A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh & Ors., Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 12012–12013 of 2025, decided by a two-Judge Bench (J. J.B. Pardiwala and J. R. Mahadevan) on 5 May 2025. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in rejecting an application under Order 18, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to recall and re-examine witnesses.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the power to recall and further examine witnesses under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC is primarily a court’s tool to clarify ambiguities and elicit explanations necessary for adjudication, and not an instrument for parties to fill gaps in their case. Read with Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the rule confers on the trial court an exclusive right to put questions to recalled witnesses; questions or cross-examination by parties are subject to the court’s leave.

The Court emphasized that recall under Order 18, Rule 17 should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances, and, where necessary for fairness, courts may employ their inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC to permit a party to recall a witness for cross-examination.

The judgment relies on and follows precedents including Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate and K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, and cites Sultan Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand Sirmal in support. The appeals were dismissed, reinforcing the narrow, clarificatory scope of Order 18, Rule 17 CPC and warning against its routine use to prolong litigation.

Keywords: Order 18 Rule 17 CPC; Section 165 Evidence Act; recall of witness; re-examination; inherent jurisdiction Section 151 CPC; clarificatory power; witness cross-examination.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This matter reached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions challenging two orders of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh — the rejection of an application under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC dated 7 January 2025 and the dismissal of a Review Petition dated 27 February 2025. The petitioner sought recall and re-examination of witnesses under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC; the High Court rejected the application and declined review.

The procedural posture is classic: a litigant attempts to reopen witness testimony after completion of evidence, claiming necessity to adduce clarificatory or additional evidence. The Supreme Court’s hearing concentrated on the scope of Order 18, Rule 17 as read with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, and whether the High Court’s refusal amounted to an error of law or an exercise of permissible judicial discretion.

The Court traced earlier precedents that circumscribe the recall power notably Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar and K.K. Velusamy and reiterated that the rule is not available as a tool for parties to cure omissions or to reopen their case for the sake of additional examination without cogent justification. The Court also clarified the interplay between Order 18, Rule 17 and the judge’s discretionary power to permit party-led cross-examination when warranted, invoking Section 151 CPC where necessary.

The ruling thus reasserts both the exclusivity of the court’s primacy in recalling witnesses and the exceptional nature of party-driven re-examination.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The factual matrix, as set out in the impugned orders and summarized in the Special Leave Petitions, reveals that parties had completed witness testimony in the civil proceedings before the trial court. Subsequent to the close of evidence, the petitioner filed an application under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC seeking recall and further examination of specific witnesses.

The petitioner’s stated rationale was to clear material ambiguities and elicit answers material to contested issues. The trial and High Court records reflect that the High Court examined the application and rejected it on the ground that the petitioner’s request did not meet the narrow threshold for invoking Order 18, Rule 17, and that the petitioner appeared to be seeking to fill lacunae in its own case rather than procuring clarification required for adjudication.

The petitioner moved the High Court in review, which was dismissed, prompting the present Special Leave Petitions. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner advanced arguments that the recall was necessary to elicit critical clarifications and that denial caused prejudice to the petitioner’s case. The respondents contended that permitting recall for party-driven further examination would convert Order 18, Rule 17 into a device for tactical delay and would trespass upon the court’s exclusive role under Section 165 Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court scrutinized the statutory language and earlier authorities to determine whether the High Court’s exercise of discretion was lawful and within the principle that recalling witnesses under Order 18, Rule 17 is primarily a court’s instrument for clarification and not a remedy for a party’s failure to produce evidence earlier. The Court’s review of authorities led to dismissal of the petitions, holding that the High Court’s decision conformed to the established law and that the narrow, exceptional test governing such recalls had not been met.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the petitioner’s application under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC to recall and re-examine witnesses.

ii. Whether Order 18, Rule 17 CPC permits a party, as of right, to recall a witness for further examination-in-chief, cross-examination or re-examination.

iii. How Order 18, Rule 17 CPC should be read with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and what limitations follow for parties seeking to question a recalled witness.

iv. Whether the court may, in exercise of Section 151 CPC, permit party-driven recall for the purpose of cross-examination or further examination, and on what conditions.

v. What standards and safeguards should govern the exercise of the recall power to avoid misuse and undue delay.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the impugned evidence contained ambiguities and lacunae that materially affected the petitioner’s case and, therefore, recall under Order 18, Rule 17 was necessary to elicit clarifications essential for just adjudication. They argued that the rule expressly empowers the court to recall witnesses “at any stage” and that if the court is seized of the appropriate application, denial of recall would cause irreparable prejudice.

