The judgment in Seelan @ Jeyaseelan v. The Inspector of Police concerns the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition challenging conviction and sentence for the offence of rape of a minor child. The Supreme Court was required to examine whether the petitioner’s plea that the charge was framed only under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and not under Section 376(2) could sustain interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. The case involved the rape of a six-year-old girl, supported by consistent ocular and testimonial evidence, including that of the victim and her mother, who was an eye witness. The petitioner attempted to raise technical objections regarding the nature of the charge and physical incapacity on account of having only one hand. The Court rejected these submissions, holding that the charge framed under Section 376 IPC necessarily included Section 376(2) and that both courts below had adequately dealt with the plea of physical impossibility. The Supreme Court emphasized the settled principle that it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact, particularly in cases involving grave sexual offences against children, unless there was manifest perversity or miscarriage of justice. The dismissal of the petition reaffirmed the evidentiary value of a child victim’s testimony, the limited scope of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, and the approach of courts in sexual offences involving minors.

Keywords: Section 376 IPC, rape of minor, Special Leave Petition, concurrent findings of fact, child witness

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arose from a criminal prosecution relating to a sexual offence against a minor child, an area of criminal jurisprudence where courts have consistently adopted a victim-centric and protective approach. The petitioner was convicted by the trial court for committing rape on a six-year-old girl, an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Madurai Bench, in its revisional jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings, the petitioner invoked the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by filing a Special Leave Petition.

The primary background issue before the Supreme Court was not a reappreciation of evidence but a technical plea raised at the stage of hearing. The petitioner contended that the charge framed was only under Section 376(1) IPC and not under Section 376(2), and therefore the statutory minimum punishment prescribed under Section 376(2)(f) could not apply. This contention was sought to be used as a basis to question the legality of the conviction and sentence. The Court, therefore, examined the charge-sheet and the charges framed by the trial court.

The background also reflects the broader judicial approach towards sexual offences involving children prior to the enactment of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Even under the IPC regime, courts treated rape of minors as an aggravated offence. The case further involved an attempt by the accused to rely on alleged physical incapacity to commit the offence, a defence frequently raised in sexual offence trials and consistently scrutinized by courts with caution.

The judgment fits within a long line of Supreme Court decisions emphasizing restraint under Article 136, especially where findings of fact are based on credible evidence and affirmed by multiple courts.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The prosecution case was that the petitioner, an adult male above eighteen years of age, committed rape upon a six-year-old girl. The incident occurred when the child was alone and vulnerable, and the act was witnessed by the victim’s mother, who arrived at the scene and saw the petitioner in the act. The victim immediately narrated the incident, and her testimony remained consistent throughout the trial.

The investigation led to the recovery of the petitioner’s lungi, which corroborated the prosecution version. Medical examination established that the petitioner was potent. The accused absconded after the incident and was apprehended only after fifteen days, a circumstance relied upon by the prosecution as indicative of guilt. The child victim’s statement, though of a tender age, was found reliable and trustworthy by the trial court after due satisfaction regarding her competency to testify.

During trial, the petitioner raised a defence that he had only one hand, and therefore it was physically impossible for him to commit the act of rape. This defence was carefully examined by the trial court with reference to medical and factual evidence. The court rejected the plea, holding that there was no medical or factual basis to conclude that the act was impossible. The High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, independently assessed this contention and concurred with the findings of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted under Section 376 IPC and sentenced accordingly. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, finding no illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court, primarily challenging the nature of the charge and the applicability of Section 376(2).

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the charge framed under Section 376 IPC could be construed to include Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code.
ii. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
iii. Whether the plea of physical incapacity due to having one hand rendered commission of the offence impossible.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the charge framed by the trial court was specifically under Section 376(1) IPC and not under Section 376(2). It was argued that in the absence of a specific charge under Section 376(2)(f), which prescribes a minimum punishment of ten years for rape of a minor below twelve years, the conviction and sentence were legally unsustainable. Reliance was placed on the principle that an accused must have clear notice of the exact charge.

It was further contended that the petitioner suffered from physical disability, having only one hand, making it physically impossible to commit the offence as alleged. The petitioner also urged the Court to consider the long lapse of time since the incident and to exercise leniency in sentencing.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent State submitted that the charge framed under Section 376 IPC was comprehensive and necessarily included Section 376(2). It was argued that no prejudice was caused to the accused, as the nature of allegations and evidence clearly pointed to an aggravated form of rape involving a minor child.

The State emphasized that there were concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court based on cogent and reliable evidence, including the testimony of the child victim and her mother. It was contended that the plea of physical impossibility had been rightly rejected by both courts. The State urged that no ground for interference under Article 136 was made out.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860
ii. Article 136, Constitution of India

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition. The Court first examined the charge framed by the trial court and held that it was not confined to Section 376(1) alone but was framed under Section 376 IPC, which includes the aggravated forms under Section 376(2). The Court rejected the technical plea raised by the petitioner.

The Court emphasized that there were concurrent findings of fact that the victim, a six-year-old child, was raped by the petitioner. The testimony of the victim was found credible, and it was corroborated by her mother, who was an eye witness. The Court reiterated that the evidence of a child witness, if found reliable, can form the sole basis of conviction.

On the plea of physical incapacity, the Court noted that both courts below had considered and rejected the argument that having one hand made commission of the offence impossible. The Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and found no perversity.

The Court further observed that since the State had not filed an appeal seeking enhancement of sentence, and considering that the incident had occurred nearly twenty years earlier, it was not necessary to go into the question of applicability of Section 376(2)(f) or reduction of minimum punishment. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that a charge framed under Section 376 IPC is not confined to sub-section (1) alone and can encompass aggravated forms under Section 376(2) when the facts so disclose. The Court held that technical objections regarding the framing of charge cannot override substantive justice when no prejudice is caused to the accused.

The Court reaffirmed the settled law that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, particularly where such findings are based on credible and consistent evidence. The evidentiary value of the testimony of a child victim, when corroborated and found reliable, was again underscored.

The rejection of the defence of physical impossibility further reinforces the principle that such pleas must be supported by cogent medical or scientific evidence and cannot be accepted on mere assertions.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court’s observation that it was refraining from examining the applicability of Section 376(2)(f) and the minimum punishment prescribed thereunder, due to the absence of a State appeal and the long passage of time, constitutes obiter dicta. This observation reflects judicial restraint and highlights the discretionary nature of sentencing considerations in appellate jurisdiction.

The Court also implicitly reiterated the need for expeditious and sensitive handling of sexual offence cases involving children, though this was not central to the decision.

c) GUIDELINES

No specific guidelines were issued in this case. However, the judgment reinforces existing judicial principles relating to interpretation of charges, appreciation of evidence of child witnesses, and the limited scope of interference under Article 136.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment stands as a reaffirmation of core principles of criminal appellate jurisprudence. It underscores that technical pleas regarding the framing of charges cannot defeat substantive justice in cases involving grave offences like rape of a minor. The Supreme Court’s refusal to interfere with concurrent findings of fact reflects judicial consistency and respect for the hierarchy of courts.

The decision also strengthens the jurisprudence on the reliability of child witnesses and eye witness testimony in sexual offence cases. By rejecting the defence of physical incapacity without medical substantiation, the Court prevented dilution of accountability through speculative defences.

The restrained approach adopted by the Court in sentencing aspects, given the absence of a State appeal, demonstrates adherence to procedural fairness. The judgment thus contributes to the stability and predictability of criminal law, particularly in the context of offences against children.

K) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred
i. Seelan @ Jeyaseelan v. The Inspector of Police, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1235

b) Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860
ii. Constitution of India