A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges the cognizance taken by the Special Environment Court, Faridabad on a complaint alleging violation of Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 for uprooting and destroying trees using JCBs in Sector-113, Gurugram. The complaint named three company officers Satpal Singh (Project Manager), Kamal Sehgal (General Manager) and Sanjay Dutt (Director) though the licence for development had been granted in favour of a company.

The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether vicarious criminal liability could be fastened upon the directors/officers without specific statutory provision or precise allegations showing personal involvement and criminal intent. The Court held that in the scheme of the Act, 1900 vicarious liability does not automatically attach to company directors or office-bearers unless the statute so provides or the complaint pleads specific acts attributing personal culpability.

Observing the complaint’s vagueness and absence of allegations that the appellants personally felled or ordered the felling, the Court found no prima facie case to issue process against them and quashed the complaint and the order taking cognizance. The judgment reiterates the cardinal criminal principle that penal vicarious liability requires either statutory backing or clear, particularised averments of a director’s personal role and mens rea before criminal proceedings can be sustained.

Keywords: Vicarious liability; Directors; Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900; Personal liability; Specific averments.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from a Forest Damage Report alleging that 256 trees and numerous plants were uprooted and destroyed at Sector-113, Gate Vida, Gurugram on 2 September 2021 using mechanised equipment (JCB). The Range Forest Officer lodged PC No.1G/2022-23 (Case No.41/22) naming three individuals Satpal Singh (Project Manager), Kamal Sehgal (General Manager) and Sanjay Dutt (Director) as respondents.

The complaint referenced the notification issued under Section 4 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, and produced Form-21/22 entries, site plans and witness statements by Forest Guard and Forest Inspector asserting that the trees were uprooted with a JCB. The Special Environment Court took cognizance and issued process under Section 19 of the Act. The appellants challenged issuance of process by invoking the High Court’s revisional powers under Section 482 CrPC; the High Court declined relief and hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court was asked to examine whether mere managerial/officer status of the accused, where the licence was in the company’s name and specific persons who allegedly carried out the felling were not arraigned, sufficed to sustain criminal proceedings in absence of a statutory provision imposing vicarious liability.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The complainant (Range Forest Officer, Gurugram) lodged a forest crime report alleging illegal uprooting of trees and destruction of small plants at the specified location by use of JCB machines. The report recorded 256 trees and numerous saplings as damaged and claimed a loss quantified at Rs. 90,580/- to the Forest Department. Notices under the Forest forms were issued to the three named respondents. Statements of the Forest Guard and Forest Inspector recorded inspection of the spot and the finding that trees had been uprooted using mechanical help; those statements formed the core of the challan presented before the Special Environment Court.

The licence/permission for development of the said land had been granted in favour of a private company; however the company itself was not made an accused and the individuals arrayed were directors/officers associated with the development. The persons physically found at the crime scene allegedly engaged in felling were not made accused in the complaint. The Special Environment Court, after perusing the challan and documents, formed the view that a prima facie case under Section 19 existed and ordered summons. The High Court refused to quash the complaint and the order taking cognizance, leading to this appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether vicarious criminal liability can be fastened upon company directors or office-bearers under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 in absence of statutory provision?
ii. Whether the complaint contained specific averments to show personal participation, direction or criminal intent of the named directors/officers sufficient to warrant issuance of process?
iii. Whether a court exercising jurisdiction on a complaint (Section 156(3) / Section 200 CrPC) should permit cognizance where the allegations against individuals are vague and the principal offender (company or persons on site) is not arraigned?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioners / Appellants submitted that the complaint failed to make specific allegations of personal involvement of the appellants in the commission of the alleged offences. They argued that the licence for development was in the company’s name, that the company had not been made an accused, and that mere official/managerial designation does not attract criminal liability in the absence of a statutory provision creating vicarious liability. They contended that the complaint was vague, that persons found felling trees were not named, and that the Special Environment Court erred in taking cognizance without particularised averments showing actus reus and mens rea of the appellants.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondents submitted that the forest entries, spot inspection reports and statements of forest staff established commission of the offence and prima facie implicated the named officers. They relied on the fact of license/permission for development being connected to the company for which the appellants were responsible and argued that officers in charge could be held accountable for contraventions in regulated notified areas. The respondents urged deference to the trial court’s view that a prima facie case existed and contended that the writ jurisdiction should not be used to stifle prosecution at the threshold.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court emphasised the foundational criminal principle that vicarious criminal liability does not arise unless the statute specifically provides for it. The Court analysed Section 4 and Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900, and concluded that the Act contains no provision making directors or officers automatically criminally liable for contraventions by the company or its agents.

