A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This judgment examines the correctness of a High Court order setting aside a Sessions Judge’s order that summoned four persons as additional accused under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to stand trial with the principal accused for offences under Sections 323, 324, 307, 506 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and Section 25, Arms Act, 1959. The factual matrix concerns a violent post-volleyball altercation in which the appellant, an Army serviceman, sustained two knife injuries one of which was life-threatening.

The Sessions Judge allowed an application by the injured witness (examined as PW-1) to summon his alleged assailants after finding materials in his examination-in-chief and other papers raising a satisfaction greater than a prima facie view. The High Court, on revision, overturned that order largely on the basis of investigative reports by Deputy Superintendents of Police and the lack of medical corroboration for injuries said to be inflicted by some of the proposed additional accused.

The Supreme Court, applying the law laid down in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and subsequent authority, holds that the High Court erred in taking a hands-on revisional stance; the Sessions Judge’s conclusion was a plausible one falling within the discretionary envelope for exercise of Section 319 and ought not to have been reversed. The matter is remitted to proceed to trial; the Court clarifies that no expression here is an opinion on guilt. Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; summoning additional accused; medical corroboration; revisional jurisdiction; Hardeep Singh test.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The appeal turns upon the exercise by a trial court of the power to summon persons not originally arraigned as accused under Section 319 CrPC, and the scope of appellate/revisional interference by a High Court under CrPC. After an altercation during a village volleyball match, the appellant (an Army man on leave) was stabbed and sustained injuries including a chest wound deemed dangerous to life. A cross-case followed; the investigating agency initially submitted closure reports or reports that did not implicate certain persons, yet subsequent medico-legal documents and the appellant’s recovered testimony produced material implicating others.

The Sessions Judge, after taking PW-1’s examination-in-chief and the papers before the court into account, exercised Section 319 to summon four additional persons to face trial with the already charged accused. The High Court, revising that decision, relied on police inquiries by multiple DSPs and absence of corresponding medical injuries to conclude there was insufficient material to arraign the additional persons. The Supreme Court frames the core enquiry: did the High Court exceed a proper revisional role by substituting its own view for the Sessions Judge’s discretionary satisfaction where the latter reached a plausible conclusion under the standard articulated in Hardeep Singh?

The Court reiterates the tripartite calibration of the satisfaction required under Section 319 higher than mere prima facie but lower than proof leading inevitably to conviction and examines whether the High Court’s ‘eyes on’ approach was warranted or whether restraint (‘hands off’) should have prevailed, allowing the trial court’s assessment to stand and the issues to be tested through evidence in trial.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 09.02.2020, during a volleyball game in village Rasulpur Khurd, there occurred an altercation between teams which escalated into a violent episode. The appellant alleges that after an initial quarrel with Mukesh (opposite team member), Mukesh left and returned with a knife accompanied by Neeraj, Sagar @ Bittoo and Ankit, the latter three carrying lathis/dandas. The appellant asserts Neeraj caught hold of him while Mukesh stabbed him twice once in the waist and once near the heart, the latter penetrating up to the lungs.

He further claims Sagar and Ankit beat him with laths/handle of spade and Rajesh threatened to kill him should he return. The appellant was hospitalized; his MLR recorded two sharp-weapon injuries and medical opinion described the chest injury as dangerous to life. Initial police enquiries, including separate verifications by three DSPs and SP Karnal, produced reports that did not find involvement of Rajesh and Ankit; the IO had earlier submitted a closure report regarding allegations against the appellant in Mukesh’s (other party’s) statement.

Mukesh was later arrested; charges were framed against him on 04.03.2021 and prosecution proposed to examine 14 witnesses. The appellant, examined as PW-1 on 27.04.2021, reiterated the involvement of the four persons and applied under Section 319 CrPC to have them summoned. The Sessions Judge allowed that application; the four moved the High Court which set aside the order principally on police reports and lack of medical corroboration for blows said to be inflicted by some accused. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether, on the materials produced in the trial (including PW-1’s examination-in-chief and investigation papers), the Sessions Judge could validly exercise power under Section 319 CrPC to summon the four persons as additional accused?

ii. Whether the High Court in revisional jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the Sessions Judge’s exercise of discretion by relying upon police reports and absence of specific medical corroboration?

iii. What is the correct standard of satisfaction to be applied by a court under Section 319 CrPC, and what is the proper approach for a revisional court when reviewing such exercise of discretion?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s examination-in-chief along with the medical records and the recovered knife disclosure against Mukesh constituted material which, read together, demonstrated involvement of the four persons. It was argued that a trial court, applying the tests in Hardeep Singh, may form a satisfaction higher than prima facie from such materials and that the High Court erred by substituting its view particularly when investigative reports are not conclusive and may be vitiated by incomplete inquiry. The appellant urged that Section 319 is designed to allow courts to implead persons against whom material emerges during trial and that this discretion ought not to be curtailed by a revisional overreach where the trial court’s conclusion is plausible and warrants testing at trial.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents submitted that multiple DSP enquiries and the SP’s verification found no participation of Rajesh and Ankit, and that the medical records did not corroborate injuries allegedly inflicted by Sagar and Ankit. They contended that the Sessions Judge acted mechanically by summoning additional accused without adequate corroborative material and that the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, correctly set aside that order to prevent unnecessary harassment and delay of persons not implicated by investigation. Reliance was placed on the principle that courts must be cautious before summoning persons absent a firm evidentiary foundation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — power to proceed against persons not shown as accused when it appears from the evidence that they have committed an offence which ought to be tried with the accused.

ii. Sections 323, 324, 307, 506, 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860 — offences alleged.

iii. Section 25, Arms Act, 1959 — use/possession of weapon in commission of offence.

I) JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s revisional order and restoring the Sessions Judge’s order summoning the four persons under Section 319. The Court undertook a twofold analysis: first, an exposition of the settled law post Hardeep Singh and related authority (including Jitendra Nath Mishra); and second, an application of that law to the record.

Relying on Hardeep Singh, the Court reiterated that Section 319 contemplates the court taking into account materials available at inquiry and trial including statements recorded in the examination-in-chief and that the degree of satisfaction required is more than a prima facie threshold but less than that which would make conviction all but inevitable. The Court noted that materials such as the appellant’s unchallenged examination-in-chief, the medical records indicating a dangerous chest injury, and the disclosure/recovery of the knife from Mukesh together furnished a plausible basis for the Sessions Judge to conclude that the involvement of the proposed additional accused required testing at trial.

The existence of police reports which did not find participation was held not to be a conclusive exclusion; investigative opinions do not displace the trial court’s assessment where the trial court forms a reasonable and plausible view based on the evidence before it. While recognizing the revisional court’s competence to adopt an ‘eyes on’ approach, the Court emphasized that a ‘hands off’ approach would usually be appropriate when the trial court’s conclusion is not absurd or perverse. Given that the Sessions Judge’s satisfaction was within the permissible spectrum, interference was unjustified.

The Supreme Court therefore restored the Sessions Judge’s order and permitted the trial to proceed with the impleaded persons, while clarifying that its ruling is limited to the correctness of the order under Section 319 and does not pronounce on guilt. The Sessions Judge was encouraged to conclude trial expeditiously.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio lies in two consolidated propositions:

(1) The satisfaction required under Section 319 CrPC to summon an additional accused is a degree greater than mere prima facie material but less than the satisfaction necessary for conviction; courts may act on evidence collected during investigation and on examination-in-chief even if not yet tested by cross-examination.

(2) A revisional court should exercise restraint and not substitute its own evaluative judgment for that of the trial court where the latter’s conclusion is plausible and supported by materials on record; investigative reports that negate involvement are not necessarily conclusive and cannot automatically oust the trial court’s discretion to implead where reasonable satisfaction exists. The Sessions Judge’s order thus fell within lawful discretion and was rightly restored.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed obiter that while revisional courts possess power to examine such orders, the preferred stance is one of restraint (‘hands off’) given the trial court’s primary role in testing evidence. It reiterated that nothing in restoring the order should be read as an opinion on the merits of the allegations against the newly impleaded persons. The Court also noted the practical importance of advancing trials expeditiously and encouraged the Sessions Judge to conclude proceedings in a timely manner. These observations serve as guidance on institutional comity between trial and revisional forums.

c. GUIDELINES

i. The trial court may consider materials collected during investigation and testimony recorded in examination-in-chief while exercising Section 319 CrPC; cross-examination is not a precondition for summoning.

ii. The required satisfaction is intermediate: higher than a prima facie case but short of a level that guarantees conviction; the test is whether the material warrants testing the proposed accused at trial.

iii. Investigative reports negative of involvement should be weighed but not treated as determinative where the trial court forms a plausible contrary satisfaction based on the evidence before it.

iv. Revisional courts should avoid substituting their assessment for the trial court’s discretionary view unless that view is perverse or absurd; an ‘eyes on’ review is permissible but a ‘hands off’ approach is ordinarily preferable when the trial court’s conclusion is tenable.

v. When additional accused are impleaded, proceedings against them commence from the stage of taking cognizance and evidence must be tested in trial; judicial restraint preserves the adversarial fact-finding process.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed the careful balance struck by Hardeep Singh: enabling courts to implead persons against whom material emerges while guarding against arbitrary or mechanical use of Section 319. Practically, the judgment underscores that trial courts occupy the primary space to evaluate such materials; revisional intervention must be sparing. The case illustrates how testimonial assertions (here, the appellant’s detailed examination-in-chief), corroborated by medical records and recovery of a weapon, can constitute a sufficient foundation for impleading co-accused notwithstanding investigative reports to the contrary.

For practitioners, the judgment is a reminder to present cohesive trial-facing material if seeking impleader under Section 319, and for respondents to seek early challenge only where the trial court’s satisfaction is demonstrably unreasonable. The Court’s insistence on expeditious trial progression is salutary, particularly where Section 319 impleading can prolong proceedings; judicial administrators and trial judges should ensure prompt framing of issues and orderly testing of newly impleaded parties. The decision preserves the adversarial process allowing full evidence testing at trial while delineating the boundaries of revisional correction.

K) REFERENCES 

1. Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar & Ors., [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 416.

2. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92.

3. Jitendra Nath Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2023) 7 SCC 344.

4. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (India), Section 319.

5. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 323, 324, 307, 506, 34.

6. Arms Act, 1959, Section 25.