A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore concerns the maintainability of a second FIR registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) against the respondent, a senior official of the Bio-fuel Authority, after an earlier FIR had already been lodged in respect of an alleged demand and acceptance of bribe. The High Court quashed the second FIR under Section 482, Cr.P.C., treating it as an abuse where both FIRs related to the same offence.

On appeal, the Supreme Court analysed the evolving jurisprudence on second or subsequent FIRs notably T.T. Antony, Anju Chaudhary, Kari Choudhary, Upkar Singh, Babu Bhai and Nirmal Singh Kahlon and distilled principles allowing a second FIR where it:

(a) constitutes a counter-complaint or rival version;

(b) covers a broader ambit or separate incident;

(c) discloses new facts or a larger conspiracy; or

(d) reveals hitherto unknown material.

Applying these principles to the facts where the second FIR set out a prolonged period of alleged corrupt practice, detailed surveillance of middlemen, call records and an alleged wider conspiracy spanning months the Court held the second FIR distinct in scope from the earlier FIR that concerned a discrete demand on 4 April 2022. Quashing would have prematurely stifled investigation into systemic corruption. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the High Court order, restored FIR No.131 of 2022 and directed investigation to continue. Source: Supreme Court judgment.

Keywords: Second FIR; Maintainability; Quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.; Widespread corruption; Counter-complaint.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation arises from corruption allegations targeted at a senior official of the State Bio-fuel Authority. The ACB initially registered FIR No.123 of 2022 for an alleged demand of Rs.2 per litre on 4 April 2022 a concretely dated single episode implicating the respondent. Subsequently ACB registered FIR No.131 of 2022 (14 April 2022) which described an extended period (30 September 2021 to 12 April 2022), surveillance of alleged middlemen, recorded call logs and a broader conspiracy to grant licences in exchange for bribes.

The respondent sought quashing of FIR No.131 under Section 482, Cr.P.C., arguing absence of any fresh incident, lack of prior sanction under the P.C. Act, and that the second FIR was an impermissible repetition of allegations covered by the earlier FIR relying primarily on T.T. Antony and Babu Bhai. The High Court allowed the quashing petition treating the second FIR as the same offence and an abuse of process. The State appealed, asking whether the second FIR was maintainable when it records a different ambit and divulges material indicative of a larger, systemic malpractice.

The Supreme Court’s task was to reconcile the doctrine against multiplicity of FIRs with circumstances where later information reveals distinct offences, counter-versions or conspiratorial dimensions that warrant independent investigation. The Court therefore examined the line of precedents permitting flexibility particularly where additional investigative material or independent incidents surface and applied those contours to the present facts to decide if quashing was justified.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Three complainants Vipin Parihar (Chief Marketing Officer, Fern Bio-fuel Pvt. Ltd.), his partner Deven Shah, and Satya Narayan Saini lodged a complaint alleging that the respondent demanded a bribe of Rs.2 per litre for sale of biodiesel (aggregating Rs.15 lakhs per month) and an additional Rs.5 lakhs for licence renewal; the alleged demand occurred on 4 April 2022, giving rise to FIR No.123/2022 under Sections 7 & 7A, P.C. Act. Thereafter, on 14 April 2022, ACB registered FIR No.131/2022 based on information from an ACB constable about the respondent’s involvement in taking bribes to grant licences; the second FIR narrates incidents between 30 September 2021 and 12 April 2022, identifies alleged middlemen (Nimba Ram and Ashish), records that they were placed under surveillance, and contains detailed call records and alleged conspiratorial communications spanning months.

The respondent moved to quash the second FIR, contending that it raised no fresh incident and that any additional material should have been incorporated into the earlier investigation or pursued by permission under Section 173 Cr.P.C.. The High Court agreed and quashed FIR No.131. The State appealed, asserting that the second FIR disclosed a more extensive pattern of corrupt conduct beyond the narrow single-date episode in the first FIR and that investigation should be permitted to proceed to expose a potentially wider conspiracy.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether registration of a second FIR is maintainable where an earlier FIR pertaining to a related allegation is already registered?

2. Whether a second FIR that discloses a broader conspiracy and new material can be treated as distinct and hence permissible?

3. Whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the second FIR?

4. Whether absence of prior sanction under the P.C. Act invalidates registration or investigation of the second FIR at the stage at which it was registered?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The State (appellant) contended that the second FIR was not a mere repetition but disclosed a substantially different ambit: a sustained scheme involving middlemen, surveillance reports and call data pointing to endemic corruption in licence-granting; the first FIR concerned a single demand on 4 April 2022, while the second disclosed a longer span and additional actors. The State argued that precedent permits a subsequent FIR where fresh discovery, rival versions or a larger conspiracy emerge during investigation, and that quashing at the threshold would prematurely terminate probing into systemic malfeasance and harm public interest. The appellant relied on the investigative discretion vested in the police and judicial precedents that allow a second FIR in appropriate circumstances.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for Respondent submitted that the second FIR did not disclose any fresh incident distinct from FIR No.123 and was therefore an abuse of process; registration of successive FIRs on the same subject violates the protection against repetitive investigation and the principle of fair trial under Article 21. Reliance was placed on T.T. Antony and Babu Bhai to assert that multiple FIRs in respect of the same transaction cannot be used to subject a citizen to repeated investigations. It was also argued that prior sanction under the P.C. Act was necessary before proceeding against a public servant, and absence of such sanction rendered the investigation impermissible.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

