A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal in Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas ([2025] 1 S.C.R. 1442 : 2025 INSC 129) concerns entitlement to maintenance under Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the claimant (Appellant No.1) had a prior marriage that was not dissolved by decree but had been the subject of an executed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of separation. The Family Court granted maintenance to the wife and her child; the High Court set aside maintenance to the wife on the ground that her earlier marriage subsisted.

The Supreme Court restored the Family Court award. The Court applied purposive and social-welfare focused construction of Section 125 CrPC, examined precedent on second-wife claims (including Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga (2005) 2 SCC 33, Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K) (1991) 2 SCC 375, Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188), and distinguished strict-interpretation authorities (e.g., Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav (1988) 1 SCC 530). The Court recorded two critical factual findings: the respondent knew of the claimant’s earlier marriage and had married her knowing that fact (twice), and the claimant produced an MoU establishing de facto separation and absence of maintenance from her first husband.

On those facts the Court held that maintenance must not be denied since the legislative and constitutional purpose of Section 125 is to prevent destitution of women and children; to allow the respondent to enjoy matrimonial privileges while avoiding obligations would frustrate that purpose. The Family Court award was therefore restored.

Keywords: Maintenance; Section 125 CrPC; Second husband; MoU of separation; De facto separation; Social welfare interpretation; Wife; Dual maintenance risk.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The petition arises from a factual matrix where the claimant, having been married earlier and borne a child from that marriage, allegedly separated from her first husband by executing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of separation. Shortly thereafter she married the respondent on 27.11.2005; that marriage was the subject of a Section 12 HMA petition by the respondent and was declared null and void by the Family Court on 01.02.2006. The parties remarried on 14.02.2006 (registered on 11.09.2006). A child was born of this union.

When matrimonial disputes later arose, the claimant filed an application under Section 125 CrPC seeking maintenance for herself and her daughter. The Family Court allowed maintenance; the High Court reversed maintenance to the wife while confirming the child’s maintenance on the ground that the first marriage allegedly subsisted and therefore the claimant could not be a “wife” of the respondent for Section 125 purposes. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether, in the absence of formal divorce but on evidence of factual separation (the MoU) and knowledge of the earlier marriage by the respondent, maintenance could be denied to the wife.

The decision required the Court to balance competing strands of precedent:

(a) cases taking a strict, literal approach denying relief where a prior marriage subsists; and

(b) purposive, welfare-oriented authorities that construe “wife” liberally to avoid vagrancy and destitution.

The Court examined standards of proof applicable in Section 125 proceedings and emphasized social justice values under Articles 15(3) and 39 of the Constitution, and recent jurisprudence on the vulnerability of homemakers in India.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Appellant No.1 married Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 and had a son Sai Ganesh (born 15.08.2000). Disputes led to separation after the couple returned from the USA in February 2005. On 25.11.2005 the parties executed a MoU purportedly dissolving their marital ties. Appellant No.1 became involved with her neighbour, the respondent, and married him on 27.11.2005. The respondent filed a petition under Section 12 HMA read with Section 7 Family Courts Act; the Family Court declared that marriage null and void by decree dated 01.02.2006. Both parties then remarried on 14.02.2006; the marriage was registered on 11.09.2006.

A daughter (Appellant No.2) was born on 28.01.2008. Differences later resulted in criminal complaints by Appellant No.1 under Sections 498A, 406, 506, 420 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Appellant No.1 and Appellant No.2 applied for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC; the Family Court awarded Rs. 3,500 per month to Appellant No.1 and Rs. 5,000 per month to Appellant No.2 (order dated 26.07.2012). Respondent filed criminal revision challenging the maintenance; the High Court upheld the child’s maintenance but set aside the wife’s maintenance on the basis that Appellant No.1’s first marriage was not dissolved by decree and therefore she could not be a “wife” of the respondent under Section 125.

