A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

In Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019, judgment dated 12 February 2025) the Supreme Court (Oka, A.A. Amanullah & A.G. Masih, JJ.; reference to three-Judge Bench) adjudicated two core questions under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:

(i) whether a spouse of a marriage declared void under s.11 is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under s.25, and

(ii) whether maintenance pendente lite can be ordered under s.24 in a petition seeking declaration of nullity under s.11.

The Court analysed the statutory scheme particularly ss.5, 11, 23, 24, 25 and the meaning of “decree” in the matrimonial context. Relying on canonical precedents such as Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga, the Court held that decrees under ss.9–13 (including a decree of nullity under s.11) fall within the scope of “any decree” in s.25, entitling the financially dependent spouse to seek permanent alimony subject to judicial discretion and consideration of conduct.

The Court distinguished decisions dealing with s.125 CrPC and s.18 HAMA (eg. Yamunabai Adhav, Savitaben Bhatiya, Abbayolla Reddy) as operating in different remedial fields. On s.24, the Court held that a matrimonial court may grant interim maintenance pendente lite during s.11 proceedings if the statutory conditions are satisfied, even where a prima facie view of nullity exists, again emphasizing discretion and equitable considerations.

The judgment censured pejorative descriptors (e.g., “illegitimate wife”, “faithful mistress”) used in a Bombay High Court Full Bench decision as violative of human dignity under Art.21. The reference was answered and the matters were directed to be placed before an appropriate Bench for decision on merits.

Keywords: Hindu Marriage Act; void marriage; s.11; s.25; s.24; permanent alimony; maintenance pendente lite; decree in proceedings.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The reference arose because of conflicting authorities on whether a spouse of a marriage declared void under s.11 can claim permanent maintenance under s.25 and whether interim maintenance under s.24 is available in petitions for declaration of nullity. The statutory structure of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 distinguishes remedies that alter marital status (decrees under ss.9–13) from other civil remedies; s.23 describes “decree in proceedings” and contains procedural safeguards for grant of relief. The appellant challenged application of s.25 to decrees of nullity, arguing that a void marriage is void ab initio and therefore no spousal status subsists to attract s.25.

Concern was raised about mischief: claims arising from incestuous or bigamous relationships and potential misuse where a party had knowingly entered into a void marriage. The respondent relied on prior Supreme Court rulings which had adopted a purposive reading of s.25 to prevent the financially dependent spouse from becoming destitute, emphasizing equality of remedy and the court’s equitable discretion. The Court embarked on a textual and purposive construction of the term “decree” within the matrimonial code and juxtaposed statutory remedies under the Marriage Act with summary statutory remedies under s.125 CrPC and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, concluding that the particular remedial scheme and the legislative use of “may” created a discretionary protective route for economically dependent spouses even where the marriage was void. The Court further intervened on language and dignity, reproving judicial characterizations that demeaned women of void marriages.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appeals arose from decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in FAO No. 35 of 2016 and connected matters, culminating in Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019. The precise factual matrix of the underlying parties is recorded in the record but the core procedural posture is this: a petition under s.11 was filed seeking a declaration that a marriage was null and void on statutory grounds set out in s.5 (for example, subsisting prior marriage or prohibited relationship). In course of appellate proceedings divergent High Court and lower court rulings applied conflicting precedents on entitlement to maintenance under s.25.

The appellant-husband relied on earlier Supreme Court and High Court decisions notably Yamunabai Adhav, Abbayolla Reddy and High Court Full Bench decisions contending that where a marriage is void ab initio, the petitioner cannot be treated as a “spouse” for purposes of s.25 and that protective maintenance under other statutes (eg. s.18 HAMA or s.125 CrPC) remained available but s.25 did not. The respondent-wife argued that denial of s.25 would leave financially dependent spouses destitute, urged reliance on Chand Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga, and emphasized the gender-neutral wording of s.25 and the remedial purpose of the matrimonial code.

The Supreme Court referred the question to a larger Bench because of the conflict among precedents and the importance of uniformity in matrimonial jurisprudence.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a spouse of a marriage declared null and void under s.11 HMA is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under s.25 HMA?

ii. Whether a matrimonial court can grant maintenance pendente lite under s.24 HMA in proceedings seeking a declaration under s.11 HMA?

iii. What is the proper statutory meaning of “decree” in s.25 when read with s.23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

iv. Whether remedies under s.25 HMA can be restricted by reference to summary maintenance remedies under s.125 CrPC or s.18 HAMA?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant-husband submitted that a void marriage is void ab initio and therefore there is no spousal status upon which s.25 can operate; inclusion of a decree of nullity within “any decree” in s.25 produces absurd results and could incentivize fraudulent or immoral claims (examples posited: incestuous unions, bigamous unions, concealment of prior marriage).

