A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 challenges orders of the Special Court acquitting the respondents for offences relating to the kidnapping and subsequent killings of two university functionaries and, in a connected matter, the alleged kidnapping-murder of the General Manager of HMT, Srinagar. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on confessional statements recorded under Section 15 TADA by a Superintendent of Police and on weak ocular testimony; the weapon (AK-47) was not recovered though forensic examination confirmed cartridges as from an AK-47.

The Special Court rejected the confessions as inadmissible and held the prosecution had not proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal the State contended the confessions complied with statutory and Rule-15 safeguards and, if voluntary, could be sole basis for conviction. The Supreme Court analysed Section 15 TADA and Rule 15, surveyed controlling precedents including Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab and subsequent authorities, and found pervasive non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards: absence of contemporaneous question–answer records, non-mention of time/place, no evidence of adequate reflection time, discrepancies in dates, recording in fortified camps/JICs and prior rejection of one confession in an earlier trial (invoking issue-estoppel).

The Court held the confessions vitiated and, in the absence of reliable ocular or corroborative material (and non-recovery of the weapon), affirmed the acquittals.

Keywords: confessional statement; Section 15 TADA; Rule 15 TADA Rules; Kartar Singh; issue-estoppel; AK-47; non-recovery of weapon.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arises from two connected violent incidents in Srinagar in April 1990:

(i) the abduction of Dr. Mushir-ul-Haq (Vice-Chancellor, Kashmir University) and his Personal Secretary Abdul Gani Zargar, later found dead;

(ii) the alleged abduction-murder of H.L. Khera, General Manager HMT, Srinagar.

The cases were investigated by CBI after state request and multiple accused were charged under the TADA Act and RPC, with allegations of conspiracy by members of the banned Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front (JKSLF) to kidnap public figures to coerce government action and, failing compliance, to execute hostages. Prosecution evidence included eyewitness testimony from persons present at the abduction scene, forensic analysis linking recovered cartridges to an AK-47, and confessional statements recorded by a Superintendent of Police under Section 15 TADA.

The Special Court, after protracted trials and examination of witnesses, rejected ocular identifications and declared the confessional statements inadmissible owing to failure to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 15, resulting in acquittals. The CBI appealed, asserting the confessions were lawfully recorded and could alone sustain conviction if voluntary and direct; the Supreme Court was called upon to examine admissibility under the exceptional TADA regime and to reconcile adherence to Kartar Singh directives with the factual matrix presented.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 06.04.1990 armed persons allegedly abducted the Vice-Chancellor and his Personal Secretary from outside Kashmir University; they were transferred into a red Maruti van (Regn. JKD-9394) and later confined at several locations before being killed; their bodies were recovered on 10.04.1990. Forensic testing identified nine recovered cartridges as compatible with a 7.62 mm AK-47, but the rifle itself was not recovered. Investigation traced central roles to Hilal Beg (self-styled Chief Commander of JKSLF) and several named accused including Mohd. Salim Zargar. The CBI charged multiple persons under TADA and RPC offences including kidnapping, conspiracy and murder.

Confessional statements of Mohd. Salim Zargar, Mushtaq Ahmed Khan and Mohd. Sadiq Rather were recorded by SP A.K. Suri at locations such as BSF camp and Joint Interrogation Centres in August–September 1990. The Special Court found ocular witnesses could not identify accused in court and convicted no one, principally discarding the confessions as not conforming to Rule 15 safeguards: absence of question–answer records, no contemporaneous certification of voluntariness with time/place, inadequate or no reflection time, discrepancies in dates and prior judicial rejection of one confession. The CBI then appealed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether confessional statements recorded under Section 15 TADA by a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police were admissible in the absence of strict compliance with Rule 15 procedural safeguards?

2. Whether a previously rejected confessional statement could be relied upon in a separate subsequent prosecution or was restrained by issue-estoppel?

3. In the factual matrix of non-recovery of the weapon and weak ocular identification, could the prosecution sustain conviction relying primarily on confessions alleged to be vitiated?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The State (CBI) argued that the confessional statements were recorded by SP A.K. Suri following the statutory framework of Section 15 and Rule 15, that certificates were appended confirming voluntariness and statutory warning, and that the confessions of the accused were corroborative and sufficient to ground conviction even in absence of the weapon. The State maintained procedural lacunae were technical in character and that Kartar Singh guidelines post-dated the events; reliance was placed on precedent recognizing that a voluntary and direct confession under Section 15 may suffice for conviction without independent corroboration. The prosecution urged that Recording Officer evidence supported the authenticity and voluntary nature of the statements.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Counsel for respondents submitted that the Special Court correctly weighed the totality of record and rejected the confessions because mandatory procedural safeguards were not observed: absence of question–answer records, no contemporaneous notation of time/place, no evidence of who produced accused for recording, no authorization for the SP to record statements, and recording inside intimidating environments (BSF camp/JIC). It was further argued that one confession (of Salim Zargar) had already been repudiated in an earlier trial and had attained finality, invoking issue-estoppel to preclude the prosecution from re-using it. The respondents stressed prolonged detention, delay and overreliance on draconian statutory power to obtain confessions, contending that the trial court’s acquittal was unimpeachable.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The Court analysed Section 15 TADA and Rule 15 and applied a line of precedents beginning with the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) which upheld Section 15 but imposed strict procedural safeguards to protect voluntariness and fairness. The Court reiterated that, given the exceptional departure from general evidence law, strict compliance with Rule 15 and judicial guidelines is mandatory; any substantive or procedural lapse would render a confession unreliable.

