A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 210 : 2025 INSC 632, upheld dismissal of a partition suit at the stage of framing issues by invoking Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), clarifying that the provision empowers a court, on its own motion, to render judgment on admissions, including dismissal, without a party’s application.

The Court treated prior declaratory decrees between family members over four suits (1972–1985) as binding, held that the appellant could not go behind them, and found that the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005) preserved partitions before 20 December 2004.

The claim concerning C-38, Anand Niketan was time-barred; the Barota land controversy belonged to the Sonepat forum under Section 16 CPC and, in any event, stood governed by earlier decrees and a Will dated 03 November 1987. The judgment affirms that inadequate pleadings on the creation of an HUF and coparcenary, and admitted documents, can justify non-framing of issues and a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

The Court distinguished the retroactive reach of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma by applying the saving clause for genuine earlier partitions and treated declaratory decrees grounded in consensus as recognition of partition. Appeal dismissed.

Keywords: Order XII Rule 6 CPC; Order VII Rule 11 CPC; Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, 1956; coparcenary; Hindu Undivided Family (HUF); declaratory decree; limitation; benami; Section 16 CPC; partition.

B) CASE DETAILS

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C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal interrogated whether a Single Judge could dismiss a partition suit under Order XII Rule 6 CPC suo motu at the framing-of-issues stage, when pleadings and admitted documents demonstrated absence of a triable cause.

The suit sought partition, injunction, and accounts under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, spanning five properties allegedly held by Late Major General Budh Singh. Four earlier declaratory suits—Suit I (1972), Suit II (1977), Suit III (1978), and Suit IV (1984)—mapped the intra-family arrangements touching Barota, Bhatgaon, and C-38, Anand Niketan.

The Single Judge dismissed the suit on admissions, pointing to non-particularised claims over Kalupur and Sonepat dairy lands under Order VII Rules 1, 3 and Order VI Rule 4 CPC, limitation bars under Article 59 against attacking Suit II (8 March 1977) three decades later, benami impediment for Anand Niketan under Section 4(1), and territorial competence under Section 16 CPC for Barota.

The Division Bench affirmed, deprecating luxurious litigation. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant pressed primarily Barota and Anand Niketan, urging that the amended Section 6 (2005) had retroactive effect per Vineeta Sharma and that judgments premised on consensual or collusive dynamics could not defeat daughters’ coparcenary rights.

The Court anchored its analysis in the text and purpose of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the binding effect of prior decrees, the estoppel arising from the sister’s transactions over Barota, and the statutory saving for partitions preceding 20 December 2004.

The decision harmonises procedural economy with substantive Hindu succession doctrine, refusing to reopen settled decrees where pleadings lack the specificity necessary to plead an HUF nucleus or an unequivocal act of throwing self-acquired property into the common hotchpotch.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff-appellant, Saroj Salkan, sued for partition and allied reliefs, invoking Section 6 of the 1956 Act, across five assets:

(a) Barota land (≈72 acres with farmhouse);

(b) 11 acres at Kalupur, Sonepat;

(c) 8 bighas dairy plot, Sonepat;

(d) Bhatgaon land (≈30 acres with structures and orchard);

(e) C-38, Anand Niketan, New Delhi.

The pedigree traces to Late Major General Budh Singh (d. 08.11.1988); his son Anup Singh (d. 18.08.1989); and daughters including appellant and Respondent No.6 (Sharda Hooda), with Respondents 1–5 as heirs of Anup.

Earlier litigation is pivotal: Suit I (1972) by appellant, R-6, and Anup’s minor sons claimed Barota/Bhatgaon as HUF/ancestral and recorded a “mutual partition” in detailed jamabandi schedules; decree on 06.04.1972 declared plaintiffs owners in possession of their shares and recognised Anup as absolute owner of Bhatgaon.

Suit II (1977) by Budh Singh against his daughters pleaded the Collector Surplus treated the 1972 decree as collusive and a nullity under Haryana Ceiling Act; the daughters admitted; decree on 08.03.1977 declared Budh Singh owner in possession of Barota and revenue entries in daughters’ names wrong.

Suit III (1978) by Anup against Budh Singh averred Barota/Bhatgaon as ancestral and narrated disruption in December 1977 and allotment of Barota to Anup; decree on 06.10.1978 on admissions declared Anup owner in possession of the described Barota land.