The judgment found the complaint’s averments against the three appellants to be vague and non-specific; there were no particularised allegations that the appellants personally wielded or directed the use of JCBs or ordered the uprooting. The Court also noted that the persons physically found at the site felling trees were not made accused and the company the licence holder had not been arrayed as an accused in the complaint for reasons unknown to the complainant. Relying on precedent, notably Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. v. Datar Switchgear Ltd. ((2010) 10 SCC 479), the bench reiterated that where criminal liability is fastened on the basis of legal fiction, such vicarious liability must be expressly provided for by statute; absent that, the complainant must plead specific acts of the officer sought to be prosecuted.

The Court held the Courts below had proceeded on an erroneous assumption that officer status alone sufficed to sustain criminal proceedings. In consequence, no prima facie case against the three appellants was made out and the issuance of process could not be sustained; the complaint and the order taking cognizance were quashed. The Court clarified that departmental action against the company for breach of licence conditions remained open.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio is twofold:

(1) Criminal vicarious liability requires either express statutory provision or clear, particularised allegations of personal involvement and mens rea of the officer.

(2) A mere official designation or managerial role, or the fact that development permission was in the company’s name, does not automatically implicate directors/officers criminally; the complainant must plead specific acts connecting the individual to the offence.

The Supreme Court applied these principles to set aside the cognizance where the complaint lacked such particularity.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed obiter that in cases where legal fiction attaches vicarious liability by statute, it still cannot be assumed that all directors are liable; even then, specific and substantiated allegations against the relevant director are necessary. The bench also commented on the duty of courts to be vigilant when exercising power under Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC to prevent unwarranted harassment by criminal process when complaints are not legally tenable.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Complaints alleging offences by corporate entities must name the company where the licence/permission is in the company’s favour, unless there is clear reason not to.

2. To fasten personal criminal liability on directors/officers, the complaint must contain specific averments demonstrating personal acts or directions amounting to the offence and, where relevant, mens rea.

3. Courts taking cognizance on private or departmental complaints must scrutinise whether the pleadings, taken at face value, can legally sustain the charge; mere formal allegations are insufficient.

4. Where departmental breach of licence conditions is alleged, civil/administrative remedies against the company should be pursued in parallel or instead of criminal prosecution of officers absent particularised allegations.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces essential safeguards in criminal procedure against sweeping or speculative prosecution of corporate officers. It balances environmental enforcement objectives with procedural fairness: criminalisation cannot replace administrative remediation where the prosecutorial foundation is vague. For prosecutors and forest departments, the lesson is to draft complaints with forensic precision identify the actual perpetrators, name the corporate entity where appropriate, quantify the alleged breach and aver specifics linking individual officers to culpable conduct.

For corporate officers, the decision reduces the risk of automatic criminal exposure solely by virtue of office, while preserving departmental recourse against companies. The case thus strengthens the requirement of particularity in criminal complaints involving corporate contexts and restates the settled principle that penal vicarious liability must rest on statutory text or explicit pleaded facts.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited & Anr. v. Datar Switchgear Limited & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 479.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 — Section 4, Section 19.
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 156(3), Section 200, Section 482 (jurisdictional principles).