A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The present judgment examines the retrospective and continuing applicability of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to criminal proceedings that arose prior to its enforcement, where the accused was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the appellant, convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, could claim the benefit of juvenility at the appellate stage, despite the offence having been committed in 1981 and despite the appellant having crossed the age threshold under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The Court analysed the legislative scheme of the 2000 Act, subsequent amendments by Act 33 of 2006, and the saving provisions under Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The judgment clarifies that juvenility must be determined with reference to the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence and that such a claim can be raised at any stage of proceedings, including after conviction. While upholding the conviction, the Court set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and remitted the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders under Section 15 of the 2000 Act, thereby reinforcing the rehabilitative philosophy underlying juvenile justice jurisprudence in India.

Keywords:
Juvenility, Pending criminal proceedings, Retrospective benefit, Juvenile Justice Act 2000, Sentencing modification

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from a conviction recorded in connection with an offence committed in December 1981, at a time when the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 governed juvenile offenders. Under the 1986 framework, a male offender above sixteen years was excluded from the definition of a juvenile. The appellant was accordingly tried as an adult and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court. While special leave petitions filed by co-accused were dismissed, notice was issued in the appellant’s case limited to the question of juvenility.

The background of the judgment is deeply embedded in the evolution of juvenile justice jurisprudence in India. The enactment of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 marked a decisive shift by uniformly raising the age of juvenility to eighteen years, irrespective of gender. Subsequent amendments in 2006 expanded the scope of the Act by expressly permitting claims of juvenility to be raised at any stage of proceedings. The legislative intent was clearly to extend rehabilitative protection to those who were children at the time of commission of the offence.

The Court was thus required to reconcile the appellant’s conviction under the pre-2000 regime with the expanded statutory protections introduced later. The issue assumed constitutional significance because it involved the interplay between vested rights, repeal and saving clauses, and the continuing applicability of beneficial legislation. The judgment situates itself within this broader statutory and doctrinal framework while addressing the specific injustice arising from rigid application of age thresholds under earlier enactments.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

An FIR was registered on 11 December 1981 at Police Station Gilaula, District Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, alleging commission of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, along with two co-accused, was tried before the Sessions Court. Upon conclusion of trial, all accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 994 of 1982. Special leave petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. While the petitions of the co-accused were dismissed, notice was issued in the appellant’s case confined to the plea of juvenility.

Pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, the trial court conducted an inquiry to determine the age of the appellant on the date of the offence. Documentary evidence, including school admission registers, transfer certificates, and gazette records of the high school examination, established the appellant’s date of birth as 15 April 1965. On the date of the offence, the appellant was 16 years, 7 months, and 26 days old.

The prosecution did not challenge the documentary evidence. The complainant had died, and no contrary evidence was led. Despite these findings, the trial court opined that the appellant was not a juvenile under the 1986 Act as he was above sixteen years of age.

The Supreme Court thus had before it an undisputed factual foundation establishing minority under the 2000 Act, alongside a conviction recorded decades earlier under a different statutory regime.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether juvenility is to be determined with reference to the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence?
ii. Whether a claim of juvenility can be raised at the appellate stage after final conviction?
iii. Whether the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 applies to offences committed prior to its enforcement?
iv. Whether the repeal of the 2000 Act by the 2015 Act extinguishes accrued rights of juvenility?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the appellant was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence and was therefore entitled to the benefit of juvenility under Section 2(l) of the 2000 Act. It was contended that Sections 7A and 20 expressly permit raising such a claim at any stage, including after conviction.

Reliance was placed on authoritative precedents such as Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) to demonstrate that the determinative date is the date of the offence and not the date of trial or conviction. The appellant further argued that Section 25 of the 2015 Act, read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, preserved vested rights accrued under the repealed enactment.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State contended that the appellant was rightly tried as an adult under the 1986 Act, as he had crossed sixteen years of age. It was argued that the 2000 Act could not be retrospectively applied to unsettle convictions attained under the earlier statute.

The State relied upon Gaurav Kumar @ Monu v. State of Haryana to submit that procedural safeguards relating to age determination must be strictly complied with and that belated claims should not ordinarily be entertained.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 2(l), Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
ii. Section 7A, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
iii. Section 20, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
iv. Section 64, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
v. Section 25, Juvenile Justice Act, 2015
vi. Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897
vii. Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court held that juvenility must be determined on the basis of the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence. The Court undertook an extensive examination of Section 20 of the 2000 Act, as amended in 2006, and emphasised that the Explanation expressly mandates determination of juvenility in all pending cases at any stage.

The Court clarified that the repeal of the 2000 Act by the 2015 Act does not obliterate accrued rights. Section 25 of the 2015 Act was interpreted as a saving provision preserving the application of the earlier regime to pending proceedings. Read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the statutory scheme protects substantive rights that had crystallised under the repealed law.

While affirming the conviction on merits, the Court set aside the sentence of life imprisonment. The matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders under Section 15 of the 2000 Act, including determination of fine and compensation payable to the victim’s family.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in the affirmation that the right to be treated as a juvenile is a substantive and accrued right that crystallises on the date of commission of the offence. This right is not extinguished by subsequent attainment of majority or by repeal of the governing statute. The Court authoritatively held that Sections 7A and 20 of the 2000 Act confer jurisdiction upon all courts, including appellate courts, to determine juvenility at any stage.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that the 2015 Act introduces a distinct regime concerning children in conflict with law and noted that complex constitutional questions may arise where offences are committed before 2015 but charges are filed thereafter. These observations were expressly left open.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Juvenility must be determined with reference to the date of offence.
ii. Claims of juvenility are maintainable at any stage of proceedings.
iii. Conviction may be sustained, but sentencing must conform to juvenile justice statutes.
iv. Pending cases remain governed by the 2000 Act despite its repeal.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 69
ii. Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, [1982] 3 SCR 583
iii. Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, [2005] 1 SCR 1019
iv. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, [2009] 7 SCR 623
v. Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2010] 5 SCR 137

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
ii. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
iii. General Clauses Act, 1897
iv. Indian Penal Code, 1860