Suit IV (1984) by Anup’s sons against Anup claimed the Anand Niketan house—purchased allegedly from the Bhatgaon proceeds—as joint family/coparcenary property inter se father and sons; decree on 03.01.1985 allotted 2/3rd to the sons and 1/3rd to Anup.

The present plaint lacked cadastral particulars for Kalupur and dairy plots and did not plead when Budh Singh inherited ancestral property pre-1956 or threw any self-acquired property into an HUF hotchpotch. The Single Judge dismissed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC; the Division Bench affirmed; the Supreme Court granted leave and decided as reported.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

Whether Order XII Rule 6 CPC authorises a trial court to dismiss a suit suo motu at any stage, including pre-trial, on the basis of admissions in pleadings and documents, without an application from a party; whether the prior declaratory decrees in Suit I (1972), Suit II (1977), Suit III (1978), and Suit IV (1984) estop the appellant from pleading an HUF/coparcenary and unsettle settled titles; whether the saving proviso to Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended by Act 39 of 2005) preserves partitions prior to 20.12.2004 so as to exclude retroactive claims under Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; whether the claim against C-38, Anand Niketan is barred by Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963 and by Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act; whether territorial jurisdiction for Barota lies under Section 16 CPC in Sonepat; and whether vague pleadings lacking particulars mandated by Order VII Rules 1, 3 read with Order VI Rule 4 CPC justify non-framing of issues and decree on admissions.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that dismissal could at best rest on Order VII Rule 11 CPC and not Order XII Rule 6 CPC, especially absent a defence application, relying on Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120 and Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K. Madan Mohan Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 871, to emphasise the “speedy decree on admissions” objective but not to authorize outright dismissal on admissions without motion.

They maintained that the plaint disclosed an HUF over ancestral properties of Budh Singh, supported by the very text of the four suits where parties described Barota and Bhatgaon as ancestral or HUF assets and recorded partitions or declarations.

They stressed that Suit I (1972) rested on mutual partition and ownership in possession for plaintiffs and recognized Anup as absolute owner of Bhatgaon; Suit II (1977), brought by the father against daughters, was a strategic device after the Collector Surplus treated the earlier decree as collusive; admissions by young daughters under paternal influence should not defeat statutory entitlements.

They argued that Suit III (1978) affirmed an HUF/coparcenary narrative; Suit IV (1984) expressly averred that the Anand Niketan property represented joint family accretions from the Bhatgaon nucleus, thereby acknowledging the joint character of acquisitions. They invoked Vineeta Sharma to state that Section 6 is retroactive, conferring rights by birth to daughters, and that sham or collusive partition claims must be scrutinised, citing the Explanation to Section 6(5).

They insisted that the trial should have proceeded to evidence to test alleged admissions and to permit explanations about the circumstances of consensual decrees, rather than truncation at the issues stage.

G) RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS

The counsels for respondents urged absence of cause over Kalupur and dairy plots because the plaint lacked cadastral particulars required by Order VII Rules 1, 3 read with Order VI Rule 4 CPC. They pointed to appellant’s concession before the Division Bench confining the dispute to Barota and Anand Niketan, and argued Section 16 CPC routed Barota to Sonepat.

They underscored the appellant’s admission in replication that Barota was a gallantry grant to Budh Singh during World War II, making it self-acquired. Further, Barota devolved by a registered Will dated 03.11.1987 upon Anup’s sons. As for C-38, Anand Niketan, they emphasized that it was purchased in 1968 and sub-leased on 03.04.1970 in Anup Singh’s name; no challenge was lodged for thirty-seven years, attracting Article 59 and the bar under Section 4(1) Benami Act.

Respondents highlighted the binding effect of Suit II (1977) where the daughters admitted and the court declared them without right in Barota; Suit III (1978) vested Barota in Anup on admission; and Suit IV (1984) divided Anand Niketan between Anup and his sons. They relied on Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 to contend that vague pleadings do not warrant framing issues and justify decree on admissions.

