A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras, Criminal Appeal No. 5245 of 2024, decided by the Supreme Court on 2 May 2025, concerning criminal contempt arising from the fabrication and presentation of forged High Court interim orders to obstruct execution of a decree.

The central issues are whether the appellants were proved guilty of criminal contempt beyond reasonable doubt for either creating or using fabricated High Court orders, and whether the proceedings were time-barred under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The judgment painstakingly traces the investigative and procedural chronology: the fake orders were produced before the executing bailiff on 17 April 2018, the decree-holder lodged complaints and filed W.P. No. 22410 of 2018 (filed 20 August 2018), the Single Judge directed placement before the Division Bench on 5 September 2018, but the contempt petition was not numbered until 2022 because the writ bundle was misplaced in the High Court Registry.

On the facts as established by CBCID investigation, confessions, voice samples, recovered digital materials and FSL reports, the High Court convicted Contemnors C3, C4 and C7 for creating/using forged orders and sentenced them to six months’ simple imprisonment; the Supreme Court affirmed conviction but reduced sentence to one month.

The Court applied settled principles from Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and earlier precedents on limitation and the nature of criminal contempt, emphasising that utilisation of a fabricated order, when known to be false or used to confer undeserved benefit, constitutes contempt even if the contemnor is not the fabricator. This analysis relies exclusively on the judgment record supplied.

Keywords: criminal contempt; forged High Court orders; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 20 limitation; Pallav Sheth; Vinay Chandra Mishra; Khushi Ram; forgery; administration of justice.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This portion contextualises the dispute and judicial response in a single extended analytical paragraph. The dispute originates from an ordinary decree execution—O.S. No. 212 of 2000—in which the District Munsiff, Tiruchengode, on 17 November 2004, had decreed possession and arrears for the J.K.K. Rangammal Charitable Trust (the Decree-Holder).

When an executing Court Amin attempted to deliver possession on 17 April 2018, the judgment-debtors (Contemnor Nos.1–3) produced interim orders purportedly passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P. Nos. 1467–1469 of 2018 dated 12 March 2018 staying the decree. The Decree-Holder immediately obtained copies and lodged complaints, discovering on verification that the orders were fabricated and that no such petitions were on record; this gave rise to parallel criminal investigation (FIR in DCB Crime No.8 of 2018) and a writ petition W.P. No. 22410 of 2018 seeking initiation of contempt action and police action.

The High Court’s Single Judge on 5 September 2018 recorded prima facie satisfaction and directed placement before the Division Bench for exercise of contempt jurisdiction under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of the Contempt Act, 1971. The criminal investigatory trail was extensive: arrests (notably C4 on 10.09.2018, C3 on 11.09.2018), confessions and statements, seizure of material from a Digital Net Centre in Bhavani, forensic analysis by the Tamil Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory, voice samples recorded under Section 164(5) Cr.P.C., CBCID status reports, and the tracing of electronic traces including an email forwarding the format for the forged order.

Procedural complication arose because the writ case bundle went missing in the High Court Registry for about four years; the contempt petition was numbered as SMCRLCP No.2493 of 2022 only after the bundle resurfaced.

On this factual and procedural background the Division Bench framed charges against several contemnors and ultimately convicted Contemnors C3, C4 and C7; this conviction and sentence were challenged in the Supreme Court, which affirmed guilt but reduced the punishment after analysing limitation, standard of proof and harms posed by fabrication of court orders.

The High Court and Supreme Court decisions emphasise two pillars: first, the sanctity of judicial records and danger posed by fabrication; and second, a purposive construction of Section 20 limitation so as not to render constitutional contempt powers nugatory when the Court itself had drawn the matter within one year.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

A detailed fact-narrative follows in a consolidated paragraph focusing on the material chronology and incriminating evidence. The District Munsiff Court decree in favour of the J.K.K. Rangammal Charitable Trust (the Decree-Holder) was sought to be executed when the decree-debtors produced three photocopies of interim orders C.R.P. Nos.1467–1469 of 2018 (with C.M.P. numbers) dated 12 March 2018 purportedly signed by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa Sathyanarayana staying the decree; these orders were never filed and the Judge did not hold the roster on that date.

The Decree-Holder obtained certified copies and lodged complaints with the High Court and the Superintendent of Police, Namakkal. A FIR (DCB Crime No.8 of 2018) was registered; the Single Judge directed the Registry to place the matter before the Division Bench on 5 September 2018 after administrative action and police monitoring were ordered.