On the facts the Court found material defects in the confessions. The certificate appended to Salim Zargar’s statement was vague: it failed to mention place/time, there was no contemporaneous question–answer record proving interrogation and voluntariness, and the recollection of PW-12 about date and place contradicted the certificate (discrepancy between 06.08.1990 and 16.09.1990).

Further, the same statement had been rejected earlier in another trial; acceptance now would disturb that earlier finding—invoking the doctrine of issue-estoppel as explained in Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh (2013). As to the confessions of Mushtaq Ahmed Khan and Mohd. Sadiq Rather, similar fatal omissions existed: no recorded time/place, absence of question answer transcripts, no evidence of authorization for SP A.K. Suri to record them, and recording on the same day of production with no meaningful reflection time. The Court emphasised that recording in heavily guarded BSF camps or JICs cannot be considered a “free atmosphere” required by Kartar Singh.

Given these pervasive breaches no reflection time, no formal contemporaneous satisfaction notes, recording in intimidating venues the confessions were vitiated. The Court also noted evidentiary weakness: eyewitnesses could not identify accused and weapon was not recovered though cartridges were examined, thus leaving the prosecution with inadmissible confessions and insufficient corroboration. Consequently, the Special Court’s acquittals were held to be the only possible view on the evidence; the appeals were dismissed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal ratio is that confessions under Section 15 TADA are admissible only if recorded in strict compliance with Rule 15 and the safeguards articulated in Kartar Singh and subsequent decisions. Where contemporaneous records fail to show that the recording officer explained statutory warnings, questioned the accused to ascertain voluntariness, allowed adequate reflection time, recorded the statement in a free atmosphere, and sent the confession promptly to the magistrate as mandated, the confession is unreliable and inadmissible. Further, where a confessional statement has been judicially rejected in prior proceedings between the parties, issue-estoppel prevents its reuse to disturb earlier findings. In the absence of such admissible confession, circumstantial or ocular deficiencies (such as non-recovery of weapon and inability of eye-witnesses to identify accused) make conviction unsafe.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court lamented procedural abuse in the exercise of exceptional powers under TADA, observed that the safeguards exist to prevent misuse, and noted the serious consequences when such safeguards are ignored—both for accused and for victims whose cases fail due to investigative shortcomings. The judgment also observed that the draconian provisions of TADA prompted eventual repeal and emphasised judicial vigilance where statutes permit departures from ordinary evidentiary protections.

c. GUIDELINES

The Court reaffirmed and applied the Kartar Singh guidelines: confessions must be recorded in the accused’s language and in a free atmosphere; the recording officer must explain statutory warnings and satisfy himself through questions that the confession is voluntary; adequate reflection (cooling) time should be afforded; the magistrate to whom confessions are forwarded must record any statement and examine complaint of torture; and strict compliance with Rule 15 certificates is indispensable. The judgment stresses contemporaneous documentation of question–answer sessions, time/place particulars, production details and proper transmission to Magistrate as non-negotiable steps.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeals underscores the paramount importance of procedural safeguards where law derogates from general evidentiary norms. The decision affirms that substance yields to form when the form is the chosen protector of voluntariness and fairness; confessions procured under exceptional statutory regimes require meticulous adherence to mandated procedure or risk exclusion. Practically, the judgment signals to investigative agencies that reliance on confessions as a substitute for robust investigative corroboration is perilous.

The invocation of issue-estoppel to foreclose reuse of a previously rejected confession reinforces finality of judicial findings on voluntariness. For criminal practitioners and police authorities, the case is a cautionary template: ensure contemporaneous records of statutory warnings, clear question–answer logs, documented reflection periods, recording in non-coercive environs, prompt forwarding to magistrates, and transparent authorisations for recording officers. The ruling thus preserves core protections against coerced admissions, while illustrating how investigative failures (non-recovery of weapon, weak ocular ID) compound the consequence of procedural lapses leading to acquittal despite serious allegations of terrorism and murder.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 2 SCR 375; (1994) 3 SCC 569.
2. SN Dube v. NB Bhoir, (2000) 2 SCC 254.
3. Sharafat Hussain Abdul Rahaman Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 11 SCC 62.
4. Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 245.
5. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1.
6. Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 5 SCC 118.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, Section 15; TADA Rules, Rule 15.
2. Ranbir Penal Code, 1932 (relevant sections: 118, 120-B, 302, 341, 364, 365, 368).
   Arms Act, 1959 (Section 3/25).

Primary judgment cited: State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz & Ors., [2025] 4 S.C.R. 156 : 2025 INSC 376.