They also argued estoppel against Respondent No.6, who purchased a part of Barota from Sanjiv Singh on 23.01.1992 and sold it on 12.01.2000, negating her coparcenary stance. The Division Bench’s condemnation of luxurious litigation was invoked to show abuse, and that clever drafting cannot cure absence of material foundation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

The dispute engaged Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which permits courts, at any stage, on application or suo motu, to deliver judgment on admissions, encompassing decrees for plaintiffs or dismissal for defendants; the Court also considered Order VII Rule 11 CPC on rejection of plaint; Order VII Rules 1, 3 and Order VI Rule 4 CPC on pleading particulars; Section 16 CPC directing suits for immovable property to the forum where property lies; Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for cancellation or setting aside instruments or decrees; Section 4(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act barring benami enforcement; Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as substituted in 2005, especially proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(5) with its Explanation saving partitions effectuated by registered partition deed or court decree before 20.12.2004. The authorities cited included Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120; Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K. Madan Mohan Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 871; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes, (2012) 5 SCC 370; ITDC Ltd. v. Chander Pal Sood & Son, 2000 84 DLT 337 (DB); Kalyani (Dead) by LRs v. Narayanan, 1980 Supp SCC 298; and a coordinate Supreme Court order in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, SLP (C) No. 9975 of 2025. Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th ed., p. 347 was referenced on branch HUFs.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court held the challenge untenable. It affirmed that Order XII Rule 6 CPC confers very wide discretion to pronounce judgment at any stage, even suo motu, and that the power includes dismissing a suit on the plaintiff’s admissions, following the Delhi High Court Division Bench in ITDC v. Chander Pal Sood and a coordinate Bench’s approval in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal. The Court parsed the four suits.

Suit I (1972), instituted by the appellant, R-6, and minors, pleaded mutual partition in Barota and acknowledged Bhatgaon as in Anup’s share.

Suit II (1977), by Budh Singh against his daughters, culminated in a decree on admission declaring the daughters’ revenue entries wrong and recognising Budh Singh as owner in possession of Barota. A “nullity” declaration for the 1972 decree was not formally sought against other beneficiaries, but the practical effect vis-à-vis the daughters was reversion to Budh Singh.

Suit III (1978), again decreed on admissions, declared Anup owner in possession of the Barota suit land.

Suit IV (1984) divided Anand Niketan between Anup and his sons on admissions. The Court concluded that these decrees—never challenged—bind the appellant, who cannot go behind them decades later. As to Section 6, the Court invoked the proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(5) to preserve partitions before 20.12.2004, treating the declaratory decrees as recognition of partition inter se family members and beyond the scope of re-opening through retroactive claims.

The plea against Anand Niketan was barred by limitation and ran afoul of benami prohibition, given the 1970 sub-lease in Anup’s name remaining unassailed for thirty-seven years. Territorial allocation under Section 16 CPC meant Barota matters lay in Sonepat. On pleadings, the Court endorsed the Single Judge’s view that non-particularised properties and absence of precise averments of HUF creation and throwing into hotchpotch defeated the suit at threshold. Appeal dismissed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio rests on three interlocking planks. First, Order XII Rule 6 CPC authorises courts to deliver judgment on admissions at any stage and on their own motion; the power is not circumscribed to decreeing suits and extends to dismissal.

The Court expressly approved the ITDC v. Chander Pal Sood interpretation and aligned with its own coordinate precedent in Rajiv Ghosh, thus cementing that judgment on admissions is a procedural tool of judicial economy that may conclusively terminate unmeritorious suits where admissions in the pleadings or documents negate a cause of action.

Second, prior declaratory decrees in Suit II (1977) and Suit III (1978), both on admission, and Suit IV (1984), have a binding effect; a party cognizant of such decrees cannot collaterally attack them decades later under a fresh partition suit. This directly engages Article 59 Limitation Act; the bar to challenge a decree thirty years later is fatal.

Third, under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended, the proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(5) with the Explanation safeguard partitions before 20.12.2004 when effected by a registered deed or a court decree. The Court construed the consensual declaratory decrees as recognition of partition, thereby removing the suit from the retroactive fold of Vineeta Sharma concerning daughters’ rights by birth.

Ancillary findings include application of Section 4(1) Benami Act in respect of C-38, Anand Niketan and Section 16 CPC regarding immovable property suits. Collectively, these principles warranted dismissal under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, given the admissions, the decrees’ finality, and the insufficiency of pleadings to sustain an HUF claim.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court’s discussion signals two broader propositions.

One, while Vineeta Sharma articulates a transformative, gender-just reading of Section 6, its retroactive operation does not nullify genuine partitions or court-recognised arrangements concluded before 20.12.2004; the Explanation to Section 6(5) exists to insulate bona fide partitions and prevent sham setups. The judgment’s emphasis that declaratory decrees, though not styled as partition decrees, may embody and acknowledge completed partition, operates as guidance for future litigation seeking to exploit form over substance.

