A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment adjudicates the statutory conflict concerning the authority to nominate four members to the statutory Board constituted under the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956. The controversy arose from conflicting factional claims within the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, a public trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The State Government of Maharashtra assumed the power to nominate four members under Section 6(1)(viii) due to internal disputes in the Diwan and issued a notification dated 21 June 2019.

The Bombay High Court set aside the notification, holding that the Government lacked statutory authority to nominate members under the said provision. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scheme of Section 6, its sub-sections, and the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules, 1958. The Court distinguished between the public trust entity and the statutory Gurudwara Board, holding them to be distinct juridical personalities.

The Court authoritatively interpreted Section 6(1)(viii) to vest exclusive nomination power in the collective body of the Diwan, and not in any individual office bearer, Working Committee, or the State Government. The absence of a fallback power in Section 6(3) for clause (viii) was decisive. The judgment reinforces the doctrine that statutory powers must be exercised strictly in the manner prescribed by law, and that administrative convenience cannot override legislative intent.

Keywords: Statutory interpretation, nomination power, religious endowments, public trust law, administrative overreach

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute emerged from the statutory framework governing the administration of Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib, a historically significant Sikh institution. The Nanded Act, 1956, enacted by the erstwhile Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, established a statutory Board for managing Gurudwara affairs. The Board’s composition under Section 6 reflects a delicate balance between government nominees, elected representatives, and nominees of Sikh religious bodies.

A central component of this structure is Section 6(1)(viii), which entrusts four nominations to the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. The Diwan itself traces its origin to a society registered in 1350 Fasli and later became a public trust under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. Over decades, factional disputes plagued its internal governance, particularly concerning elections, membership, and leadership.

These disputes resulted in multiple and conflicting nomination claims being submitted to the State Government in 2019. Faced with administrative paralysis, the Government issued a notification nominating four members by selectively drawing from rival lists. This executive intervention prompted a constitutional challenge before the Bombay High Court.

The High Court restrained itself from entering disputed factual terrain pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 22 of the MPT Act. Instead, it confined itself to pure statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court, while affirming this approach, addressed a foundational question concerning who holds the legal authority to nominate under Section 6(1)(viii) and whether the State could assume such power in exigent circumstances.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan was registered as a society in 1951 and as a public trust in 1982. Its governance structure included a General Committee comprising all members and a Working Committee of 28 members elected biennially. Internal disputes intensified following trust registration, culminating in litigation resolved by the Supreme Court in 2014, which affirmed the finality of trust registration while leaving membership disputes open under the MPT Act.

In 2019, the term of the Gurudwara Board necessitated fresh nominations. Under Rule 6 of the 1958 Rules, the State Government requested the Diwan to nominate four members. Instead of a unified resolution, multiple letters were submitted by rival claimants asserting authority as President or Secretary. Some letters lacked Diwan resolutions.

The State sought clarification from the Charity Commissioner, who informed it that Inquiry Applications Nos. 44 and 114 of 2019 concerning Diwan leadership were pending. Despite this, the State Government issued a notification on 21 June 2019 nominating four individuals.

The notification was challenged under Article 226. The High Court held that the Government had usurped powers statutorily vested in the Diwan and set aside the notification. The appellants argued before the Supreme Court that historical practice permitted the President to nominate members and that administrative exigency justified State intervention.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the State Government possesses authority to nominate members under Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Act, 1956?
ii. Whether the power of nomination under Section 6(1)(viii) vests in individual office bearers or the collective body of the Diwan?
iii. Whether administrative necessity can justify deviation from statutory prescription?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants submitted that historical practice demonstrated nominations being made by the Diwan President. It was argued that Gurucharan Singh had regularly exercised nomination powers without objection. The appellants contended that Section 6(2) read with Rule 6 enabled State facilitation and that the Government acted to prevent administrative vacuum.

It was further submitted that the first respondent lacked locus standi due to alleged removal as trustee by a Working Committee resolution. Pending disputes before the Charity Commissioner were argued to be irrelevant to immediate Board functioning.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents asserted that Section 6(1)(viii) confers exclusive authority on the Diwan as a collective entity. It was argued that Section 6(3) consciously excludes clause (viii), thereby denying the State any residuary power.

The respondents emphasized the rule of law doctrine, arguing that executive convenience cannot override statutory mandate. They highlighted inconsistencies in nomination letters and absence of Diwan resolutions.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 6(1)(viii), Nanded Act, 1956
ii. Section 6(2) and 6(3), Nanded Act, 1956
iii. Rule 6, Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules, 1958
iv. Section 22, Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision. It held that Section 6(1)(viii) vests exclusive nomination authority in the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan. The Court undertook a structural interpretation, noting that Section 6(3) grants fallback powers to the State only for clauses (iv) to (vii). The deliberate exclusion of clause (viii) was decisive.

The Court clarified that the Diwan refers to the entire collective body of voting members, not the President or Working Committee. It rejected arguments based on past practice, holding that custom cannot override statute. The State’s action was characterized as statutory usurpation.

Directions were issued to complete pending inquiries within three months and to convene a Diwan meeting under the supervision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The exclusive statutory power to nominate four members under Section 6(1)(viii) lies with the collective body of the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, and the State Government lacks authority to exercise or assume this power, even in cases of internal dispute.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that administrative deadlock cannot justify executive overreach. It emphasized the necessity for religious and charitable bodies to update bye-laws to prevent governance paralysis.

c) GUIDELINES

i. The Diwan shall convene a collective meeting to nominate members.
ii. The Assistant Charity Commissioner shall act as observer.
iii. Pending trust disputes must be resolved expeditiously.
iv. The State shall refrain from intervening beyond statutory limits.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Sardar Jeewansingh (Dead) Through LRs v. Shersingh & Ors., Decision dated 22.01.2014, Supreme Court of India

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956
ii. Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950