A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1845 : 2025 INSC 528, holding that the family- and high-court reasonings denying maintenance to the wife were unsustainable and that maintenance must be awarded from the date of filing. The Court rejected speculative findings of the Family Court notably the assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands as contrary to law and based on conjecture. It further held that the Family Court misread a compromise deed to impute an admission of misconduct by the wife where none existed.

Applying the principle in Rajnesh v. Neha and emphasising the protective and remedial object of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court directed payment of Rs. 4,000 per month to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition and confirmed maintenance already awarded to the children from the same date (with the daughter’s arrears limited to her attaining majority). The judgment also reaffirmed the legal position that informal religious tribunals such as Court of Kazi, Dar-ul-Qaza or Sharia Courts have no coercive legal status; their decisions are enforceable only if voluntarily accepted and not in conflict with statutory law.

Keywords: Section 125 CrPC; maintenance from date of application; dowry presumption rejected; Dar-ul-Qaza/Court of Kazi legal status; compromise deed; Rajnesh v. Neha; second marriage; maintenance arrears.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal concerns entitlement to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC after marital breakdown between spouses who had each entered a second marriage. The wife (appellant) alleged cruelty and forcible eviction by the husband, and filed for maintenance; the husband filed and later obtained a talaq through informal religious adjudications.

The Family Court granted modest maintenance to minor children but denied maintenance to the wife, reasoning inter alia that:
(a) being a second marriage precluded dowry demand and

(b) a prior compromise deed reflected the wife’s admission of misconduct. The High Court dismissed revision, accepting those reasons.

The Supreme Court reviewed whether the courts below had applied proper legal principles in assessing evidence and granting relief under the protective and remedial regime of Section 125. The Court examined two recurring themes: the inappropriateness of drawing legal conclusions from speculative social assumptions (such as a second marriage meaning no dowry demand), and the legal status of decisions or determinations by bodies described as Court of Kazi, Dar-ul-Qaza or Sharia Court. The judgment situates itself in a line of precedents stressing purposive interpretation of maintenance provisions and the primacy of statutory adjudication over unenforceable religious pronouncements.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The parties married on 24.09.2002 according to Islamic rites; both had earlier marriages. Two children were born of the union: daughter Aatika and son Muzammil. In 2005 the husband filed a divorce suit before a Court of Kazi in Bhopal which was dismissed pursuant to a compromise dated 22.11.2005. The wife alleged repeated cruelty and dowry demands (a motorcycle and Rs. 50,000), and that she and the children were turned out in May 2008. Thereafter, in September–October 2008 the husband filed for divorce again before a Darul Kaja/Kajiyat and a talaqnama dated 22.01.2009 followed.

The wife filed a petition under Section 125 CrPC on 13.10.2008 claiming Rs. 5,000 per month for herself and Rs. 1,000 each for the children. The Family Court awarded Rs. 1,500 to the daughter and Rs. 1,000 to the son but denied maintenance to the wife on findings that she had left the matrimonial home and that the compromise reflected her admission of wrongdoing; it further reasoned that there was no scope for dowry-demand in a second marriage. The High Court in revision upheld the Family Court’s findings. The husband failed to appear before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a wife deserted by her husband is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC when courts below find she left the matrimonial home?
ii. Whether speculative social assumptions (e.g., second marriage implies no dowry demand) can justify denying maintenance?
iii. Whether a compromise deed that contains no explicit admission can be read as an admission to deny maintenance?
iv. From which date should maintenance ordered under Section 125 be made payable — date of application or date of order?
v. What legal status, if any, attaches to decisions of Court of Kazi/Dar-ul-Qaza/Sharia Court in India?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant’s counsel argued that she was illiterate, had no independent income, and was turned out after being beaten and subjected to dowry demand and cruelty. She relied upon the compromise (2005) to show attempts to live together and alleged no admission of misconduct therein. She contended respondent had repeatedly pursued informal religious divorce forums and that the Family Court erred in treating the wife as living without sufficient cause. Counsel sought maintenance for the wife and enhancement for children.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State (respondent no.1) supported the Family Court’s award to children and the denial of maintenance to the wife on the ground that she was living separately without sufficient reason. The husband was served but did not appear to contest before the Supreme Court.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court held that the Family Court’s reasoning was legally unsound and set aside both the Family Court and High Court orders to the extent they denied maintenance to the wife.

