A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 (Supreme Court, 17 Feb. 2025) examines whether a preliminary inquiry is an indispensable prerequisite before registering an FIR against a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and whether a superior police officer may pass a composite order under Section 17 of the PC Act directing both registration and investigation.

The Superintendent of Police of the Karnataka Lokayukta relied upon a detailed source information report that quantified alleged disproportionate assets (Rs. 3,81,40,246; ~90.72% over known income) and, by order dated 4 Dec. 2023, directed the Deputy Superintendent to register an FIR and investigate. The High Court quashed the FIR, holding that a preliminary inquiry should have preceded registration and that the SP could not simultaneously order registration and authorize an investigation. The Supreme Court reversed.

The Court held that preliminary inquiry is desirable but not mandatory where the information itself discloses a cognizable offence; a sufficiently detailed source report may functionally satisfy the limited object of a preliminary inquiry (i.e., to determine whether cognizable offence is disclosed). Further, on harmonious construction of the PC Act and CrPC, the Superintendent is competent to issue a composite order directing registration of FIR and authorizing investigation under Section 17, provided the exercise of power shows application of mind and assigns reasons.

The decision reinforces Lalita Kumari’s principle that FIR-registration depends on whether information discloses a cognizable offence and upholds the investigatory purpose of the PC Act while warning against mechanical or casual orders.

Keywords: Prevention of Corruption Act; preliminary inquiry; composite order; Section 17 PC Act; disproportionate assets.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from a detailed source information report prepared by an inspector of the Karnataka Lokayukta alleging that the respondent, a senior public servant (DGM/Vigilance), had amassed assets disproportionate to known income. The Superintendent of Police reviewed the report, formed a prima facie view that offences under Section 13(1)(b) and related provisions of the PC Act were disclosed, and by order dated 4 December 2023 directed the Deputy Superintendent to register an FIR and investigate under Section 17 of the PC Act. An FIR was registered the same day.

The respondent moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC which quashed the FIR on two principal grounds:

(i) absence of a preliminary inquiry prior to registration in corruption cases; and

(ii) impropriety of a composite order i.e., the Superintendent directing investigation before formal FIR-registration.

The State challenged that order before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was required to resolve two inter-linked questions: whether a preliminary inquiry is obligatory in every corruption case before an FIR can be registered; and whether a superior police officer may validly issue a composite order simultaneously directing registration of an FIR and authorising investigation under the PC Act.

The judgment situates itself among precedents such as Lalita Kumari, Managipet, Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, and older authorities like P. Sirajuddin and Bhajan Lal, reconciling them to hold that the necessity of a preliminary inquiry is fact-sensitive and that a reasoned composite order by a superior officer is permissible where the source information discloses a cognizable offence and the officer manifests application of mind.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent joined KPTCL in 2007 and later served as Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive Engineer (Electrical), BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore. In November 2023 a Police Inspector submitted a source information report to the Superintendent, alleging the respondent had acquired assets totalling Rs. 3,81,40,246/—approximately 90.72% beyond his known sources of income.

The Superintendent, after examining the report, issued an order on 4.12.2023 under Section 17 PC Act directing the Deputy Superintendent to register FIR (Crime No. 56 of 2023) for offences under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) and Section 12 and to investigate. The order also authorized inspection of banker’s books under Section 18 and assigned the investigation to a named DSP having prior experience in disproportionate assets cases. On the same day the FIR was registered.

The respondent filed a criminal writ petition under Section 482 CrPC; the High Court quashed the FIR primarily because no independent preliminary inquiry had been conducted and because the Superintendent allegedly issued the authorisation without separate registration—thereby treating preliminary inquiry as mandatory in corruption cases and disallowing the composite order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registration of an FIR against a public servant in corruption cases under the PC Act?

2. Whether a detailed source information report submitted to a superior officer can be treated as a functional substitute for a preliminary inquiry?

3. Whether a Superintendent of Police is empowered under the statutory scheme (PC Act read with CrPC) to pass a composite order directing registration of an FIR and simultaneously authorising investigation under Section 17?

4. Whether an order authorising investigation, passed mechanically or without reasons, can vitiate consequent FIR and investigation?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The State submitted that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory where the information itself discloses the commission of a cognizable offence; the source information report here was elaborate and amounted to a preliminary scrutiny; the Superintendent applied his mind and produced a reasoned order; and therefore he was competent under Section 17 PC Act to direct registration and investigation.

Reliance was placed on Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, Managipet, and CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi-line authorities to support discretionary non-necessity of preliminary inquiry and on Ram Singh/Kailash Vijayvargiya to justify prompt registration and investigation to prevent shielding of corrupt officials.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Counsel contended that corruption allegations damage reputation and a preliminary inquiry is a condition precedent before registration; the Superintendent acted mechanically and without proper verification; the second proviso to Section 17 mandates caution when lower-rank officers investigate Section 13(1)(b) offences; reliance on P. Sirajuddin and Lalita Kumari stressed protective purpose of preliminary inquiry in corruption cases. The respondent argued that omission to conduct an independent preliminary inquiry thus vitiated the registration and investigation.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court answered both issues against the High Court. On Issue A the Court reaffirmed the principle in Lalita Kumari that registration of FIR is mandatory where information prima facie discloses a cognizable offence; preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every corruption case and its scope is limited to ascertaining whether a cognizable offence appears from the material.