Petitioners relied on the language of Order 18, Rule 17 CPC to contend that recall can be sought not only by the court suo motu but also at the instance of a party, especially where answers previously given led to confusion on core issues of fact. Counsel invoked the principle of fair trial and the right to adduce relevant evidence, stressing that procedural formalism should not thwart substantive justice.

They sought to distinguish precedents cited by respondents by pointing to case-specific exigencies—such as newly emergent facts, inadvertent omissions, or contradictory testimony discovered only after initial examination—that would justify recall. Where the High Court imposed a narrow interpretation, petitioners argued it was unduly rigid and prevented courts from securing the truth.

They further urged that the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction because the High Court’s orders curtailed the petitioner’s ability to obtain necessary clarifications and thereby frustrated substantive rights. The petitioners also argued that if the Court were to find Order 18, Rule 17 restrictive, it should nonetheless recognize the role of Section 151 CPC to enable party-driven recall where fairness demands.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that Order 18, Rule 17 CPC is designed principally as a tool for the court to secure clarifications; it does not grant parties an unqualified right to recall witnesses to remedy their own failure to produce evidence or to craft additional lines of examination.

Respondents relied on the statutory text and judicial precedent to assert that the right to put questions during recall under Rule 17 is vested in the court, and that parties may only be permitted to ask questions with the court’s leave. They drew attention to Section 165 Evidence Act which explicitly empowers the judge to ask any question and bars parties from objecting to such questions or from cross-examining on replies without the court’s permission, thereby reinforcing the court-centric nature of recall.

Respondents warned of practical consequences if parties were routinely permitted to recall witnesses: trials would elongate, tactics for delay would flourish, and finality would be undermined. They submitted that the petitioner’s request showed hallmarks of attempted re-opening of evidence to plug deficiencies rather than genuine clarificatory need, thus attracting the strict limitations set out in decisions such as Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar and K.K. Velusamy.

Respondents contended that the High Court properly exercised discretion and that the Supreme Court should not disturb that finding absent misapplication of law or perversity. The respondents further argued that where exceptional circumstances arise, the trial court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC provides the route, but this route must be used sparingly and subject to conditions like cost and time-bound directions.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Order 18, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — “The Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit.”

ii. Section 165, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Judge’s power to put questions and the bar on parties objecting or cross-examining on answers without leave.

iii. Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice, including permitting recall in exceptional circumstances.

iv. Principles from precedents: Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate; K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy; Sultan Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand Sirmal — on the limited, clarificatory and exceptional application of recall power.

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled principle that Order 18, Rule 17 CPC confers a power on the court to recall any witness at any stage for the purpose of clarification or to remove ambiguities. The Court emphasized that this power may be exercised suo motu by the court or upon a party’s request, but importantly, the rule centres the court as the primary actor: the court alone has the right to put questions to the recalled witness.

The Court analyzed Section 165 Evidence Act and noted its express language empowering the judge “to ask any question he pleases in any form at any time” and the prohibitory language that parties cannot object to such questions nor cross-examine on answers without the leave of the court. Reading the two provisions together, the Supreme Court held that Order 18, Rule 17 cannot be invoked by parties as a right to recall witnesses for the purpose of re-examination-in-chief or to effectuate further opportunity for cross-examination unless the court, acting under Section 151 CPC, permits otherwise for compelling reasons.

The Court reiterated the precedent in K.K. Velusamy, which counsel had relied upon, observing that the recall power is to be used sparingly and only for clarification, not to fill gaps in a party’s case or to prolong litigation. The Court quoted Vadiraj to stress that recall should not be routinely awarded merely because it will not cause prejudice; rather the recall must be bona fide, assist the court in resolving the issues, and, if allowed, be accompanied by safeguards (costs, time limits) to avoid abuse.

The Bench found no perversity in the High Court’s rejection: the petitioner’s application did not satisfy the exceptional threshold. The Supreme Court further clarified that where circumstances truly warrant party-driven recall for cross-examination, the court may permit such recall in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC, but this jurisdiction must be exercised cautiously and with conditions to prevent misuse. Having found the High Court’s orders consonant with the legal principles and precedents, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions and the Review Petition.

