A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 975 of 2025), delivered 25 February 2025, focusing on the interplay between Section 197, CrPC (sanction for prosecution of public servants), the role of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) under the POSH Act, 2013, and the correctness of a Magistrate taking cognizance in the absence of a prior sanction. The Court accepted that the appellant a BIS official who acted as Presiding Officer of the ICC while on deputation to FSSAI filed a counter-affidavit in administrative litigation and engaged with the complainant in an official capacity.

The central legal question was whether those official acts required prior departmental sanction before criminal proceedings could be instituted, and whether any concept of “deemed sanction” can be read into Section 197. Applying established principles (notably Amrik Singh, Amod Kumar Kanth, Gurmeet Kaur), the Court held that where the alleged acts are connected to the discharge or purported discharge of official duty, Section 197 applies and prior sanction is a condition precedent to cognizance.

The Court rejected the State’s contention of “deemed sanction” as unsupported by Section 197 and the cited precedents. Because the competent authority (BIS) ultimately refused sanction, the Court quashed the charge-sheet and summons insofar as they related to the appellant. The decision underscores the protective purpose of Section 197, circumscribes judicial inclination to treat administrative silence as permitting prosecution, and clarifies the limited and fact-sensitive enquiry required at the cognizance stage.

Keywords: Sanction for Prosecution; Section 197 CrPC; Internal Complaints Committee; POSH Act 2013; Deemed Sanction; Cognizance; Public Servant.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from a summoning and charge-sheet issued after an FIR lodged by Dr. Manisha Narayan alleging workplace sexual harassment at FSSAI. An ICC enquiry (2014–15) had found Dr. S.S. Ghonkrokta guilty; Ghonkrokta challenged the ICC report before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The appellant, deputed to FSSAI in 2016 and appointed Presiding Officer of the ICC, filed a counter-affidavit in CAT largely reiterating the ICC’s findings.

The complainant later asserted non-authorization for that affidavit and alleged that the appellant had threatened and pressured her to withdraw proceedings and to accept transfer; these allegations surfaced in the complainant’s s.164 statement (14.10.2020). An FIR (30.10.2018) and subsequent charge-sheet (02.07.2022) arrayed the appellant as accused No.4. The chargesheet noted that sanction under s.197 had been sought but, because departmental response was not received within the procedural window, treated sanction as “deemed” received and the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons (06.10.2022).

The appellant sought quashing under s.482; the High Court refused. On appeal the Supreme Court confronted two discrete but linked questions:

(i) whether the acts complained of were sufficiently connected to the appellant’s official duties so as to attract the protection of s.197, and

(ii) whether a concept of “deemed sanction” is sustainable under s.197 or relevant precedents.

The administrative department (BIS) ultimately declined to grant sanction (letter dated 14.11.2022), having examined ICC report and chronology and noting the appellant’s joining after the occurrence and ICC report. The Court had to determine whether initiation of criminal proceedings without prior departmental sanction vitiated cognizance and whether the High Court should have quashed. The decision engages the protective purpose of s.197, earlier precedents on when sanction is required, and the limits of judicial supplementation of statutory sanction regimes.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Dr. Manisha Narayan filed FIR No.610/2018 alleging repeated sexual harassment (2012) by Dr. Ghonkrokta while she served at FSSAI; ICC report (submitted 22.06.2015) found Ghonkrokta guilty and recommended FIR and disciplinary measures. Ghonkrokta challenged the ICC report before CAT (O.A. No.1505/2016). The appellant, deputed from BIS to FSSAI between 27.04.2016 and 25.07.2019, was appointed Presiding Officer of the ICC on 12.05.2016 and filed a counter-affidavit in CAT on 16.01.2017 on behalf of FSSAI and the complainant (respondent No.6).

