A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case, Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad, decided by the Supreme Court in 1952, revolves around the application and interpretation of Section 20(1) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 concerning the acknowledgment of debt repayment and its implications for extending the limitation period. The core question before the Court was whether acknowledgment of debt repayment made after the expiration of the limitation period—but before the suit was instituted—was sufficient to extend the limitation, and whether such acknowledgment made only after institution of suit could serve the same purpose. It also examines whether a simple mortgage bond not properly attested under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, could still be enforced by way of a personal decree for the repayment of the debt.

The trial court had granted a personal money decree against the mortgagor-defendants, refusing, however, a mortgage decree due to improper attestation. The High Court found the attestation valid but held that, due to lack of appeal by the plaintiffs, a mortgage decree could not be granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld that a written acknowledgment of payment must predate the institution of the suit, irrespective of whether it occurs within the limitation period. It found that mere acknowledgment in a written statement filed during litigation could not revive a time-barred claim. Therefore, the personal decree granted by the trial court was set aside.

This case remains a landmark ruling clarifying the procedural preconditions under Section 20(1) and the substantive principles of limitation law, particularly in the context of mortgage enforcement, debt acknowledgment, and the principles of pleading and amendment in civil suits.

Keywords: Section 20 Limitation Act, Acknowledgment of Debt, Simple Mortgage, Personal Decree, Attestation, Time-Barred Suit

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date:
October 17, 1951

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Patanjali Sastri J., Mukherjea J., Das J., Vivian Bose J.

vi) Author:
Justice B.K. Mukherjea

vii) Citation:
Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad, [1952] SCR 116

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 20(1), Indian Limitation Act, 1908

• Article 116, Schedule I, Indian Limitation Act, 1908

• Section 59, Transfer of Property Act, 1882

• Order 7 Rule 6 & Order 41 Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, 1908

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None specifically overruled, but the case clarified interpretation of Section 20.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:

• Limitation Law

• Civil Procedure

• Property and Mortgage Law

• Law of Evidence

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The genesis of the dispute lies in a Title Mortgage Suit (No. 7 of 1940) initiated by Kamla Prasad against Sant Lal Mahton and others for recovery under a simple mortgage bond dated 8th April, 1927, executed to secure a loan. The bond matured for repayment on 6th March, 1928, but the suit was filed in 1940, beyond the six-year limitation period for personal recovery under Article 116 of the Limitation Act. However, the plaintiffs relied upon a series of part payments made towards the debt and asserted that such payments, read with Section 20(1) of the Limitation Act, preserved the limitation.

The trial court upheld the plaintiff’s case on limitation and granted a personal decree but declined to recognize the bond as a valid mortgage due to defective attestation. The High Court found the attestation sufficient, treating it as a valid mortgage, but did not grant a mortgage decree since no appeal/cross-objection was filed. The matter came before the Supreme Court on these intertwined procedural and substantive issues.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

• A mortgage bond was executed on 8th April 1927, with the due date of payment fixed as 6th March 1928.

• The plaintiffs sued on 4th March 1940.

• Several payments were made post-execution but not endorsed on the bond.

• No acknowledgment of payments existed in writing before the suit was instituted.

• Defendants admitted the payments in their written statement during the suit proceedings.

• The Subordinate Judge found the bond invalid as a mortgage due to lack of legal attestation but still granted a personal decree, relying on Section 20.

• The Patna High Court reversed the finding on attestation but refused to grant a mortgage decree due to procedural limitations.

• The Supreme Court analyzed the scope of acknowledgment under Section 20 and the possibility of grant of mortgage decree in the absence of plaintiff’s appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether acknowledgment of part payments under Section 20(1) of the Limitation Act must be in existence before institution of the suit.

ii) Whether acknowledgment of payments in a written statement filed after suit could extend limitation.

iii) Whether the mortgage bond was validly attested and enforceable under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act.

iv) Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to mortgage relief despite not filing a cross-appeal.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

• The trial court erred in granting a personal decree, as the suit was instituted beyond limitation.

• The payments made by the defendants were not acknowledged in writing, hence did not extend the limitation period under Section 20(1).

• The acknowledgment in the written statement, filed after institution of suit, could not validate a time-barred claim.

• The bond was not properly attested, and therefore not enforceable as a mortgage under Section 59, Transfer of Property Act.

• Plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for sale, since they did not file an appeal against the trial court’s refusal.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

• The payments made were voluntarily admitted by the defendants in their signed written statement, which should suffice as acknowledgment.

• The bond was properly attested and thus valid as a mortgage.

• Even without an appeal, the High Court had powers under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC to grant a mortgage decree in favour of the plaintiffs.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 20(1), Indian Limitation Act, 1908
A payment of debt or interest within limitation must be acknowledged in writing, signed by the payer, for it to extend limitation.

ii) Article 116, Indian Limitation Act
Prescribes a six-year limitation for recovery of debt on a registered contract from the date of default.

iii) Section 59, Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Requires attestation by at least two witnesses for creation of valid mortgage of immovable property.

iv) Order 7 Rule 6, CPC
Plaintiff must plead exemption from limitation when filing a time-barred suit.

v) Order 41 Rule 33, CPC
Empowers the appellate court to grant relief to a party who has not filed an appeal, in appropriate circumstances.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that Section 20(1) requires:

• Payment must occur within limitation, and

• Written acknowledgment must exist prior to suit.

Since none of the payments had acknowledgment in writing signed by debtor before the suit, the claim was time-barred.

Acknowledgment in the written statement after suit was inadmissible to extend limitation.

Also, since plaintiffs did not file appeal or cross-objection, the appellate court could not grant a mortgage decree despite finding proper attestation.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that although Order 41 Rule 33 offers wide discretion, it cannot override the requirement of appeal where substantive relief is to be granted.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Section 20 acknowledgment must be in writing and pre-date the institution of suit.

• Admissions in pleadings after suit cannot extend limitation.

• Order 41 Rule 33 must be exercised with judicial restraint, particularly when the plaintiff has not appealed.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment in Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad is a seminal interpretation of Section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. It laid down that acknowledgment of payment made after the suit has commenced is ineffectual for saving limitation. It reaffirmed that limitation must be assessed strictly on the date of institution of the suit, and only written acknowledgments existing at that time can revive a claim.

The ruling also highlights that mortgage relief requires procedural compliance, and the absence of appeal or cross-objection cannot be overridden, even by Order 41 Rule 33.

The judgment has since guided courts in distinguishing between substantive rights and procedural powers, ensuring that equity does not supplant statutory mandates.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Mohd. Moizuddin v. Nalini Bala, AIR 1937 Cal 284; ILR (1937) 2 Cal 137
ii) Lal Singh v. Guiab Rai, ILR 55 All 280
iii) Venkata Subbu v. Appa Sundaram, ILR 17 Mad 92
iv) Ram Prasad v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1923 Nag 117
v) Viswanath v. Mahadeo, ILR 57 Bom 453

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Indian Limitation Act, 1908 – Sections 20(1), Article 116
ii) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 59
iii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order 7 Rule 6, Order 41 Rule 33