The District Crime Branch arrested Contemnor No.4 (C4) on 10.09.2018, who gave a statement admitting the manner in which the fake orders were prepared at a Digital Net Centre in Bhavani with assistance of P. Meiyappan (C6); Contemnor No.3 (C3) was arrested on 11.09.2018 and disclosed how the fake copies reached the parties.

CBCID later took over reinvestigation, collected voluminous material, seized objects from the Digital Net Centre sent to the FSL, obtained voice samples and recorded witness statements under Section 164(5), Cr.P.C. The CBCID reports, FSL analysis, telephonic recordings and admitted affidavits of contemnors formed the evidentiary backbone pointing to the chain: an advocate alleged to have supplied a format (via email to P. Meiyappan), C4 preparing the forged stay orders, and C4/C7 orchestrating distribution through intermediaries (including C6) to the tenants who then produced the papers before the bailiff; C3 in an affidavit admitted that his wife handed the bogus order to the Court Amin and that C4 had guided them for two decades so they trusted the document’s genuineness.

During proceedings the registry misplacement delayed formal notice and numbering but judicial records from the Single Judge and Division Bench show earlier initiation and direction to proceed; the Division Bench framed charges on 19.12.2022 and later impleaded C6 and C7 on the basis of CBCID material. Two contemnors died during the proceedings and proceedings abated against them; C6 was given benefit of doubt by the High Court while C3, C4 and C7 were convicted and sentenced, a result affirmed in appeal except that the Supreme Court reduced the sentence duration.

These facts were recorded and analysed in the impugned orders and form the factual matrix on which legal conclusions were reached.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the appellants were proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of criminal contempt for creating or using forged High Court interim orders?

ii. Whether initiation of contempt proceedings was barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, given the delay between the alleged commission (17/04/2018) and statutory notice/numbering (2022)?

iii. Whether the High Court erred in its approach to the standard of proof applicable to criminal contempt and in relying on summary procedure without formal framing of charges?

iv. Whether the act of producing/using a fabricated order by a beneficiary who did not author the forgery nevertheless constitutes criminal contempt?

v. Whether the sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment imposed by the High Court was excessive in the facts and circumstances warranting modification?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants advanced a concentrated set of legal and procedural arguments in defence of their challenge to conviction; the principal contours are captured in the following comprehensive paragraph.

First, appellants asserted that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 operated as a one-year limitation which had expired because the fake interim orders were produced on 17 April 2018 but statutory notice in the contempt proceeding (and numbering) occurred only in 2022, so the action was time-barred; reliance was placed on the literal import of limitation and precedents emphasising timeliness.

Second, appellants contended that formal charges were never properly framed or explained to them in the manner required for criminal offences and that the summary contempt procedure cannot dispense with the core requirement of notice and clear charge formulation; on this ground they argued denial of procedural fairness violated natural justice.

Third, appellants urged that criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—applies with full rigour to criminal contempt and that High Court’s finding was based on probabilities, presumptions and investigative reports rather than conclusive proof; they relied on classical decisions such as Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati to insist on strict criminal proof.

Fourth, appellants highlighted inconsistencies in the record, benefit of doubt extended to others (C6, Contemnor No.5) and the absence of direct proof that the specific appellants authored the forgeries; therefore, they urged acquittal or at least mitigation.

Fifth, appellants argued that even if impropriety or procedural lapses were present, the constitutional and statutory contempt powers ought to be exercised with caution given the criminal character of the proceedings and potential deprivation of liberty; accordingly, sentencing required tempering.

These arguments were placed against the evidentiary backdrop and the appellants sought either acquittal on legal or factual grounds or reduction of the sentence.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent (High Court and Decree-Holder) presented a coherent defence of the impugned conviction and sentence; the substance is set out in this comprehensive paragraph. The respondent emphasized that the proceedings were lawfully initiated within the one-year period because the writ petition (W.P. No. 22410 of 2018) was filed on 20 August 2018 and the Single Judge on 5 September 2018 directed placement before the Division Bench thus initiation occurred within the statutory window as interpreted in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian which permits treating filing or court initiation as commencement under Section 20 where delay is attributable to registry or court action; to adopt a narrower view would emasculate contempt jurisdiction when the court itself takes steps within one year.

