A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018), decided by the Supreme Court on 16 April 2025 (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.), and addresses

(i) whether State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood was rendered per incuriam,

(ii) whether that decision binds the present petitioners,

(iii) whether a writ under Article 32 can be used to directly or collaterally challenge a Supreme Court judgment.

The petitioners retired officers of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited sought pensionary benefits under the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 (the 1999 Scheme) but were excluded by the repeal notification dated 02.12.2004, which saved those who had already retired between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004.

The High Court in P.D. Nanda v. State of H.P. had read down the repeal to include similarly situated employees; a subsequent two-judge Bench in Rajesh Chander Sood reversed that view and upheld the cut-off date. The petitioners in the present case argued that Rajesh Chander Sood ignored binding precedents and was therefore per incuriam.

The three-Judge Bench systematically rejects the per incuriam plea, affirms the competence of the State to fix the cut-off date in light of administrative review and financial viability considerations, and crucially reiterates the settled principle that Supreme Court judgments passed under Article 136 cannot be collaterally attacked by proceedings under Article 32; review and curative petitions remain the proper remedies. The decision emphasizes finality of lis and the limits of judicial re-opening of concluded litigation.

Keywords: Article 32; Rajesh Chander Sood; per incuriam; finality of lis; Himachal Pradesh 1999 Scheme; cut-off date; pension; review; curative petition.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from a policy the 1999 Scheme which sought to extend to corporate sector employees parity with State Government pension benefits, by creating a corpus-based pension arrangement and allowing opting-in by employees; it was implemented effective 01.04.1999 by notification dated 29.10.1999.

The State later constituted a High Level Committee in 2003 to assess viability; the Committee reported in October 2003 that the scheme was not self-sustaining for reasons including interest rate uncertainty, declining recruitment (and hence corpus erosion), and an inability to yield government-like pensions from the envisaged corpus.

Acting on that report, the Finance Department repealed the 1999 Scheme by notification dated 02.12.2004, but saved employees who had retired between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 and who had opted for the scheme. A batch of writ petitions in the Himachal Pradesh High Court (lead: P.D. Nanda) challenged the repeal; the High Court read down the notification to include employees who had become members of the 1999 Scheme and had retired after 02.12.2004 or who remained in service so as to preserve the scheme’s object.

The State appealed and a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) reversed the High Court, holding that the State was entitled to withdraw the welfare measure prospectively and to fix the cut-off date 02.12.2004; this view vindicated administrative choice based on financial non-viability and rejected promissory-estoppel and parity claims.

Subsequently, three retired officers who were excluded by the 2004 notification filed the present writ under Article 32, challenging both the denial of benefits and the correctness of Rajesh Chander Sood, arguing the two-Judge Bench had acted per incuriam by failing to follow binding precedents and by misapplying principles relating to vested pension rights and Article 14 equality.

The Supreme Court convened a three-Judge Bench to consider whether Rajesh Chander Sood was per incuriam and whether a litigant can use Article 32 to reopen or collaterally attack a Supreme Court judgment. The Court examined the scheme’s architecture, the Committee’s report, the law on vested rights and estoppel, the jurisprudence on cut-off dates and budgetary policy, and the settled doctrine that final Supreme Court decisions cannot be re-litigated via Article 32 but by review or curative petitions.

The Court emphasized that an administrative decision to withdraw a welfare measure is reviewable on conventional grounds (arbitrariness, mala fides) but not susceptible to collateral upset in Article 32 when the Supreme Court has already pronounced.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The essential factual matrix is straightforward and critically determinative: the State issued the 1999 Scheme (notification 29.10.1999, effective 01.04.1999) to extend pension parity to employees of State-owned corporations; employees could opt in, surrendering employer’s CPF contribution (to be moved to a corpus) in exchange for pension benefits modelled on the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and related rules.

The Corporation amended bylaws to implement the scheme and many employees, including the three petitioners, exercised the option. The State convened a High Level Committee on 21.01.2003 to evaluate viability; the Committee reported on 28.10.2003 that the 1999 Scheme was not self-sustaining because of interest rate uncertainty, declining new entrants (shrinking corpus inflows), and insufficient fund yields to replicate government pensions.

Acting on that report, the Finance Department issued the repeal notification dated 02.12.2004 with a saving clause for those who had retired between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 and who had opted for the scheme, but denying similar benefits to those who remained in service and retired after the notification.

Employees challenged the repeal in the Himachal Pradesh High Court; the High Court found that members had vested rights on opting and read down the notification to include later retirees and those still in service, ordering corpus transfer, pension orders and interest.

The State appealed and the Supreme Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) reversed the High Court, holding that the State could withdraw a welfare scheme prospectively, save those who had commenced to draw pension, and that promissory estoppel did not apply because employee rights under the prior CPF regime were restored and corporate employers remained distinct juristic entities.

The present petitioners had superannuated after 02.12.2004 and did not participate in the earlier proceedings; they filed the present writ under Article 32 seeking parity. The State opposed on maintainability grounds and laches, and relied on Rajesh Chander Sood, the Committee’s financial findings, and the policy nature of budgetary allocation that cannot be judicially commandeered.

