A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The judgment addresses the limits of judicial intervention at the stage of criminal investigation, particularly when allegations overlap with issues pending before a specialized environmental forum. The case arose from a challenge by a major automobile manufacturer seeking quashing of an FIR alleging cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy in relation to alleged installation of emission “defeat devices” in vehicles sold in India. The petitioner argued that the FIR was barred because the same subject matter was pending before the National Green Tribunal and this Court in connected civil appeals, and further that the complaint was vitiated by delay and factual inaccuracies.
The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that criminal investigations cannot be interdicted merely because civil or environmental proceedings on overlapping subject matter are pending. The jurisdiction of the police to investigate cognizable offences remains intact so long as the FIR discloses the commission of an offence, even broadly. The Court emphasized that proceedings before the NGT were environmental and regulatory in nature and did not adjudicate individual consumer grievances or alleged misrepresentations made to specific purchasers. Questions relating to delay, number of vehicles purchased, existence of defeat devices, and alleged representations were held to be disputed questions of fact incapable of determination in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The judgment consolidates jurisprudence discouraging premature quashing of FIRs and reiterates the doctrine of separation of functions between investigative agencies and constitutional courts.
Keywords: Quashing of FIR, Defeat Devices, Criminal Investigation, Environmental Regulation, Consumer Deception, Section 482 CrPC
B) CASE DETAILS
| Particulars | Details |
|---|---|
| Judgement Cause Title | Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. |
| Case Number | Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4931 of 2020 |
| Judgement Date | 26 November 2020 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Quorum | S.A. Bobde, C.J.; A.S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J. |
| Author | Justice V. Ramasubramanian |
| Citation | [2020] 11 S.C.R. 786 |
| Legal Provisions Involved | Sections 34, 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 IPC; Section 482 CrPC; Section 110 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 |
| Judgments Overruled | Nil |
| Related Law Subjects | Criminal Law, Environmental Law, Administrative Law, Consumer Protection |
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case is situated in the broader global controversy relating to alleged manipulation of vehicular emission standards through software mechanisms commonly referred to as “defeat devices”. In India, this controversy surfaced following notices issued in 2015 by the Automotive Research Association of India alleging abnormal nitrogen oxide emissions in certain diesel vehicles. These developments triggered environmental proceedings before the National Green Tribunal, resulting in extensive regulatory scrutiny and the imposition of substantial environmental compensation upon manufacturers.
Parallel to these environmental proceedings, an individual purchaser lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been induced into purchasing vehicles based on false representations regarding emission compliance. The FIR alleged offences of cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code. The manufacturer approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, contending that the complaint was malicious, belated, factually incorrect, and impermissible due to pendency of civil appeals arising from the NGT’s order before the Supreme Court.
The High Court declined to quash the FIR but granted limited protection against arrest. The present Special Leave Petition challenged that refusal, raising fundamental questions concerning the relationship between environmental adjudication and criminal liability, the scope of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, and the extent to which courts may interfere with ongoing investigations.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner company is engaged in manufacture, import, and sale of passenger vehicles in India and represents multiple automobile brands. In November 2015, the Automotive Research Association of India issued a show cause notice alleging that certain diesel vehicles emitted nitrogen oxide at levels far exceeding laboratory test results, raising suspicion of installed defeat devices.
Two original applications were filed before the National Green Tribunal in 2015 by individuals who were not vehicle purchasers. These applications sought broad environmental remedies including suspension of sales, rectification of engines, disgorgement of profits, and compensation for environmental damage. Following expert assessment, the NGT recorded findings that defeat devices had been used, that emissions exceeded permissible limits, and imposed environmental compensation of ₹500 crores, while directing the Central Pollution Control Board to consider prosecution under applicable laws.
Civil appeals against the NGT’s final order were admitted by the Supreme Court, which directed that no coercive steps be taken against the manufacturer in relation to the NGT’s directions.
In July 2020, the third respondent lodged an FIR alleging that he had purchased seven Audi vehicles after receiving assurances that no defeat devices were installed. Upon learning of the NGT findings, he alleged deception, falsification of records, and dishonest inducement. The petitioner disputed the number of vehicles purchased, citing the VAHAN portal, and asserted that the FIR was merely a reproduction of allegations pending before the Supreme Court.
The High Court refused to quash the FIR, leading to the present appeal.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether an FIR can be quashed when issues with overlapping subject matter are pending adjudication before the Supreme Court arising from proceedings before the National Green Tribunal?
ii. Whether delay in lodging a criminal complaint constitutes sufficient ground for quashing an FIR at the threshold?
iii. Whether disputed factual questions can be examined in proceedings seeking quashing under Section 482 CrPC?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the substratum of the FIR was identical to issues pending before the Supreme Court in civil appeals arising from the NGT order, thereby barring police investigation. It was argued that allowing criminal proceedings would amount to parallel adjudication and abuse of process.
It was further contended that the complaint was lodged after an inordinate delay of over two and a half years, rendering it malicious. The petitioner also asserted that government records demonstrated purchase of only three vehicles, undermining the credibility of the complainant and exposing the FIR as vexatious.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The counsels for the respondent submitted that environmental proceedings before the NGT addressed regulatory compliance and environmental harm, not individual consumer deception. It was argued that criminal liability arising from alleged misrepresentations to a purchaser constituted a distinct cause of action.
The respondent contended that delay and numerical discrepancies were matters of evidence requiring investigation and trial, not grounds for quashing at the inception.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ii. Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860
iii. Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
iv. Rules 115, 126, 126A, Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
I) JUDGEMENT
The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR. It held that the existence of pending civil appeals against the NGT’s order did not bar an individual purchaser from initiating criminal proceedings. The environmental proceedings were characterized as broad and general, aimed at regulatory compliance and environmental protection, not adjudication of personal deception claims.
The Court reiterated that delay alone cannot justify quashing an FIR and that disputed factual questions, including the number of vehicles purchased and existence of defeat devices, must be determined through investigation. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC were held to be exceptional and to be exercised sparingly.
Reliance was placed on King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat to underscore that courts should not usurp the investigative domain of the police when an FIR discloses cognizable offences.
a) RATIO DECIDENDI
The ratio decidendi lies in the reaffirmation that criminal investigation cannot be interdicted merely because parallel civil or environmental proceedings are pending. If an FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences even broadly, courts are barred from interfering at the threshold. Proceedings before specialized tribunals do not extinguish individual criminal remedies where allegations concern personal deception or misrepresentation.
b) OBITER DICTA
The Court’s discussion on global developments relating to emission manipulation, including European and American regulatory responses and consumer remedies, constitutes persuasive obiter. These observations contextualize the Indian regulatory response but do not form the binding basis of the decision.
c) GUIDELINES
i. Courts must avoid examining disputed facts while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
ii. Pendency of civil or regulatory proceedings does not bar criminal investigation arising from distinct factual grievances.
iii. Delay in lodging FIR is not per se fatal at the threshold stage.
J) REFERENCES
a) Important Cases Referred
i. King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, AIR 1945 PC 18
ii. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335
iii. S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659
b) Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Penal Code, 1860
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
iii. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
iv. Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989