Before the Supreme Court the Family Court’s factual findings that the respondent knew of the first marriage and had married Appellant No.1 despite that knowledge, and that the MoU and conduct demonstrated de facto separation with no maintenance being drawn from the first husband were not substantially disputed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether a woman is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC from her second husband when her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting?

2. What standard of proof is required in Section 125 proceedings to establish the subsistence or dissolution (de facto) of an earlier marriage?

3. Whether knowledge of a prior marriage by the second husband and de facto separation from the first husband disentitle a claimant from maintenance?

4. How should courts reconcile conflicting precedents—those adopting strict textualism and those preferring purposive/social welfare construction—when adjudicating maintenance claims?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that: the parties lived as a legally cognizable matrimonial unit with the respondent; the respondent was fully aware of the earlier marriage and nevertheless married the appellant twice; the MoU constituted compelling evidence of de facto dissolution and separation from the first husband and established that the appellant did not draw maintenance from that marriage; precedent permits relief where the second wife’s legal status is challenged but the husband cannot prove subsistence of the first marriage; Section 125 is remedial and must be construed purposively to prevent destitution; denial of maintenance would reward the respondent for enjoying marital advantages while evading obligations.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that: the appellant’s first marriage was legally subsisting in absence of a decree of divorce; legislative history and certain precedents preclude extending “wife” to a woman whose marriage is void ab initio; strict statutory interpretation prohibits treating a second wife as entitled to maintenance; allowing maintenance would enable dual maintenance claims and contravene settled authorities such as Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Section 12, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (petition for annulment/dissolution).
3. Family Courts Act, 1984 (Section 7 jurisdictional reference).
4. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (contextual criminal allegations).
5. IPC provisions (Sections 498A, 406, 506, 420) — factual background to matrimonial dispute.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court restored the Family Court’s maintenance award to Appellant No.1 after applying a purposive construction to Section 125 CrPC in light of social justice objectives. The Court surveyed conflicting precedent: older authorities (e.g., Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav and Bakulabai) favoured a strict textual approach denying maintenance where the first marriage subsisted; later decisions (Vimala (K), Dwarika Prasad Satpathy, Chanmuniya, Badshah) endorsed a welfare-oriented expansive reading protecting women who lack strict documentary proof or who have been misled or left vulnerable.

Relying on settled principles that Section 125 is remedial and aimed at preventing vagrancy and destitution, the Court emphasized that the standard of proof in maintenance proceedings is not as exacting as in criminal trials and that factual realities such as de facto separation, absence of maintenance from the first husband, and the second husband’s knowledge are material.

Two key factual findings made by the Family Court were accepted:

(i) the respondent had actual knowledge of the appellant’s earlier marriage and entered into marriage with her notwithstanding that fact;

(ii) the existence of an MoU and conduct showed dissolution of marital ties with the first husband and absence of maintenance/entitlements from that marriage.

Given these findings, the Court held that to deny maintenance would be to permit the respondent to reap benefits of the marital relationship while denying concomitant obligations, defeating the social purpose of Section 125. The Court acknowledged the hypothetical mischief of dual maintenance claims but found it inapplicable on the facts (no concurrent maintenance from the first husband). The judgment also invoked constitutional values of social justice and recent exposition on vulnerability of homemakers (citing Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (2024)) to underline why financial protection must be afforded. The Family Court award (Rs. 3,500 to wife; Rs. 5,000 to child) was therefore restored.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The operative ratio is that where a claimant proves de facto dissolution/separation from her earlier husband and does not derive maintenance from that earlier marriage, and where the second husband had knowledge of the earlier marriage and accepted the marital relationship, the claimant can be treated as entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The Court held that the remedial object of Section 125 requires an expansive, purposive construction and that strict non-extension of the term “wife” would subvert social welfare aims when the respondent seeks to benefit from a de facto marriage while shirking obligations.