The Supreme Court, on full consideration, held that the petition constituted a collateral attack on a binding Supreme Court judgment, that Rajesh Chander Sood was not per incuriam (it did not ignore binding precedent), and reiterated that review and curative processes are the correct routes to challenge Supreme Court pronouncements; thus, the writ was dismissed. The Court emphasized the administrative bona fides of the State and the legitimate nexus between the cut-off classification and the object of containing financial exposure.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the judgment in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) is per incuriam and therefore not binding on similarly situated petitioners?

ii. Whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be maintained to directly or collaterally attack a prior judgment of the Supreme Court delivered under Article 136?

iii. Whether the State was justified in repealing the 1999 Scheme with effect 02.12.2004 and in fixing that date as the cut-off for saving pension rights of retirees?

iv. Whether the classification created by the cut-off date violat es Article 14 by dividing a homogeneous class without nexus to the object?

v. Whether promissory estoppel, vested rights or Article 300A create an inviolable property interest preventing repeal of the 1999 Scheme once employees had opted in?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The petitioners’ central contention is that the 1999 Scheme created a vested statutory right on employees who opted in and thereby forfeited prior employer CPF benefits; that vesting occurred on choice and enrolment, not merely on eventual superannuation, and therefore the State could not withdraw the acquired benefit unilaterally.

Relying on the express incorporation of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 into the 1999 Scheme (clause 1(2)), petitioners argue that the legal architecture conferred enforceable pensionary entitlements and connotes property under Article 300A; once the right vested by action and reliance, equitable doctrines such as promissory estoppel should block repudiation.

The petitioners further argue that Rajesh Chander Sood overlooked controlling precedents on equality and pension rights, notably D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, where the Constitution Bench recognized pension rights and struck down arbitrary cut-offs; they assert that a cut-off tied to date of retirement within a homogeneous class (employees who were members of the 1999 Scheme) lacks reasonable nexus to the object, thereby infringing Article 14.

The petitioners invited the Court to find Rajesh Chander Sood per incuriam because, they contend, the two-Judge Bench failed to consider a line of authority on vested pension rights and erred in treating the 1999 Scheme as a mere welfare indulgence revocable at will. In addition, the petitioners criticized the reliance on financial viability as a post hoc justification where the State had framed the scheme and the respondents had relied upon it asking why the State could not sustain the scheme or fund shortfalls if necessary, particularly where employees had altered position irrevocably by opting in.

The petitioners relied on equitable and constitutional protections to insist that the present retirees ought to be placed on parity with those who had already retired before 02.12.2004.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State’s response is anchored on three pillars: maintainability, administrative competence, and finality of Supreme Court decisions.

First, the State contends the writ under Article 32 is a collateral challenge to Rajesh Chander Sood and thus procedurally untenable; the correct remedy is review or curative petition, not fresh Article 32 proceedings seeking to revisit a Supreme Court pronouncement.

Second, on the merits, the State points to the High Level Committee’s comprehensive viability analysis (report dated 28.10.2003), which showed the corpus could not sustain government-level pensions and that continuing the scheme would impose unknown fiscal burdens; thus, the repeal and the 02.12.2004 cut-off are reasonable policy choices with a rational nexus to the object of containing financial burden. The State stresses that the 1999 Scheme was a welfare measure extended not in its capacity as employer of corporate employees but as a benefactor; corporate bodies remained independent juristic entities and the State never intended to assume residual budgetary liability judicially imposing such liability would usurp budget and policy discretion.

Third, the State argues there is no per incuriam: the two-Judge Bench in Rajesh Chander Sood carefully considered precedents such as R.R. Verma and BALCO and placed appropriate legal limitations on applying promissory estoppel and vested-rights reasoning where financial viability and inter-entity distinctions are material. Also, the State raises delay and laches: the petitioners did not participate earlier and only filed after their superannuation; equitable relief should be withheld.

Conclusively, the State submits that permitting Article 32 collateral attack would impair finality and invite endless litigation.

H) JUDGMENT

The three-Judge Bench (Ujjal Bhuyan, J., delivering the opinion) disposed of the petition by reiterating two central propositions:

(i) Rajesh Chander Sood is not per incuriam and remains binding,

(ii) judgments of this Court rendered under Article 136 are not amenable to collateral review by way of Article 32 writ petitions review/curative are the exclusive judicial remedies to revisit a Supreme Court decision.

The Court reconstructed the procedural history: High Court’s reading down (19.12.2013), reversal in Rajesh Chander Sood (2016), and the present writ. The Court analyzed whether the two-Judge Bench ignored authoritative precedents or failed to follow binding law; it concluded the two-Judge Bench gave “elaborate reasons” and did not disregard binding decisions; therefore the per incuriam label was unwarranted.

