A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025) addressed the critical issue of whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The dispute arose after the Madhya Pradesh High Court had dismissed the appellants’ petitions under Section 482 CrPC, ruling that such proceedings were of a civil nature and hence not subject to inherent powers. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act—though predominantly civil—are entertained by Magistrates functioning as criminal courts, thus falling within the ambit of Section 482 CrPC.

The Court drew a distinction between the civil reliefs under the Act and the procedural jurisdiction of criminal courts, emphasizing that High Courts indeed retain inherent powers to quash such proceedings in appropriate circumstances. However, in view of the object of the DV Act—namely, providing protective, compensatory, and restorative remedies to women subjected to domestic violence—the Court mandated that the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction should be cautious, reserved only for cases of manifest illegality or abuse of process. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the appellants’ petitions for reconsideration. This ruling harmonizes the DV Act with principles of criminal procedure, affirming the balance between safeguarding women’s rights and preventing misuse of judicial processes.

Keywords: Domestic Violence Act, 2005; Section 12 DV Act; Section 482 CrPC; Section 528 BNSS; Inherent powers of High Court; Quashing of proceedings; Civil nature of DV Act proceedings; Abuse of process of court; Judicial circumspection.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present case revolves around the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC and its corresponding provision under Section 528 of the BNSS. The legal conundrum is whether such powers can be exercised to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while dismissing the appellants’ petitions, held that proceedings under Section 12 are civil in nature and thus beyond the scope of inherent criminal jurisdiction. This interpretation effectively insulated DV Act proceedings from supervisory scrutiny under Section 482, potentially leading to misuse or perpetuation of frivolous claims.

The appeal before the Supreme Court therefore required harmonizing the scheme of the DV Act with the procedural architecture of criminal courts. The Court engaged in an interpretative exercise, examining the object of the DV Act, which seeks to provide immediate reliefs to women subjected to domestic violence through protective orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody arrangements, and compensation. It recognized that although such reliefs are civil, their adjudication lies with Magistrates—who are criminal courts under the CrPC. This gave rise to the jurisdictional overlap.

The Court considered earlier precedents including Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016) and Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022), which characterized DV Act proceedings as predominantly civil. However, contrasting High Court rulings in Devendra Agarwal v. State of U.P. and Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala acknowledged the maintainability of Section 482 petitions. The Supreme Court reconciled these conflicting views, affirming the availability of inherent jurisdiction but cautioning against its liberal invocation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, is the brother-in-law of the respondent, Vidhi Rawal. The connected appellants included her husband, Prateek Tripathi, and her in-laws, Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari. The marriage between Prateek and Vidhi took place on 12 December 2019 at Dewas under Hindu rites.

Subsequently, the respondent alleged that she was subjected to cruelty, dowry harassment, and demands amounting to ₹20 lakh and a luxury SUV. She filed complaints first at the Police Station Women Consultancy Centre, Dewas, and later lodged FIR No. 3/2022 under Sections 498A, 504, 506, and 34 of the IPC. Additionally, on 2 March 2022, she filed MJCR No. 215/2022 under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas. She sought relief under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the DV Act alleging harassment, physical assault, and eviction threats while abroad.

In response, the appellants filed petitions under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the DV Act application. They argued that the application was baseless and constituted an abuse of process. However, the High Court dismissed their petitions, holding that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are civil in nature and thus cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.

Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s interpretation and invoking precedents that recognized the applicability of inherent jurisdiction to DV Act proceedings.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are amenable to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS.

ii. Whether such proceedings, being predominantly civil in nature, can nevertheless be quashed by criminal procedural jurisdiction.

iii. What is the scope and limitation of High Court interference under inherent powers in matters concerning welfare legislation like the DV Act.

iv. Whether the Madhya Pradesh High Court erred in holding that Section 482 petitions are not maintainable against DV Act proceedings.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellants argued that Section 2(i) of the DV Act defines “Magistrate” as a Judicial Magistrate of First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate exercising powers under CrPC. Thus, proceedings under Section 12 are conducted in criminal courts. Since such courts fall under Section 6 of the CrPC, the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 are attracted.

It was submitted that Section 26 of the DV Act allowing remedies to be sought in civil or family courts does not restrict the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court over proceedings filed before Magistrates. Reliance was placed on rulings such as Devendra Agarwal v. State of U.P. and Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala, where High Courts acknowledged that Section 482 jurisdiction could be invoked against DV Act proceedings to prevent abuse of process.

The appellants stressed that the nature of relief—whether civil or criminal—should not determine jurisdiction; rather, the forum adjudicating the relief does. Since the Magistrate acts as a criminal court under CrPC, petitions under Section 482 CrPC are maintainable. They further contended that denying such recourse would leave parties remediless against frivolous or malicious DV Act proceedings.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent’s counsel countered that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act are civil in nature, as recognized by this Court in Kunapareddy and Prabha Tyagi. These proceedings involve protective and restorative remedies rather than punitive sanctions. Consequently, the inherent criminal jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is inapplicable.