The Court found two principal infirmities:

(1) the Family Court’s assumption that a second marriage rules out dowry demand was speculative and contravened judicial restraint; and

(2) the Family Court misread the compromise deed as containing an admission by the wife when no such admission appeared on the document.

The Court emphasized the remedial object of Section 125 CrPC and the protective role it plays for dependent spouses and children, invoking Rajnesh v. Neha to hold that maintenance ordinarily ought to be payable from the date of filing the maintenance petition rather than from the date of judicial order, acknowledging chronic judicial delays. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court awarded Rs. 4,000 per month to the appellant wife from the date of filing and directed payment of arrears within four months.

The previously awarded maintenance to children was ordered payable from the date of application, and the daughter’s entitlement was limited by her attainment of majority. The Court further clarified that decisions of bodies styled Court of Kazi/Dar-ul-Qaza/Sharia Court have no coercive legal force and are enforceable only if voluntarily accepted and not in conflict with statutory law.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal conclusions were:

(i) courts must not base maintenance denial on conjectural social assumptions such as the belief that a second marriage negates dowry demand;

(ii) an absence of express admission in a compromise deed precludes construing it as an admission justifying denial of maintenance; and

(iii) in light of the remedial purpose of Section 125, maintenance should generally be awarded from the date of filing the application, consistent with Rajnesh v. Neha and related precedents that guard against destitution due to procedural delay. These holdings together governed the reinstatement and quantification of maintenance.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court reiterated and expanded prior observations (notably in Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India and related pronouncements) that Dar-ul-Qaza/Court of Kazi/Sharia Courts are informal dispute-resolution mechanisms without statutory or coercive authority; fatwas and decisions of such bodies have no legal status unless voluntarily accepted and not inconsistent with law. The Court cautioned these bodies about issuing fatwas affecting individual rights at the instance of strangers and underlined human-rights protections against informal punishments. The remarks emphasise constitutional primacy and rule of law.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Courts should avoid speculative socio-moral inferences (e.g., that second marriage precludes dowry demand) when adjudicating maintenance.

2. Compromise deeds must be read textually; courts cannot invent admissions absent on the instrument.

3. Section 125 is remedial: maintenance ordinarily to run from date of filing to prevent destitution.

4. Decisions of informal religious tribunals carry only inter-se validity if voluntarily accepted and not contrary to law; they are not enforceable coercively.

5. Courts must apply purposive interpretation to protect dependants and offset procedural delays.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court corrected factual and legal errors by lower fora and reaffirmed the protective ambit of Section 125 CrPC. The judgment supplies three durable lessons for family-law adjudication: avoid socio-legal stereotyping; respect the textual contents of settlement instruments; and apply a purposive approach that dates maintenance to the filing of the petition where delay is judicially attributable. The ruling also clarifies the constitutional limits of parallel religious dispute mechanisms and reiterates that informal religious determinations cannot displace statutory rights unless assimilated voluntarily and lawfully. Practitioners should note the Court’s willingness to grant maintenance retrospectively to avoid compounding vulnerability caused by delay. The award of Rs. 4,000 monthly to the appellant is modest but principle-affirming: the process must not penalise a dependent spouse for the systemic pace of justice.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Shahjahan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1845 : 2025 INSC 528.

2. Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324.

3. Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 707.

4. Nagarathinam v. State, through the Inspector of Police, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 559.

5. Shail Kumari Devi v. Krishan Bhagwan Pathak, (2008) 9 SCC 632.

6. Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353.

7. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 125.