On legal principles, the Court canvassed authorities: Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (no writ under Article 32 to correct High Court orders affecting ongoing proceedings), Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami (no reopening of Supreme Court judgments by Article 32), Rupa Ashok Hurra (curative jurisdiction available for gross miscarriage, but not via Article 32), and Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action (reiterating non-maintainability of writs that amount to re-hearing Supreme Court decisions).

The judgment gave careful attention to the nature of the 1999 Scheme: it was introduced as a welfare measure with intended self-financing architecture; the High Level Committee’s report supplied factual underpinnings of unviability; the State acted bona fide on that basis. The Court accepted the State’s premise that the classification saving those already drawing pensions while withdrawing benefits prospectively for those whose pension rights had not yet arisen possessed a reasonable nexus to the object of limiting fiscal exposure.

The Court rejected promissory estoppel for reasons articulated in Rajesh Chander Sood: the employer-employee legal relationship did not convert corporate employees into State employees for all purposes; the prior CPF rights were restored if the 1999 Scheme was repealed and employees were not left worse off irretrievably.

On Article 14, the Court held the classification was not arbitrary: saving retirees who already had commenced to draw pension was rational; extending benefits to later retirees would have multiplied State exposure unfairly and lacked a compensating rationale.

On maintainability, the Court held it would be impermissible to permit litigants to use Article 32 to relitigate a matter already decided by this Court, because that would dissolve finality of lis and clog the administration of justice; review and curative petitions are the appropriate, circumscribed channels.

The Court therefore dismissed the petition while refraining from costs given petitioners’ age and status. The judgment carefully balanced constitutional remedies, administrative choice, and finality, and underscored that policy rescission grounded in verifiable financial incapacity is not ipso facto unconstitutional.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is twofold:

first, a Supreme Court judgment rendered under Article 136 (or via special leave) cannot be collaterally assailed by a writ under Article 32; the constitutionally prescribed corrective mechanisms are review and, in extreme cases, curative petitions not fresh writs that would reopen settled conclusions.

Second, where a State, acting bona fide on demonstrable financial impossibility, withdraws a welfare scheme prospectively and saves only those who have already commenced to draw benefits, such classification is legally sustainable if it bears a rational nexus to the object of minimizing fiscal exposure; vested rights that are contingent (contingent on future superannuation) are not invariably unalterable if the State’s retreat is justified and not arbitrary.

These principles dispose of both maintainability and merits questions in this matter.

b. OBITER DICTA 

Obiter observations stress the salutary value of finality of lis: the Court warns against the proliferation of collateral writs seeking re-adjudication of Supreme Court pronouncements, which would erode certainty and invite litigious churn.

The Court also records sympathy for retirees but makes clear sympathy cannot override rule of law constraints on judicial re-opening of its own final decisions the institutional cure is review/curative jurisdiction. Further, the judgment offers dicta on the limits of promissory estoppel against the State when welfare measures (not contractual employer obligations) are withdrawn on grounds of financial non-viability supported by contemporaneous examination.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Parties challenging a Supreme Court judgment should pursue review under the Rules of Court and, in rare circumstances, curative petitions — a fresh Article 32 writ is improper to relitigate final Supreme Court decisions.

2. When a welfare pension scheme is withdrawn, State action must be supported by credible, contemporaneous financial analysis; policy rescission based on documented non-viability is less likely to be struck down if a rational nexus to the object is demonstrable.

3. Fixation of a cut-off date that saves those already drawing benefits is a defensible classification if it prevents open-ended fiscal exposure and does not rest on arbitrary considerations.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision is a measured reaffirmation of two constitutional realities: institutional finality and the limited scope of equitable doctrines against the State where a welfare instrument is withdrawn on genuine financial grounds.

The Court demonstrates judicial restraint by distinguishing vested contractual or statutory rights from contingent or welfare-based entitlements, and by insisting that systemic fiscal judgments remain within the province of the executive unless shown arbitrary or mala fide.

By refusing to label Rajesh Chander Sood as per incuriam, the Court preserves doctrinal stability and prevents fragmentation of precedent; this outcome signals practitioners that litigants excluded by a prior Supreme Court pronouncement must proceed by review or curative modalities rather than collateral Article 32 litigation. For service and pension law, the judgment clarifies that an employee’s opt-in to a scheme does not automatically immunize the scheme from prospective withdrawal when the State demonstrates non-viability and exercises administrative review within legal bounds.

The judgment therefore tightens the interface between administrative policy, constitutional equality safeguards, and remedial architecture emphasizing that claims to pension benefits grounded in welfare instruments will be scrutinized against both the scheme’s statutory text and contemporaneous policy records. The Court’s insistence on finality furthers predictability in public law litigation and underscores the exceptional nature of curative relief.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018, Supreme Court of India, Judgment dated 16 April 2025.

2. State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77.

3. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1.

4. Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 225.

5. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.

6. D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305.

7. R.R. Verma v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 402.

8. BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333.

9. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161.

10. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3 SCC 114.

b. Important Statutes / Rules Referred

1. Constitution of India, Article 32.

2. Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 (Notification dated 29.10.1999; repeal notification 02.12.2004).

3. Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (incorporated by clause into the 1999 Scheme).

4. Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981.