The Court directed that pending applications stand disposed of. The decision thus reiterates a structured, restrictive approach to recall and re-examination while preserving narrow remedies under inherent powers for fairness.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle is that Order 18, Rule 17 CPC vests the power to recall and put questions to a witness primarily in the court trying the suit; it is not a provision that entitles parties, as of right, to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination or to fill evidentiary lacunae.

Read with Section 165 Evidence Act, the rule underscores the court’s exclusive role in directing the examination of recalled witnesses; parties may not object to questions the judge asks and cannot cross-examine on answers without the court’s leave. The Court held that recall is a clarificatory measure to remove ambiguities in testimony and must be invoked sparingly, in exceptional cases.

Where a party seeks recall for its own examination purpose, courts may, in exceptional situations, permit such recall in exercise of Section 151 CPC, but only with stringent safeguards—costs, time schedules, and controlling directions—to prevent procedural gamesmanship. This ratio maintains judicial control over evidentiary processes while allowing a narrow escape valve for fairness under inherent jurisdiction.

b. OBITER DICTA 

In obiter observations, the Court cautioned that routine recourse to Order 18, Rule 17 “would defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials.” The Bench suggested procedural safeguards when recall is permitted — awarding appropriate costs to compensate delays; fixing time schedules for completion; and rejecting frivolous or mischievous applications with heavy costs.

The Court noted that where additional oral or documentary evidence is necessary, and non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, courts should apply discretion beneficially but not permissively. The Bench also observed that while Section 151 CPC can be used to permit party-led recall, such exercise should be cautious and exceptional. These observations provide practical guidance on balancing the court’s inquisitorial authority with parties’ rights and trial expeditiousness.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Purpose Test: Order 18, Rule 17 CPC should be invoked only to remove ambiguities or clarify statements essential for adjudication. It is not for bolstering a party’s case by producing additional material that could have been led earlier.

2. Court’s Primacy: The court has exclusive right to put questions to the recalled witness; parties may ask questions only with the court’s permission, consistent with Section 165 Evidence Act.

3. Sparing Use: The recall power must be used sparingly and in exceptional situations; routine or tactical applications should be declined.

4. Inherent Jurisdiction: If recall is to be allowed at the instance of a party for further examination or cross-examination, the court should invoke Section 151 CPC and record reasons for departing from the usual rule.

5. Safeguards When Allowed: When a court allows party-driven recall, it should (a) impose costs to compensate delay, (b) fix a time schedule to complete the proceedings promptly, and (c) deny relief if application is frivolous or seeks to cover up negligence.

6. Non-Prejudice Is Not Enough: The mere absence of prejudice to the other party is not a sufficient ground for permitting recall; the recall must meet the clarificatory and exceptional thresholds.

7. Record Reasons: Courts should record brief reasons when they permit party-led recall under inherent jurisdiction, specifying why exceptional relief was justified.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision in Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh & Ors. reaffirms the settled jurisprudence that Order 18, Rule 17 CPC is a court-centric provision to clarify evidence and cannot be transformed into a party’s tool for re-opening their case. The Court balanced two competing imperatives: the need to secure truth via judicial questioning and the policy imperative of finality and expedition in civil trials.

By reading Rule 17 in pari materia with Section 165 Evidence Act, the Court entrenched the proposition that the judge’s power to question is paramount and that party participation in recall is strictly subject to judicial control. The recognition that Section 151 CPC may be invoked in exceptional cases preserves fairness where genuine prejudice would otherwise occur, but the insistence on costs, time limits and careful recording of reasons deters abuse.

Practically, litigants and practitioners should prepare their case so evidence is complete when led, because post-hoc recalls are unlikely except on cogent grounds. Trial courts should adopt the guidelines provided: insist on bona fides, impose compensatory costs when necessary, and manage the process with firm timetables. The judgment thus consolidates precedent and supplies useful procedural guardrails for trial practice, helping to curb dilatory tactics while preserving remedial space for true justice.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410.

2. K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275.

3. Sultan Saleh Bin Omer v. Vijayachand Sirmal, A.I.R. 1966 A.P. 295.

4. Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh & Ors., 6 S.C.R. 601 : 2025 INSC 628.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order 18, Rule 17; Section 151.

2. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165.