Court adopts a victim-centric approach to sentencing, refusing leniency in light of the gravity of injuries and permanent disability caused to the complainant. The decision reinforces substance over form in criminal justice and curtails hyper-technical objections that obstruct accountability.

Keywords: Alteration of charges; Section 34 IPC; Section 149 IPC; Attempt to murder; Unlawful assembly; Criminal procedure; Sentencing principles.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arises from a long-standing rural dispute culminating in a violent attack that permanently disabled the victim. The prosecution initially proceeded on the footing of collective criminality by an unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC, a common prosecutorial approach in group assault cases. However, during the appellate stage, the acquittal of three co-accused reduced the number of offenders below the statutory threshold prescribed under Section 141 IPC, thereby raising a complex question of law regarding the sustainability of convictions recorded with the aid of Sections 148 and 149 IPC. The appellants sought acquittal on this technical ground, arguing that once the unlawful assembly charge failed, the entire prosecution case collapsed.

The Supreme Court situates this controversy within the broader framework of criminal procedure, particularly the philosophy underlying Chapter XVII of the CrPC. The Court revisits earlier precedents to reaffirm that criminal trials are not governed by rigid formalism but by the overarching objective of ensuring substantive justice. The background discussion reflects judicial concern over attempts by accused persons to exploit procedural lapses, especially when overwhelming evidence exists regarding their individual involvement. The Court also contextualises the issue against earlier decisions such as Amar Singh v. State of Punjab and Subran v. State of Kerala, clarifying their limited applicability based on factual distinctions. The background thus sets the stage for a principled reconciliation between procedural safeguards and societal interest in punishing grave crimes like attempted murder.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The victim, Ranbir Singh (PW-1), lodged a complaint stating that on 24.01.1998 he was threatened by the appellants and one Om Prakash with death if he attempted to irrigate his agricultural field. Despite the threats, he continued his routine work. On 25.01.1998, while passing through Hudawala field, the appellants, armed with axes, intercepted and assaulted him. Each appellant inflicted specific blows on vital parts of his body, including the head, legs and hand. Subsequently, three other accused joined the scene, though the complainant candidly admitted that his injuries had already been inflicted by the appellants before their arrival.

The assault resulted in multiple grievous injuries. Medical evidence revealed fractures of both legs, extensive vascular damage and nerve injuries. Despite emergency surgeries at PGIMS Rohtak, the victim’s condition deteriorated, leading to the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses, including the injured witness and his brother Balwan (PW-3), the sole eyewitness who rushed to the scene upon hearing cries. The medical testimony corroborated the ocular version in material particulars.

The trial court convicted all surviving accused under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 148 IPC. The High Court, on reappreciation, acquitted three accused who arrived later and upheld the conviction of the appellants, though with reduced sentence. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court challenging both conviction and sentence.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a conviction recorded with the aid of Section 149 IPC can survive when the number of accused is reduced below five due to acquittal?
ii. Whether courts can alter or modify charges at the appellate stage by invoking Section 34 IPC or convict an accused individually without causing prejudice?
iii. Whether conviction can be sustained solely on the testimony of related witnesses in the absence of independent witnesses?
iv. Whether long lapse of time and partial sentence undergone justify reduction of sentence in grave offences under Section 307 IPC?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that once three co-accused were acquitted, the essential requirement of five persons under Section 141 IPC failed, rendering the convictions under Sections 148 and 149 IPC unsustainable. Reliance was placed on Amar Singh v. State of Punjab and Dhupa Chamar v. State of Bihar to argue that the prosecution case must collapse entirely. It was further contended that conversion of the charge to Section 307 IPC simpliciter or with the aid of Section 34 IPC at an advanced stage caused serious prejudice to the defence. The appellants also questioned the credibility of PW-3 as an interested witness and highlighted the absence of independent witnesses. Alternatively, a plea for leniency in sentencing was raised based on long period of bail and partial sentence undergone.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent State submitted that the prosecution evidence clearly established a premeditated attack with deadly weapons, satisfying the ingredients of Section 307 IPC. It was argued that Sections 211–224 and 386 CrPC empower courts to alter charges at any stage, and no prejudice was caused since the appellants were fully aware of their specific roles. The State contended that the testimony of injured witnesses carries high evidentiary value and non-examination of independent witnesses was inconsequential given the private location of the offence. The State opposed any reduction of sentence considering the permanent disability caused to the victim.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals insofar as conviction under Section 307 IPC was concerned, while setting aside the conviction under Section 148 IPC. The Court held that failure of the unlawful assembly charge does not bar courts from assessing individual culpability or invoking Section 34 IPC. It found no prejudice to the appellants since their specific roles were put to them under Section 313 CrPC. The Court upheld reliance on related witnesses, noting that violent crimes in agricultural fields rarely have independent spectators. On sentencing, the Court refused leniency, emphasising the brutality of the attack and lifelong disability suffered by the victim, and directed the appellants to serve the remainder of their five-year sentence.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio lies in the affirmation that improper or failed framing of charges under Section 149 IPC does not vitiate conviction if evidence independently establishes guilt under substantive provisions or Section 34 IPC, and no prejudice is caused to the accused.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that misplaced sympathy in sentencing undermines victim justice and that prolonged bail cannot itself be a mitigating factor in serious offences involving permanent disability.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Courts may alter or modify charges at any stage under Sections 211–224 and 386 CrPC if no prejudice is caused.
ii. Acquittal of some accused does not bar conviction of others on individual evidence.
iii. Related witnesses are not unreliable per se; their testimony must be tested on credibility.
iv. Sentencing must reflect gravity of harm and societal interest, not mere passage of time.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach to criminal adjudication. It curbs hyper-technical challenges that seek acquittal despite clear evidence of guilt. By harmonising procedural flexibility with substantive culpability, the Supreme Court strengthens the doctrinal clarity between Sections 34 and 149 IPC. The decision also underscores the centrality of victim rights in sentencing discourse and discourages undue leniency in cases of extreme violence.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

1. Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 679.
2. Kantilal Chandulal Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 3 SCC 166.
3. Willie (William) Slaney v. State of MP, AIR 1956 SC 116.
4. Chittarmal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 2 SCC 266.
5. Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118.

b) Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.