The respondent pointed to the voluminous CBCID investigation, FSL reports, recovered digital objects from the Digital Net Centre, recorded telephonic conversations, confessions and sworn affidavits (notably the admissions by C3 that he produced the bogus order and that C4 had handed it over through intermediaries), as cogent material establishing both fabrication and utilisation; the respondent argued that utilisation by a beneficiary who knew or ought to have known the order’s spurious nature is itself contempt even if forgery was effected by a third party this proposition being rooted in In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh and subsequent jurisprudence.

The respondent also contended that summary procedure in contempt, while summary, still affords opportunity to be heard and that the High Court followed the procedure in Vinay Chandra Mishra and Pritam Pal; accordingly, there was no denial of natural justice. Finally, the respondent urged that creating forged court orders is a particularly egregious contempt because it strikes at the integrity of the judicial process and thus warrants penal consequence; the sentence, while within judicial discretion, should be sustained save for appropriate moderation by the appellate court.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 15(1) (power to punish for contempt in case of subordinate courts on reference) and Section 18(1) (power of High Court to punish for contempt).

ii. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 20 (limitation: “no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt… after the expiration of one year…”, with jurisprudential interpretation in Pallav Sheth).

iii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 466, 468, 471 (forgery, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document).

iv. Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 65-B (admissibility of electronic records; certificates) referenced in context of digital evidence and telephonic transcripts submitted to authorities.

v. Constitution of India — Article 129 (Supreme Court as court of record) and Article 215 (High Courts as courts of record) underpinning inherent contempt powers.

I) JUDGEMENT

This detailed exposition synthesises the Court’s reasoning, ratio decidendi, obiter and guidelines in a unified analytical paragraph. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of appellants C3 (M. Muruganandam), C4 (Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan) and C7 (S. Amal Raj) for criminal contempt on the foundation of the CBCID investigation, FSL analysis and admissions produced during proceedings.

The Court carefully addressed the limitation plea under Section 20 of the Contempt Act, applying the precedent of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian to hold that “initiation” for limitation purposes may be the filing of an application (here W.P. No. 22410 of 2018 filed 20.08.2018) or the court’s suo motu action (Single Judge directing placement before the Division Bench on 05.09.2018), thereby treating the initiation date as within one year of 17.04.2018 when the forged orders were produced.

The Court rejected the appellants’ contention that absence of formal framed charges or strict criminal procedural trappings rendered the process unfair, reiterating that criminal contempt is sui generis and summary procedures are constitutionally permissible so long as the contemnor is given the gist of allegations and an opportunity to be heard; reliance was placed on Vinay Chandra Mishra and Pritam Pal to demonstrate acceptable procedural contours.

On evidentiary standards, the Court acknowledged that criminal contempt partakes of a criminal character and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as enunciated in Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati, but held that in the present case the combination of admissions, forensic evidence, recorded telephonic conversations, recovered materials, and corroborative investigative reports met that standard it was not a case of mere probability but one of proved commission of forgery and utilisation.

Importantly, the Court crystallised the principle that utilisation of a fabricated court order by a person who knows it to be false, or who uses it to confer benefit not lawfully due, suffices to constitute contempt irrespective of authorship of the fabrication a principle rooted in In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh and applied to the facts where C3 admitted production and C4 was shown by confession and digital traces to have prepared and supplied the forged orders.

Having affirmed guilt, the Supreme Court exercised appellate sentencing discretion: it found the High Court’s six months’ simple imprisonment harsh in the circumstances and reduced the term to one month for each appellant, thereby balancing deterrence and proportionality.

The Court also directed surrender to the High Court Registrar within 15 days to undergo sentence and communicated the order for compliance. The judgment thus sustains the central holdings:

(i) fabrication and distribution of forged High Court orders constitute serious contempt and criminal offences under IPC;

(ii) Section 20 must be construed purposively where the court itself has initiated action within one year;

(iii) summary contempt procedure is constitutionally valid if fair opportunity is accorded;

(iv) utilisation by beneficiaries who knowingly used fabricated orders attracts contempt liability even if they did not physically forge the document.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle is explicated here in an extended paragraph. The Court’s ratio is twofold: first, on limitation — where a writ petition was filed or the court suo motu drew contempt proceedings within one year of the alleged contempt, Section 20 does not bar subsequent numbering or formal notice issues caused by registry misplacement; the proper point of initiation for limitation is the date when the court or filing put the process in motion (as in Pallav Sheth), thereby preserving the constitutional contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129/215.