It was urged that earlier High Court Full Bench authorities which denied s.25 entitlement should be followed, and that maintenance remedies available under s.18 HAMA or s.125 CrPC remain the appropriate routes where summary protection is sought.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the respondent-wife contended that s.25 must be read purposively to protect dependent spouses from destitution, citing Chand Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga. It was submitted that the legislature’s use of the wide phrase “at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto” cannot be narrowed to exclude decrees of nullity. Reliance was placed upon constitutional values (including Art.21) and the gender-neutral protection in s.25, arguing equitable discretion permits denial in cases of misconduct but not blanket exclusion.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 5, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — conditions for a valid Hindu marriage and categories rendering marriage void.

ii. Section 11, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — declaration of void marriages (nullity).

iii. Section 23, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — decree in proceedings and prerequisites for grant of relief.

iv. Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceeding.

v. Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — permanent alimony and maintenance (discretionary, factors include conduct, income, property).

vi. Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 18, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — alternative maintenance remedies discussed and distinguished.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Court held that the phrase “any decree” in s.25(1) is to be read with reference to s.23 which circumscribes “decree in proceedings” as decrees granting relief under ss.9–13 of the Act. Decrees under s.11 (declaration of nullity) therefore fall within the statutory ambit for purposes of invoking s.25. The Court reasoned that decrees under ss.11–13 effect a change of marital status and therefore attract the remedial apparatus of s.25. The Court reaffirmed Chand Dhawan and Rameshchandra Daga decisions which had adopted a protective, purposive construction to prevent financially dependent spouses becoming destitute.

The Court distinguished authorities that arose under s.125 CrPC or s.18 HAMA as addressing distinct, summary reliefs and hence inapposite to the statutory framework of s.25. The judgment emphasised that s.25 is discretionary and equitable; mere existence of voidness does not automatically entitle relief, nor does it bar relief where justice and conduct warrant. As to s.24, the Court held that pending proceedings under ss.9–13, including s.11, a matrimonial court may award interim maintenance if it is satisfied the applicant lacks independent income for support and litigation expenses; prima facie findings of nullity do not operate as a bar to interim relief.

The Court also censured judicial language that demeans women of void marriages, observing such descriptors violate Art.21 and cannot be sanctioned. The reference was answered accordingly and appeals remitted for adjudication on merits by an appropriate Bench.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The dispositive legal principle is that the term “any decree” in s.25 must be construed in light of s.23 and the remedial scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; decrees granting relief under ss.9–13 including a decree of nullity under s.11 are encompassed within s.25 and therefore entitle a spouse to apply for permanent maintenance subject to the court’s discretionary assessment of conduct, income and other circumstances. The Court’s ratio rests on textual harmony, legislative purpose (protecting financially dependent spouses), and precedent continuity (Chand Dhawan, Rameshchandra Daga).

b. OBITER DICTA

The judgment contains several significant observations obiter: first, that remedies under s.25 differ in nature and scope from summary remedies under s.125 CrPC and s.18 HAMA, so jurisprudence from those fields cannot be transposed mechanically. Second, the Court deprecated judicial characterizations that stigmatize women (eg., “illegitimate wife”, “faithful mistress”) as violative of dignity under Art.21, calling such language misogynistic and inappropriate. Third, examples of possible misuse (incest, bigamy) were acknowledged but the Court clarified that s.25’s discretionary character and evaluation of conduct are safeguards against absurd or unjust outcomes.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. When adjudicating s.25 claims post-decree of nullity under s.11, courts must interpret “decree” with reference to s.23 and consider the remedial and status-altering nature of decrees under ss.9–13.

ii. s.25 relief is discretionary; courts must weigh income of parties, property, conduct of parties, and other circumstances before awarding permanent alimony, and may secure payments by charge on immovable property where necessary.

iii. Interim maintenance under s.24 may be granted in pending s.11 proceedings if

(a) the proceeding under the Act is pending and

(b) the applicant lacks independent income sufficient for support and litigation expenses; courts must consider conduct and exercise caution.

iv. Decisions arising under s.125 CrPC or s.18 HAMA must not be applied wholesale to ss.24–25 HMA because they operate in separate statutory fields with different procedures and objectives.

v. Courts must avoid stigmatizing language; judicial diction must respect Art.21 dignity considerations when describing parties of void marriages.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The reference decisively aligns statutory interpretation with protective equity: a spouse of a declared void marriage is not stripped of access to the matrimonial court’s remedial powers simply because the marriage is void ab initio. By anchoring “decree” to s.23 and reaffirming Chand Dhawan/Rameshchandra Daga, the Court preserves a remedial safety net while preserving judicial discretion to refuse relief in cases of culpable conduct. Distinguishing summary maintenance remedies prevents conflation of distinct statutory regimes and ensures that courts hearing matrimonial causes can address the full spectrum of consequences arising from status-altering decrees.

The judgment also contributes to normative jurisprudence by insisting on dignified judicial language. Practitioners should note that while s.25 claims are viable after s.11 decrees, successful outcomes will turn on detailed factual demonstrations of dependency, proportionality of relief, and absence of conduct disentitling the applicant. Future benches will now consider merits in the remitted matters applying these clarified principles.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993) 3 SCC 406.

2. Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga, (2005) 2 SCC 33.

3. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530.

4. Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 636.

5. Abbayolla Reddy v. Padmamma, AIR 1999 AP 19 (High Court decision discussed).

6. Bhausaheb @ Sandhu v. Leelabai, AIR 2004 Bom. 283 (Full Bench — discussed and disapproved).

7. Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1569 : 2025 INSC 197 (this judgment).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — ss.5, 11, 23, 24, 25.

2. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — s.18 (distinguished).

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s.125 (distinguished).

4. Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s.144 (analogous discussion).