It was argued that an application under Section 12 does not amount to a “complaint” under Section 2(d) CrPC. Further, procedures under Sections 200–204 CrPC do not apply. Notices issued under the DV Act are distinct from summons under Section 61 CrPC, being governed instead by the DV Rules, 2006.

The respondent maintained that permitting Section 482 interference would dilute the DV Act’s protective framework, undermining its object of ensuring effective remedies for women subjected to domestic violence. The High Court’s interpretation was therefore justified in preserving the welfare character of the statute.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 12, 18–23, 26, 27, 28 DV Act, 2005 – Applications, protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody, compensation, and procedure.

ii. Section 31, 33 DV Act, 2005 – Penal provisions for breach of protection orders.

iii. Section 482 CrPC, 1973 – Inherent powers of High Court.

iv. Section 528 BNSS, 2023 – Inherent powers (parallel to Section 482 CrPC).

v. Section 200 CrPC, 1973; Section 223 BNSS, 2023 – Complaints before Magistrates.

vi. Section 6 CrPC; Section 6 BNSS – Constitution of criminal courts.

vii. Section 29 DV Act, 2005 – Appeal against Magistrate’s orders to Sessions Court.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dismissing the appellants’ petitions. While proceedings under Section 12 DV Act are predominantly civil in character, they are nevertheless adjudicated by Magistrates functioning as criminal courts under CrPC. Therefore, such proceedings fall within the ambit of Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.

The Court clarified that Section 482 CrPC has two limbs: first, to give effect to orders under the Code; second, to prevent abuse of process and secure justice. Since orders under Section 12 DV Act are not passed under CrPC, the first limb is inapplicable. However, the second limb squarely applies, empowering High Courts to intervene in cases of gross abuse.

Nonetheless, the Court emphasized judicial restraint. Considering that the DV Act is a beneficial legislation protecting women from domestic violence, the High Courts must be circumspect and exercise inherent jurisdiction only in cases of manifest illegality or injustice. It further noted that appellate remedies under Section 29 DV Act already exist, reducing the necessity for frequent interference under Section 482.

Ultimately, the Court set aside the High Court’s ruling, restored the appellants’ Section 482 petitions for fresh consideration, and reiterated that inherent powers remain available though sparingly exercisable.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio of the case is that High Courts possess inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. The civil nature of reliefs under the DV Act does not exclude such jurisdiction, since the forum adjudicating them is a criminal court under CrPC. However, this jurisdiction must be exercised cautiously, keeping in mind the welfare object of the DV Act, and interference is justified only in cases of clear illegality or abuse of process.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that although proceedings under Section 12 DV Act are civil in nature, their enforcement lies with criminal courts, creating a unique hybrid scheme. It noted that welfare legislations like the DV Act must not be undermined by liberal quashing, as that would frustrate women’s constitutional protections. The Court also candidly acknowledged a prior ruling by Justice Abhay Oka himself in the Bombay High Court (2016), where a contrary view had been taken. This was corrected in the present case, underscoring judicial humility and the evolving nature of legal interpretation.

c. GUIDELINES

The Supreme Court laid down the following guiding principles:

i. Proceedings under Section 12 DV Act are maintainable before Magistrates functioning as criminal courts; hence, Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS jurisdiction is attracted.

ii. High Courts can quash DV Act proceedings under inherent powers, but only under the second limb of Section 482 CrPC—to prevent abuse of process or secure justice.

iii. Interference should be exercised sparingly, only in cases of manifest illegality, frivolousness, or gross injustice.

iv. Courts must recognize the protective and welfare-oriented objectives of the DV Act and avoid liberal invocation of Section 482.

v. The existence of statutory appeals under Section 29 DV Act further necessitates judicial restraint in exercising inherent powers.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This judgment provides much-needed clarity on the contentious question of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC vis-à-vis DV Act proceedings. By affirming the applicability of inherent powers, the Court ensures that litigants are not left remediless against vexatious or mala fide applications. At the same time, by mandating judicial restraint, it safeguards the protective intent of the DV Act. The ruling thus balances the competing interests of protecting women against domestic violence and preventing misuse of welfare laws for collateral purposes.

The Court’s interpretative approach demonstrates harmonization of criminal procedural law with social welfare statutes, ensuring that inherent powers of High Courts remain robust yet carefully circumscribed. The candid acknowledgment of earlier judicial error by Justice Abhay Oka reflects the judiciary’s commitment to evolving jurisprudence and correcting doctrinal inconsistencies.

This decision will likely serve as binding precedent across High Courts, guiding them in dealing with Section 482 petitions against DV Act proceedings. It may also influence broader jurisprudence on the interplay between civil reliefs adjudicated in criminal courts and inherent supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016) 11 SCC 774.
ii. Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022) 8 SCC 90.
iii. Devendra Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Application under Section 482 No. 18994 of 2024).
iv. Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare v. Mangala (2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923).
v. Ram Lotan Vishwakarma v. State of U.P. 2025 AHC-LKO 7572.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 6, 200, 482.
ii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 6, 223, 528.
iii. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 2(a), 2(f), 2(i), 3, 12, 18–23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37.
iv. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006.