i. Whether the High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail to accused who had repeatedly evaded execution of bailable and non-bailable warrants and against whom proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC had been initiated?

ii. Whether the High Court could ignore the mandatory twin conditions laid down in Section 212(6) Companies Act while granting anticipatory bail in respect of offences under Section 447 Companies Act?

iii. Whether courts have an undiluted discretion under Section 204 CrPC to substitute summons for warrants regardless of the gravity of offences, or whether relevant circumstances (nature of offence, risk of absconding, prior non-execution) constrain that discretion?

iv. Whether the conduct of accused in concealing themselves and avoiding court process amounts to an interference with administration of justice that disentitles them to the exceptional remedy of anticipatory bail?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant, Serious Fraud Investigation Office, advanced the following core submissions before the Supreme Court:

(i) The High Court orders granting anticipatory bail were perverse because they ignored the Special Court’s detailed findings and the chronology of repeated failed attempts to secure attendance — including multiple non-bailable warrants and proclamation orders under Section 82 CrPC.

(ii) In offences covered under Section 447 Companies Act the twin conditions of Section 212(6) are mandatory and must be satisfied. The Public Prosecutor must be afforded a chance to oppose and the court must be satisfied of reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit offences while on bail.

(iii) Anticipatory bail is exceptional and must not be granted as a matter of course in serious economic offences involving large public funds and intricate conspiracies.

(iv) The High Court failed to consider well-established jurisprudence that economic offences are a distinct class where custodial processes and strict scrutiny of bail are warranted.

(v) The conduct of the accused in deliberately hiding, changing addresses, colluding with process servers and preventing execution of warrants demonstrates propensity to abscond or interfere, making grant of anticipatory bail inappropriate.

The SFIO urged setting aside High Court orders and directing surrender before the Special Court so that bail applications, if any, could be considered afresh with due regard to statutory and jurisprudential safeguards.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents (various accused) advanced differing but related arguments:

(i) Some contended they were unaware of proceedings or of summons/warrants and thus avoidance was not wilful.

(ii) Several relied on the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC and submitted that exceptional relief of anticipatory bail was available where arrest would cause harassment, humiliation or lead to irreparable prejudice and that the High Court had properly applied its discretion.

(iii) Respondents who had their anticipatory bail initially granted by the Special Court pointed to procedural safeguards already applied by trial court in those limited instances.

(iv) Some argued technical defects or clerical errors in initial cognizance and process meant that execution difficulties could not be equated with deliberate evasion.

(v) Others urged that mere non-execution reports by process servers (locked house, not present) do not ipso facto raise a finding of absconding and the High Court was entitled to examine the totality of material and grant anticipatory bail if satisfied.

The respondents urged that the Supreme Court ought not to interfere with High Court discretion unless demonstrably perverse, and that any penal consequence (including criminal contempt or prosecution for obstructing process) was for appropriate fora.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 212(6), Companies Act, 2013 — mandatory twin conditions for bail in offences covered under Section 447.

ii. Section 447, Companies Act, 2013 — punishment for fraud (cognizable when meeting thresholds).

iii. Section 204, CrPC — issue of process: summons-case or warrant-case discretion.

iv. Section 82, CrPC — proclamation for person absconding when warrants cannot be executed.

v. Section 438, CrPC — anticipatory bail: extraordinary power, to be exercised sparingly and considering nature/gravity and flight risk.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court (Trivedi, J.) allowed the SFIO appeals (except three identified SLPs where special circumstances applied) and set aside the High Court orders of 29 March 2023 and 20 April 2023 that had granted anticipatory bail to numerous accused.

The Court’s analysis proceeded along three interlocked axes: statutory mandate under Section 212(6), established jurisprudence on anticipatory bail in economic offences, and the impact of accused’s deliberate evasion of process (non-execution of warrants and initiation of Section 82 CrPC proclamation).

First, the Court reiterated that Section 212(6) makes offences under Section 447 cognizable and imposes mandatory twin conditions before bail can be granted. The Public Prosecutor must be given opportunity to oppose and, if opposed, the court must be satisfied of reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not reoffend while on bail. The Court held these conditions apply equally in anticipatory bail proceedings and cannot be ignored.

Second, the Court applied settled authorities (including P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, Nimmagadda Prasad, and others) to stress that economic offences are a class apart. Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and must be sparingly granted, particularly where alleged offences involve large-scale public loss and cool, calculated conspiracies.

Third, the Court emphasised the procedural history before the Special Court: initial bailable warrants, multiple non-bailable warrants issued subsequently due to non-execution, detailed Special Court orders to secure attendance, and proclamation proceedings initiated for absconding accused. The High Court orders granting anticipatory bail were found to have not adverted to these proceedings nor applied Section 212(6)’s twin conditions, rendering them perverse.

On discretionary aspects under Section 204 CrPC, the Supreme Court held there is no rigid formula mandating issuance of summons where the facts point to a warrant case. The discretion to issue summons or warrant depends on diverse considerations — nature of offence, seriousness, character of evidence, peculiar circumstances of accused and risk of absconding — and non-execution histories justify non-bailable warrants and proclamation steps.

Given the accused had repeatedly concealed themselves, avoided execution of process even after Special Court rejection of anticipatory bail, and, in some cases, the Special Court itself had granted bail only later after due scrutiny, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court orders as perverse and untenable in law.