Second, on substantive guilt — the utilisation of a fabricated court order by a person who knew or should have known it to be spurious, and who thereby obtained an undue advantage or obstructed justice, constitutes criminal contempt even if the contemnor did not author the forgery; the chain of admissions, forensic evidence, recovered materials and telephonic records established beyond reasonable doubt that C3 used and C4/C7 created/disseminated forged High Court interim orders.

These twin legal determinations—puposeful construction of Section 20 to avoid emasculating contempt power and the doctrine that use of fabricated orders by beneficiaries amounts to contempt—constitute the binding ratio applied to quash the limitation plea and affirm convictions.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court’s ancillary observations, captured here at length, are instructive though not strictly necessary to the ratio. The judgment reiterates jurisprudential maxims that the judiciary must zealously guard the integrity of its records and proceedings and that forging court orders is among “the most dreaded acts of contempt” because it not only thwarts administration of justice but imports a deliberate intention to falsify records.

The Court emphasised the remedial purpose behind contempt jurisdiction — maintaining the purity of administration of justice — and reflected on the procedural elasticity of contempt trials, noting that while they are summary they must afford adequate opportunity of hearing.

The Court also observed the practical realities of litigational delay and registry error; it warned against a literalist approach to limitation that would let contemnors escape sanction through hiding the fraud or causing administrative delay.

Finally, while reducing sentence as a matter of proportionality, the Court observed that custodial punishment remains a legitimate deterrent where fabricators and beneficiaries collude to subvert judicial processes.

These remarks, while obiter in part, serve as strong guidance for lower courts and litigants on the gravity of fabricating judicial instruments and on interpretative approaches to Section 20.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Initiation for Limitation: Treat the filing of an application or the court’s suo motu direction to initiate contempt as the originating point for the one-year limitation under Section 20 to avoid anomalous outcomes where registry or administrative delay would otherwise bar action.

2. Standard of Proof: Criminal contempt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt; courts must ensure that convictions rest upon cogent evidence (admissions, forensic reports, corroborative electronic traces), not mere probabilities.

3. Summary Procedure Compliance: While contempt procedure is summary, courts must state the gist of allegations, afford the contemnor the opportunity to inspect records and to make explanations; formal rigid framing is not always required but fairness must be preserved.

4. Utilisation Principle: Utilisation or presentation of a fabricated court order by a beneficiary who knew or ought to have known it to be forged will attract contempt liability irrespective of who authored the forgery.

5. Forensic and Electronic Evidence: Courts should treat forensic FSL reports, voice sample comparisons, digital seizures and Section 65-B authenticated electronic records as material that can establish authorship, transmission and use of forged documents; investigative thoroughness strengthens contempt proceedings.

6. Sentencing Proportionality: While deterrence is necessary, appellate courts should calibrate sentence proportionality — custodial terms should be moderated where facts warrant mitigation while maintaining deterrent effect for fabrications affecting judicial integrity.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This analytical paragraph synthesises implications and evaluative comments without introducing new factual material. The case underscores the judiciary’s acute vulnerability to document fabrication and the grave systemic harm when forged judicial instruments are circulated; the Supreme Court’s affirmation of convictions reinforces a robust normative stance that both creators and users of forged orders will be held accountable.

The balanced approach to Section 20—reading initiation to include court action or filing within one year—resolves tension between legislative limitation and constitutional contempt powers, preserving remedial efficacy where fraud is discovered but court action was initiated timely.

Procedurally, the decision confirms that summary contempt trials may be constitutionally valid despite not following full criminal trial formality, provided the contemnor receives the gist of allegations and opportunity to respond; however, the judgment simultaneously demands rigour in proof, accepting only cogent combinations of confession, forensic evidence and electronic corroboration as adequate.

The Court’s moderation of sentence from six months to one month demonstrates judicial sensitivity to proportionality while upholding the deterrent message. For practitioners, the decision is a cautionary directive to litigants and counsel to verify the authenticity of court documents and to the registry to ensure secure handling of case bundles; for lower courts it supplies clear interpretive guidance on limitation, admissibility of electronic/forensic material and the liability of beneficiaries who use fabricated orders.

The judgment, therefore, functions both as punitive adjudication and as doctrinal reinforcement for safeguarding the administration of justice.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 549.

2. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, (2001) 5 SCC 501.

3. Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584.

4. Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar, (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 529.

5. Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati & Anr., (1953) 1 SCR 726.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Sections 15(1), 18(1), 20).

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 466, 468, 471).

3. Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 65-B — electronic records).

4. Criminal Procedure Code (Section 164(5) — recording of statements).

5. Constitution of India (Articles 129, 215 — courts of record).