The standard of proof in such proceedings is relaxed; insistence on formal decree of divorce would run counter to the protective scheme of the provision. The principle follows earlier lines in Vimala (K), Dwarika Prasad Satpathy, and Badshah where courts protected vulnerable women despite technical infirmities in marital status, provided the husband cannot satisfactorily establish subsistence of a legal marriage or where equitable considerations weigh in favour of maintenance.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that permitting a second wife to claim maintenance could, in theory, create the risk of dual maintenance but that risk does not justify denial where facts demonstrate de facto separation and absence of maintenance from the first husband. It reiterated constitutional concerns: social justice, protection of homemakers, and the need for financial empowerment of wives who lack independent income. The judgment further commented on the importance of courts insisting on strict proof by husbands who plead subsisting marriages to defeat maintenance claims and on the distinction between live-in relationships and legal marriages in the application of Section 125 jurisprudence (noting that the present case involved formal marriages and not mere cohabitation).

c. GUIDELINES 

1. In Section 125 proceedings courts must adopt a purposive approach aligned with the provision’s social welfare object, avoiding unnecessarily pedantic requirements that would cause destitution.
2. Where a husband pleads a subsisting prior marriage to defeat maintenance, the burden to prove lawful subsistence is heavy; courts should require satisfactory proof rather than mere assertion.
3. Evidence of an MoU, prolonged separation, absence of maintenance from the first husband, and respondent’s knowledge of the prior marriage are material and may justify treating the claimant as de facto separated for maintenance purposes.
4. Courts should guard against misuse by ensuring that awards of maintenance do not produce unjust enrichment or enable simultaneous maintenance claims; factual inquiries must address whether the claimant actually receives support from the earlier marriage.
5. Findings of fact by Family Courts on these issues carry weight and are to be accepted unless perverse or unsupported by evidence.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision harmonises competing strands of precedent by foregrounding the remedial purpose of Section 125 CrPC and the constitutional imperative of social justice. The court did not effect a categorical rewrite of the law; rather it emphasised fact-sensitive application: when the second husband knowingly enters a marital relationship with a woman who is de facto separated and not drawing maintenance from a first marriage, he cannot evade maintenance obligations by relying on the absence of a formal divorce decree. This approach mitigates the harsh outcomes that strict textualism may produce namely vagrancy and economic insecurity for women and children while preserving judicial tools to prevent abuse.

The ruling underlines two practical lessons for litigants and courts:

(a) factual proof of separation, conduct and financial dependence matters significantly in maintenance adjudication;

(b) husbands asserting subsisting earlier marriages must come forward with satisfactory evidence to carry the burden.

The judgment also broadens the protective ambit of maintenance jurisprudence in India by linking it to broader socio-economic realities faced by homemakers. From a doctrinal standpoint the case reaffirms the accepted principle that Section 125 is not a penal provision but a social welfare mechanism; it invites lower courts to exercise discretion in a way that privileges substantive justice over technical formalism. The pragmatic balancing recognising potential policy concerns about dual maintenance but refusing to allow them to defeat protection for a vulnerable claimant who has demonstrably severed ties with her earlier spouse renders the decision an important touchstone in contemporary family law jurisprudence.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1442 : 2025 INSC 129 (Supreme Court of India).

2. Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga, (2005) 2 SCC 33.

3. Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal and Others, (1978) 4 SCC 70.

4. Vimala (K) v. Veeraswamy (K), (1991) 2 SCC 375.

5. Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit and Another, (1999) 7 SCC 675.

6. Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 141.

7. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Another, (1988) 1 SCC 530.

8. Bakulabai and Another v. Gangaram and Another, (1988) 1 SCC 537.

9. Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and others, (2005) 3 SCC 636.

10. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Another, (2014) 1 SCC 188.

11. Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana and Another, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1686.
    (Citations used are as referenced in the judgment document.)

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 125).

2. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 12).

3. Family Courts Act, 1984 (Section 7 reference).

4. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Sections 3 & 4).

5. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 498A, 406, 506, 420).