A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This landmark judgment in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU High Court ([1954] SCR 454) elucidates the Supreme Court of India’s interpretation of its own powers, as well as those of the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner sought the transfer of contempt proceedings from the PEPSU High Court on the grounds of potential bias and invoked Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The Supreme Court examined the scope and nature of contempt jurisdiction and rejected the petitioner’s prayer, holding that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of record and is a special jurisdiction not amenable to general criminal law procedures. The Court clarified that Section 527 does not empower it to transfer contempt proceedings initiated by a High Court. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the necessity of fairness and impartiality in judicial proceedings but reiterated that the integrity of the High Court’s jurisdiction over contempt matters cannot be diluted by invoking the general transfer provisions. The ruling solidified the constitutional autonomy of High Courts regarding contempt and delineated the limits of the Supreme Court’s supervisory power in such matters.

Keywords: Contempt of Court, Supreme Court Jurisdiction, Article 215, Section 527 CrPC, Courts of Record, Transfer of Proceedings, Inherent Powers.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU High Court

ii) Case Number
Petition No. 304 of 1953

iii) Judgement Date
November 25, 1953

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justices Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, and N.H. Bhagwati

vi) Author
Justice Vivian Bose

vii) Citation
[1954] SCR 454

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Article 215 of the Constitution of India

• Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

• Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None specifically overruled.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Judicial Administration, Contempt of Court

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
This case arises from an unusual application made under Section 527 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 for the transfer of contempt proceedings initiated by the PEPSU High Court. The petitioner, Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, requested the Supreme Court to either transfer the case to another High Court or to direct that certain named judges of the PEPSU High Court should not hear the matter due to allegations of personal bias. The case thus presented a constitutional conundrum: whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to direct such a transfer of contempt proceedings that originate from the inherent jurisdiction of a court of record, namely the High Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, was facing contempt proceedings before the PEPSU High Court. He moved the Supreme Court under Section 527 of the CrPC, 1898, asserting that due to the personal involvement of some judges in the allegations, they could not impartially adjudicate the contempt matter. He further argued that since contempt is punishable under law, it qualifies as an “offence” and therefore is triable under the CrPC. Consequently, he contended, the Supreme Court has the authority to transfer such a case in the interest of justice.

The Attorney General, appearing for the respondent, opposed the motion, asserting that the power to punish for contempt is an inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution, and hence, not subject to the provisions of the CrPC. The question before the Court thus centered on the interplay between the constitutional powers of courts of record and the procedural codes governing criminal proceedings.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Section 527 CrPC to transfer contempt proceedings pending before a High Court.
ii. Whether contempt of court constitutes an “offence” under CrPC, making it subject to criminal procedure.
iii. Whether it is judicially appropriate for a judge who is personally attacked in contempt allegations to hear the matter.
iv. Whether Article 215 of the Constitution gives the High Courts exclusive and inherent powers over contempt proceedings.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Section 527 of the CrPC provides for the transfer of any “case” from one court to another if it is expedient for the ends of justice. They argued that contempt is an “offence” because it is punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and the term “offence” in Section 4 of the CrPC includes acts punishable under “any law for the time being in force.” Hence, contempt falls within the purview of the CrPC, making Section 527 applicable.
The counsel emphasized that since contempt can be punished by imprisonment and fine, it should be triable under the normal criminal process, thus entitling the Supreme Court to transfer the matter from the allegedly biased PEPSU High Court judges.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in contempt matters is not derived from CrPC but from their constitutional and inherent powers as courts of record. They cited Article 215 of the Constitution of India, which recognizes that every High Court is a court of record and has all the powers to punish for contempt of itself. The Attorney General also stressed that Section 1(2) of the CrPC excludes its application to special jurisdictions unless otherwise specifically provided.
The respondents relied heavily on judicial precedent, including Surendranath Banerjea v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal (1883) 10 I.A. 171, and In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar (I.L.R. 48 All. 711), affirming that contempt jurisdiction is unique and not governed by the general criminal law.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Article 215 of the Constitution of India — Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
ii. Section 1(2) of CrPC, 1898 — Excludes the applicability of the Code to special jurisdictions or powers unless otherwise stated.
iii. Section 527 of CrPC, 1898 — Pertains to the transfer of cases but not applicable to contempt proceedings initiated by a court of record.
iv. Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 — Preserves the inherent jurisdiction of High Courts for contempt.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Court held that the power to punish for contempt is a special jurisdiction inherent in all courts of record, such as High Courts. Therefore, such proceedings cannot be transferred under Section 527 of the CrPC.
ii. The Constitution, through Article 215, vests this power in the High Courts, and Section 1(2) of the CrPC specifically excludes such special jurisdictions from its ambit.
iii. Contempt does not fall within the definition of “offence” under the CrPC for procedural purposes, and therefore, proceedings for contempt are not “cases” under Section 527.
iv. The Code of Criminal Procedure cannot regulate contempt proceedings as it would lead to anomalies like requiring magistrates to try contempts of the High Court, which is absurd and contrary to judicial hierarchy and structure.

b. OBITER DICTA 
i. Justice Bose observed that “it is desirable on general principles of justice that a Judge who has been personally attacked should not as far as possible hear a contempt matter which, to that extent, concerns him personally.” This principle, though not enforceable, is advised to maintain judicial impartiality.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Courts of record possess inherent jurisdiction to deal with contempt.

• CrPC does not override this special jurisdiction.

• Judges personally involved in the contempt should recuse where feasible to preserve public confidence.

• Supreme Court has no power to order transfer of such contempt matters initiated by High Courts.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The decision in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi stands as a pivotal pronouncement that reinforces the autonomous nature of contempt jurisdiction as vested in courts of record, especially High Courts. The Supreme Court made it clear that this special jurisdiction is insulated from procedural constraints applicable to ordinary criminal matters under the CrPC. This interpretation preserves the dignity and authority of the High Courts, ensuring that their power to protect the judicial process remains unimpaired.

The ruling also serves as a caution against potential judicial bias in contempt cases. Although the Supreme Court could not direct a recusal, it urged judges to act judiciously by recusing themselves in situations of personal involvement. This advisory aims to uphold the cardinal principle that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Surendranath Banerjea v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal, (1883) 10 I.A. 171
ii. In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar, I.L.R. 48 All. 711
iii. In the matter of Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary, I.L.R. 29 All. 95
iv. Crown v. Sayyad Habib, I.L.R. 6 Lah. 528
v. In the matter of Muslim Outlook, AIR 1927 Lah. 610
vi. In re Murli Manohar Prasad, I.L.R. 8 Pat. 323
vii. Harkishen Lal v. The Crown, I.L.R. 18 Lah. 69
viii. Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322
ix. William Rainy v. The Justices of Sierra Leone, 8 Moo. P.C. 47
x. Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor, AIR 1945 P.C. 134
xi. Emperor v. B. G. Horniman, AIR 1945 All. 1

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Article 215, Constitution of India
ii. Section 527, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
iii. Section 1(2), Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
iv. Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, Sections 3 and 5
v. High Courts Act, 1861
vi. Government of India Act, 1915