The Court noted that items listed in Lalita Kumari (matrimonial, commercial, medical negligence, corruption, unexplained delay) are illustrations where preliminary inquiry may be desirable but not a right of the accused. Applying Managipet and Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, the Court held a detailed source information report may functionally fulfill the narrow role of a preliminary inquiry when it sets out assets, bank transactions and cross-references official records to disclose disproportion.

In this case the November 2023 report quantified assets and compared income, therefore a prima facie cognizable offence was disclosed and registration without a separate fresh inquiry was permissible.

On Issue B the Court examined Section 17 and the statutory matrix with CrPC provisions. It held a superior police officer (Superintendent) has the power to evaluate source reports and, by virtue of powers conferred under CrPC (e.g., Section 36/Section 154 interplay), may direct subordinates to register FIRs and concurrently authorise an investigating officer under Section 17 PC Act.

The Court rejected the High Court’s four-step administrative precondition that effectively constrained the Superintendent’s authority. The Court cautioned that orders must not be mechanical; they must demonstrate application of mind and assign reasons. Distinguishing Bhajan Lal (where orders were perfunctory), the Court found the SP’s order in this case was reasoned, issued after 24 days, referenced particulars, quantified disproportion and named the investigating officer with justification for selection; therefore the composite order was valid.

The Court emphasized harmonious construction CrPC governs registration while PC Act governs limitation on who may investigate so Section 17 limits the rank of investigators but does not bar the Superintendent from directing registration and simultaneously authorising investigation subject to observance of reasons and bona fides. The High Court order quashing the FIR was thus set aside and the FIR restored.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold:

(1) Preliminary inquiry is not an absolute precondition to FIR registration in corruption cases where information (or a source report) itself discloses a cognizable offence, registration is mandatory;

(2) a Superintendent of Police who, after reasonable application of mind, is satisfied that prima facie ingredients of offence exist, may issue a composite order under Section 17 PC Act directing registration and simultaneously authorising investigation, provided the order is reasoned and not mechanical.

The decision harmonises Lalita Kumari’s mandamus to register FIRs with practical exigencies of corruption investigations and ensures superior officers can act without needless procedural fetters while protecting against perfunctory authorisations.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed obiter that administrative frameworks carved by courts that produce procedural check-dams may incapacitate investigation and inadvertently protect corrupt officials. It reiterated that fair investigation requires both procedural safeguards for accused and not procedural impediments that frustrate enquiry. The Court also noted that while the SP’s power is wide, misuse (mechanical orders or lack of reasons) will attract the protective principles in Bhajan Lal; hence reasoned orders are essential.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. When detailed source reports disclose disproportionate assets with quantified comparisons, superior officers may treat such reports as functionally satisfying the limited purpose of preliminary inquiry.

2. Composite orders authorising registration and investigation are permissible when the superior officer records reasons and demonstrates application of mind.

3. Mechanical, pro forma or casually worded orders authorising investigation will be vitiated; reasons and time-frame showing deliberation strengthen validity.

4. Registration of FIR remains mandatory if information discloses cognizable offence; preliminary inquiry is restricted to cases where information does not prima facie disclose such offence.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment strikes a balance between two competing imperatives: protection of public servants from frivolous prosecutions through a limited, protective preliminary scrutiny, and the State’s duty to investigate corruption decisively where material prima facie discloses offences. Practically, the ruling clarifies that formalist sequences (preliminary inquiry → FIR → SP authorisation) are not constitutionally mandated when the material before the competent superior officer is itself detailed and revealing of cognizable offences.

The decision will have salutary impact on anti-corruption enforcement by permitting senior police officers to act on developed source reports without artificial procedural encumbrances—subject to the caveat that exercise of such power must be reasoned and non-mechanical. For practitioners, the judgment reinforces careful drafting of source reports and reasoned orders: quantification of disproportion, cross-referencing of income and assets, and specific reasons for selecting investigators will immunize the investigative process from quashing challenges.

Simultaneously, courts retain the supervisory jurisdiction to quash investigations that originate from perfunctory or mala fide authorisations. The ruling thus preserves the rule of law by enabling prompt investigations of corruption while safeguarding accused persons from arbitrary or casual prosecution.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, [1970] 3 SCR 931 : (1970) 1 SCC 595.

2. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1.

3. CBI & Anr. v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi & Anr., [2021] 13 SCR 364 : (2021) 18 SCC 135.

4. State of Telangana v. Managipet (Mangipet) Sarveshwar Reddy, [2019] 14 SCR 716 : (2019) 19 SCC 87.

5. State of M.P. & Ors. v. Ram Singh, [2000] 1 SCR 579 : (2000) 5 SCC 88.

6. Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri, [2023] 6 SCR 135 : (2023) 14 SCC 1.

7. Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas, [2008] 12 SCR 165 : (2008) 8 SCC 580.

8. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Sections 12, 13(1)(b), 13(2), 17, 18).

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 154 and provisions on powers of superior officers).