A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment addresses the precise interpretative scope of Section 167(2)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly the phrase “imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years”. The controversy arose in the context of offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, where the statute prescribes a maximum punishment extending up to fourteen years, but does not stipulate any minimum mandatory sentence. The respondent-accused claimed statutory or default bail on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed within sixty days from the date of arrest. The State contended that the ninety-day period applied, arguing that the offence was punishable up to fourteen years and thus fell within clause (i) of the proviso to Section 167(2).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the legislative intent behind the phrase “not less than ten years” necessarily postulates the existence of a statutorily prescribed minimum sentence. In the absence of such minimum, an offence punishable with imprisonment up to fourteen years cannot be equated with an offence punishable with imprisonment not less than ten years. Relying on the authoritative pronouncement in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam and its subsequent reaffirmation in M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the Court held that the sixty-day period was applicable. The respondent was therefore entitled to default bail upon the failure of the investigating agency to complete the investigation within the stipulated time.

The decision reinforces the constitutional significance of personal liberty and procedural safeguards in criminal investigation, and clarifies that statutory ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the accused when liberty is at stake.

Keywords:
Statutory bail; Default bail; Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.; Official Secrets Act, 1923; Minimum sentence interpretation; Personal liberty.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment is situated within the evolving jurisprudence on statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a provision designed to balance the investigative powers of the State with the constitutional mandate of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The case arose from a prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, a legislation enacted to safeguard national security interests, often invoked in cases involving espionage or sensitive information.

Despite the gravity of such allegations, the Court was confronted with a procedural question of statutory interpretation rather than the merits of the accusations. The appeal tested whether offences prescribing a maximum punishment of fourteen years without specifying a minimum term could be brought within the ninety-day investigation window contemplated for offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not less than ten years. This question assumed critical importance as it directly determined the accused’s entitlement to default bail.

The High Court of Delhi had applied the sixty-day rule and granted bail to the respondent. The State challenged this interpretation, asserting that the severity of punishment justified extended custody. The Supreme Court’s task was therefore to reconcile the textual interpretation of Section 167(2) with established precedent and constitutional safeguards.

The background reflects a consistent judicial emphasis that statutory bail is not a discretionary relief but an indefeasible right accruing upon default of the investigating agency. The judgment thus continues the line of authority that treats procedural lapses affecting liberty with utmost seriousness.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

An FIR bearing No. 230 of 2020 was registered on 13.09.2020 at the Special Cell, Delhi, against the respondent for offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. During the course of investigation, Section 120B of the IPC was added, alleging criminal conspiracy. The respondent was arrested on 14.09.2020.

Multiple applications seeking regular bail were filed by the respondent before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts. Each of these applications was dismissed. Subsequently, on 14.11.2020, the respondent invoked Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., claiming that sixty days had elapsed from the date of arrest and that the charge-sheet had not been filed.

The Magistrate dismissed the application, observing that the sixty-day period was yet to expire, but clarified that statutory bail would become applicable upon such expiry. The State challenged this observation by filing a revision petition. Meanwhile, the respondent filed a fresh application under Section 167(2), which was again dismissed.

Aggrieved, the respondent approached the High Court of Delhi under Sections 397, 401 and 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court allowed the revision petition and granted statutory bail, holding that the offence did not fall under the ninety-day category. The State thereafter preferred the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the phrase “imprisonment for a term not less than ten years” under Section 167(2)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. includes offences prescribing a maximum punishment of fourteen years without a statutory minimum?

ii. Whether offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 attract the ninety-day or sixty-day period for completion of investigation?

iii. Whether the respondent was entitled to default bail upon non-filing of charge-sheet within sixty days?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State submitted that Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 prescribes imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years, indicating the seriousness of the offence. It was contended that such severity should place the offence within the ambit of Section 167(2)(a)(i), thereby allowing ninety days for investigation. The State argued that adopting a narrow interpretation would undermine national security considerations and investigative efficacy. It was further urged that the High Court erred in mechanically applying precedent without appreciating the object of the special statute.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent submitted that the statutory language is explicit and unambiguous. It was argued that the expression “not less than ten years” necessarily implies a minimum mandatory sentence, which is absent under the Official Secrets Act provisions invoked. Reliance was placed on Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam and M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, where this Court had authoritatively clarified the interpretation of Section 167(2). It was asserted that once the sixty-day period expired without filing of the charge-sheet, the right to default bail became indefeasible.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 167(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ii. Sections 3, 4 and 5, Official Secrets Act, 1923
iii. Section 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the High Court granting default bail. The Court held that Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act prescribes only a maximum punishment and does not lay down any minimum term. Consequently, the offence does not fall within clause (i) of the proviso to Section 167(2). The Court reaffirmed that in such cases, the sixty-day limit applies. The investigation having remained incomplete within that period, the respondent acquired an indefeasible right to statutory bail.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio rests on the textual and purposive interpretation of Section 167(2)(a). The Court held that the phrase “not less than ten years” must be given its natural meaning, signifying a legislatively prescribed minimum sentence of ten years or more. An offence punishable up to fourteen years, without a minimum threshold, does not satisfy this criterion. The Court relied extensively on Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, where a similar interpretative issue was conclusively settled. This interpretation was further reinforced by M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, emphasizing that default bail is a fundamental procedural safeguard.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that prolonged detention without filing of charge-sheet erodes the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty. It noted that the appeal had remained pending for four years, during which the respondent continued on bail, underscoring the need for expeditious trials. These observations, while not central to the decision, reiterate the constitutional philosophy underlying criminal procedure.

c. GUIDELINES

i. The statutory period under Section 167(2) must be determined strictly on the basis of the presence or absence of a minimum prescribed sentence.
ii. Maximum punishment alone cannot determine applicability of the ninety-day rule.
iii. Default bail must be granted immediately upon accrual of the right, subject to furnishing bail.
iv. Trial courts must proceed expeditiously once default bail is granted.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strengthens procedural safeguards against investigative delay and reinforces the principle that statutory bail is an indefeasible right. It prevents expansive interpretation of penal statutes at the cost of personal liberty. By reaffirming settled precedent, the Court ensures uniformity and predictability in criminal procedure. The decision also serves as a reminder that even in cases involving national security legislation, procedural guarantees cannot be diluted.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, [2017] 8 SCR 785
ii. M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, [2020] 12 SCR 915

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ii. Official Secrets Act, 1923
iii. Indian Penal Code, 1860