1. Section 154, Cr.P.C. — registration of information as FIR.

2. Section 156, Cr.P.C. — police power to investigate cognizable offences.

3. Section 173, Cr.P.C. — police report; further investigation and supplementary reports.

4. Section 482, Cr.P.C. — inherent powers of High Court to prevent abuse of process.

5. Sections 7, 7A, 8 & 12, P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2018 — offences relating to public servants and taking gratification.

6. Section 120-B, IPC — criminal conspiracy.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court. It undertook a survey of precedents and extracted a principled approach: although the general rule disfavors multiplicity of FIRs for the same incident, flexibility exists where the second FIR is a counter-complaint, presents a rival version, covers different ambit, discloses new facts or reveals a larger conspiracy.

The Court noted T.T. Antony as laying down protective doctrine but emphasised subsequent decisions Anju Chaudhary, Kari Choudhary, Upkar Singh, Babu Bhai and Nirmal Singh Kahlon which clarified exceptions and permitted second FIRs on new discoveries or broader conspiratorial canvass. Applying these principles, the Court contrasted the narrow, single-date demand recorded in FIR No.123/2022 with FIR No.131/2022 that narrated months of activity, identities of middlemen, recorded communications and surveillance findings.

The Court held that the second FIR’s scope was substantially larger and distinct; to quash it would preclude inquiry into systemic corruption. The Court therefore set aside the High Court order, restored FIR No.131/2022 and directed expedited completion of investigation with oversight by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive principle is that a second FIR is maintainable where it is not simply a repetition of the same incident but:

(i) presents a rival or counter-version;

(ii) discloses material beyond the ambit of the earlier FIR;

(iii) arises from new discoveries including evidence of a larger conspiracy; or

(iv) refers to a separate incident.

The Court held that judicial power to quash under Section 482 must be exercised carefully so as not to obstruct legitimate investigation into wider criminality. On facts, the second FIR disclosed sustained corrupt practice and therefore could not be treated as the same transaction as the first FIR.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed, obiter, that absolute rigidity against any subsequent FIR would produce anomalous and unjust results for instance, precluding victims from lodging counter-complaints or preventing police from pursuing leads that surface during the course of investigation. The Court reiterated that procedural safeguards (fair investigation, judicial oversight) and legislative mechanisms (permission for further investigation where required) need to be respected, but cannot be used to immunise entrenched corrupt networks from investigation. It further noted that questions of sanction under the P.C. Act may be raised at appropriate stages but do not automatically justify quashing where prima facie material warrants probe.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Apply the test of sameness — examine whether both FIRs relate to identical incident/transaction or to different incidents.

2. If the second FIR discloses new facts, actors or a larger conspiracy, it is ordinarily maintainable; courts should avoid premature quashing that stifles investigation into systemic offences.

3. Where the police obtain further material during investigation, the appropriate response may be further investigation or a supplementary report under Section 173, but registration of a distinct FIR may be justified if the new material discloses separate cognizable offences or a new conspiracy.

4. High Courts must exercise Section 482 sparingly; quashing is appropriate where the second FIR is a sham, mala fide, or wholly repetitive without any discernible new material.

5. Issues of prior sanction under the P.C. Act should be examined in context and at proper stages of investigation and prosecution rather than used as an automatic ground for quashing where prima facie material exists.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court balanced the twin imperatives of protecting individuals from repetitive and oppressive investigations and preserving the State’s ability to investigate newly discovered or broader criminality. By applying a contextual test focused on sameness, scope and new discovery, the Court endorsed a pragmatic approach that favours allowing probing into alleged systemic corruption when the second FIR reveals material beyond a narrow episodic allegation.

The judgment underscores careful but restrained use of Section 482, Cr.P.C. and signals that technical plea of multiplicity cannot be used to foreclose serious inquiries into administrative corruption. Practitioners should therefore analyse the factual canvas closely when advising on quashing petitions: if the later FIR contains surveillance material, distinct actors, extended timelines or records suggestive of conspiracy, courts will likely permit investigation to continue; conversely, mere repetition without any new foundation remains vulnerable to quashing.

K) REFERENCES 

1. State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, Crim. App. No. 847 of 2025 (S.C.), 19 Feb. 2025.

2. Babu Bhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254.

3. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181.

4. Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., (2013) 6 SCC 384.

5. Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi, (2002) 1 SCC 714.

6. Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292.

7. Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441.

8. Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322.

9. Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148.

10. P. Sreekumar v. State of Kerala, (2018) 4 SCC 579.

11. Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.