The Court directed the respondents to surrender to the Special Court within one week and clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on merits; bail applications filed later before the Special Court are to be decided according to law.

Appeals arising out of several SLPs were allowed while three (Akshat Singh, Naveen Kumar and Mahesh Dutt Sharma) were dismissed as not pressed or on account of lower court grants.

The Court underscored that judicial time and the trial process must be respected and the accused are duty-bound to cooperate with courts rather than delay or frustrate administration of justice by concealing or avoiding process.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core legal reasoning (ratio) rests on three pillars:

1. Section 212(6) prescribes mandatory twin conditions for bail in offences under Section 447 Companies Act, and those conditions must be satisfied even in anticipatory bail proceedings; courts cannot ignore them.

2. Anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC is an extraordinary remedy and must be exercised sparingly, particularly in economic offences which constitute a separate class due to their complex conspiratorial nature and the large public harm they cause; prior precedents require strict scrutiny of bail pleas in such matters.

3. Where the accused has engaged in conduct that obstructs the administration of justice—repeatedly avoiding execution of bailable/non-bailable warrants and prompting proclamation proceedings—that conduct aggravates flight risk and interference with trial, and disentitles the accused from the exceptional privilege of anticipatory bail.

The combined effect is that High Court orders granting anticipatory bail without considering these statutory and factual features are perverse and legally unsustainable.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside those orders and directed surrender for appropriate proceedings before the Special Court. These conclusions reproduce and apply earlier authorities (P. Chidambaram, Inder Mohan Goswami, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy), and interpret Section 204 CrPC discretion not as mechanical but contextual.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court made important observations beyond the strict ratio that have persuasive value.

It observed that judicial time at all levels is precious and that accused persons are duty-bound to cooperate with trial courts and attend when required. Avoidance of attendance or collusion with process servers to frustrate execution of warrants amounts to obstruction of justice.

The Court emphasised that issuance of non-bailable warrants and initiation of proclamation proceedings must be treated seriously by appellate forums when they consider anticipatory bail petitions, and not dismissed as mere procedural formalities.

The judgment reiterated that there is no rigid “summons-first” formula under Section 204 CrPC and that judges must factor in the nature of offence, evidence and possibility of absconding when choosing process.

The Court also clarified it expressed no opinion on the merits and left bail determinations to the trial court to assess facts and applications in accordance with law. These passages function as guidance to High Courts and trial courts in handling anticipatory bail applications in complex economic prosecutions.

c. GUIDELINES

• Mandatory compliance with Section 212(6): In offences under Section 447 Companies Act, any bail (including anticipatory bail) must respect the twin conditions of Section 212(6) — Public Prosecutor must be heard and, if opposed, the court must be satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit an offence while on bail.

• Exceptional nature of anticipatory bail in economic offences: High Courts and Sessions Courts must exercise Section 438 powers sparingly in economic offences, with careful reasons recorded considering nature of accusations, gravity, evidence, and risk of flight or witness tampering. Reference precedents must be followed.

• Consideration of prior non-execution and proclamation: Where non-bailable warrants have been issued and proclamation proceedings initiated, courts should treat such history as material and not casually disregard it while considering anticipatory bail. Such conduct indicates risk of absconding/obstruction.

• Discretion under Section 204 CrPC is contextual: There is no inflexible rule that summons must precede warrants; the choice depends on offence gravity, accused’s conduct and practical likelihood of securing attendance. Courts must record reasons for choosing summons over warrant or vice versa.

• Duty of accused to cooperate with trial courts: Courts should record that accused must not resort to concealment or other obstructive conduct to derail proceedings. Non-cooperation is a strong factor militating against anticipatory bail.

• If anticipatory bail is granted notwithstanding adverse conduct, reasons must be detailed: High Courts must not pass cryptic orders; they must advert to the Special Court orders, the history of process execution, and statutory constraints when granting exceptional relief.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court in SFIO v. Aditya Sarda affirms a robust, contextual approach to anticipatory bail in complex economic prosecutions. Statutory shackles such as Section 212(6) cannot be circumvented. Established jurisprudence treating economic offences as a class apart remains authoritative. Courts must factor in the accused’s conduct, including repeated non-execution of process and initiation of Section 82 CrPC proclamations, as potent indicia against grant of anticipatory bail.

Practically, the judgment signals to High Courts that interlocutory indulgences that ignore trial court records and statutory safeguards will be reversed. For trial courts and investigators, it vindicates rigorous process steps (issuing NBWs, invoking proclamation) as legitimate tools to secure attendance.

For litigators, the case underlines the need to address Section 212(6) head-on in any bail strategy, to confront the Public Prosecutor’s opposition, and where necessary to seek expeditious adjudication by the trial court rather than pivot to appellate interventions that may be viewed as circumventing trial process.

The Court’s refusal to express on merits preserves prosecutorial contest strictly for trial. But the order to surrender and to face trial reasserts the primacy of procedure over tactical delay.

Overall, the judgment strengthens procedural discipline in white-collar prosecutions and sharpens the threshold for granting anticipatory bail where public interest, the scale of alleged fraud and obstructions to process are evident.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Ors., (2007) 12 SCC 1.
2. P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24.
3. Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 439.
4. Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 466.
5. Srikant Upadhyay & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Another, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 282.
6. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2023) 12 SCC 1.
7. Union of India through Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 SCC Online SC 306.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Companies Act, 2013 — Section 212(6); Section 447.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 82, 204, 438.
3. Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (referred in complaint).