Two, the Court echoes Maria Margarida on the centrality of pleadings: vague averments about an HUF or ancestral nucleus, without dates, modes, and particulars mandated by Order VII Rules 1, 3 and Order VI Rule 4 CPC, do not oblige courts to frame issues; they justify decisive orders at threshold under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The observations on estoppel against Respondent No.6—owing to her 1992 purchase and 2000 sale of Barota portions—illustrate that litigants cannot assert inconsistent positions to claw back coparcenary membership.

Finally, the Court’s acceptance of the Division Bench’s censure of luxurious litigation is a caution that admissions-based adjudication is not an exception but a necessary tool to protect judicial resources when the record itself defeats the claim. These strands, while not the core holding, shape procedural conduct in partition suits and the evidentiary burden for pleading HUF claims post-2005 amendment.

c. GUIDELINES 

The ruling, though case-specific, yields workable guidance. Courts may, under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, on their own initiative, enter judgment—including dismissal—once admissions in pleadings or documents negate a cause of action; no separate application is a precondition.

Parties pleading HUF/coparcenary must state clear particulars: the source of alleged ancestral property; whether inheritance pre-1956; the date/month/year and manner of any act of throwing self-acquired assets into the hotchpotch; and property-wise particulars per Order VII Rules 1, 3 and Order VI Rule 4 CPC. Declaratory decrees acknowledging familial arrangements can operate as recognition of partition; post-2005 daughter’s rights cannot unsettle partitions saved by the proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(5) before 20.12.2004.

Challenges to decades-old decrees must surmount Article 59; delay is dispositive. Where title documents—such as a 1970 perpetual sub-lease—stand unassailed for long, claims are vulnerable to limitation and benami bars under Section 4(1). Suits over immovable property must heed Section 16 CPC for territorial forum.

Litigants adopting positions in prior suits or executing transactions over disputed properties may face estoppel against inconsistent pleas in later proceedings. Trial courts, at the framing-of-issues stage, must scrutinise pleadings and documents; if admissions and legal bars foreclose relief, they should deploy Order XII Rule 6 CPC to nip meritless suits in the bud, conserving judicial time.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a firm procedural note: Order XII Rule 6 CPC is not a timid instrument; it is a robust gatekeeper against trials where admissions and undisputed documents erase triable issues. By treating consensual declaratory decrees as effective recognition of partition, the Court ensures the 2005 amendment’s egalitarian promise coexists with legal certainty over pre-2004 arrangements preserved by statute.

The appellant’s reliance on Vineeta Sharma faltered because retroactivity meets its limit at the proviso and Section 6(5); the Court carefully channels the remedial thrust of daughters’ rights without unravelling genuine, court-acknowledged partitions. The ruling also reaffirms classical pleading discipline for HUF claims.

A litigant must plead the HUF nucleus with dates, acts, and property identifiers; without this, issues need not be framed, and decree on admissions is apt. The refusal to reopen C-38, Anand Niketan showcases the decisive role of limitation and the benami bar when title documents lie unchallenged for decades.

The territorial routing of Barota under Section 16 CPC and the estoppel against R-6 for her transactions round out the equity analysis. In aggregate, the decision offers a coherent blueprint for courts managing partition suits entangled with prior family decrees: honour finality, enforce pleading rigor, apply statutory savings faithfully, and wield Order XII Rule 6 CPC to terminate litigation that the record itself renders untenable.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India, [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 187 : (2000) 7 SCC 120.
ii. Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K. Madan Mohan Rao, [2023] 9 SCR 1218 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 871.
iii. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 135 : (2020) 9 SCC 1.
iv. Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., [2012] 3 SCR 841 : (2012) 5 SCC 370.
v. ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son, (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB).
vi. Kalyani (Dead) by LRs. v. Narayanan, [1980] SCR 1130 : (1980) Supp. SCC 298.
vii. Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, SLP (Civil) No. 9975 of 2025, order dated 07 April 2025.
viii. Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh & Ors., [2025] 6 S.C.R. 210 : 2025 INSC 632.

b. Important Statutes Referred

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, especially Order XII Rule 6; Order VII Rule 11; Order VII Rules 1, 3; Order VI Rule 4; Section 16.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 6 (as substituted by Act 39 of 2005), proviso to Section 6(1), Section 6(5) and Explanation.
Limitation Act, 1963, Article 59.
Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, Section 4(1).
Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (context of Collector’s treatment in earlier suits).
Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th ed., p. 347.