The complainant later claimed she had not authorised the affidavit and sought to amend; FSSAI filed a Misc. Application to permit complainant to represent herself. The FIR pre-dated the s.164 statement that named the appellant; the complainant’s s.161 statement (16.06.2020) did not name the appellant. In s.164 (14.10.2020) she alleged the appellant filed the counter-affidavit without consent and later threatened/pressured her (transfer/study-leave threats) to withdraw the case. Police filed charge-sheet (02.07.2022), stating sanction under s.197 was sought but absent and “deemed” granted; the Magistrate took cognizance and issued summons (06.10.2022).

BIS was later sent sanction request but received documents late and after chargesheet; BIS sought further records and on 14.11.2022 refused sanction, observing the appellant had joined FSSAI after the events and did not feature in ICC report; BIS concluded appellant not involved and not fit for prosecution. The High Court dismissed the s.482 petition; the Supreme Court granted leave and heard the matter.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether acts alleged against a public servant who acted as Presiding Officer of an ICC are “in the discharge of official duty” so as to attract the bar in s.197 CrPC?
ii. Whether the Magistrate could take cognizance in the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority under s.197?
iii. Whether a doctrine of “deemed sanction” applies where the sanctioning authority remains silent beyond a statutory or conventional timeframe?
iv. Whether the High Court erred in declining to quash the summoning order under s.482 given the sanction denial by the competent authority?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The appellant acted in official capacity (Presiding Officer, ICC); her counter-affidavit and interactions were within official duties and therefore prior sanction from BIS was required before criminal proceedings.
ii. Sanction request was mis-directed to FSSAI rather than BIS producing delay; BIS ultimately refused sanction — hence prosecution could not stand.
iii. Magistrate erred in taking cognizance without sanction; the High Court should have quashed charges against her.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Investigating Officer sought sanction; absence of timely response allowed filing on the basis of legal opinion treating sanction as “deemed” — reliance on procedural precedent to proceed.
ii. Material existed to proceed; once cognizance and trial processes have commenced, mere denial of sanction later does not automatically quash the proceedings; sanction can be urged at subsequent stages.
iii. The appellant acted mala fide — perjury and protecting co-accused — making criminal remedy appropriate despite official capacity.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — prohibition on courts taking cognizance of offences by public servants acting in discharge of official duty without previous sanction.
ii. Explanation to s.197 — lists exceptions (certain sexual offences and others) where sanction not required.
iii. POSH Act, 2013 — internal inquiry mechanism and role of ICC; administrative remedies distinct from criminal sanction.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court began with an uncontroversial premise: s.197 exists to shield public servants from unjustified criminal proceedings where acts fall within official duty. The factual chronology showed the appellant joined FSSAI after alleged incidents and after ICC report; she later acted as Presiding Officer and filed a counter-affidavit reflecting ICC findings.

The Court parsed the affidavit and concluded it merely reproduced ICC conclusions and sought dismissal of Ghonkrokta’s OA; it did not impugn the complainant or advance false defences on her behalf. The filing was in official capacity and the appellant later moved to allow the complainant independent representation indicating absence of criminal intent. Applying authoritative tests (notably Amrik Singh and Amod Kumar Kanth), the Court held the crucial question is whether the act is “traceable to” or “connected with” the discharge of official duty. If so, sanction is prerequisite.

The Court found no room to treat the filing as private conduct divorced from official duties; interaction with the complainant and the affidavit were official acts. On the controversial argument of “deemed sanction”, the Court rejected any implication that s.197 permits judicially created deemed sanction. The decisions relied on by the State (Vineet Narain, Subramanian Swamy) did not lay down a doctrine equating administrative silence to sanction; in particular, Subramanian Swamy contained only an obiter suggestion for parliamentary consideration and did not alter statutory text.

The Court emphasized that where an act is indisputably traceable to official duty, allowing cognizance without sanction would defeat s.197’s purpose. Given that BIS the competent authority considered materials and expressly refused sanction (14.11.2022), the initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellant was vitiated. Consequently the chargesheet and summons as to the appellant were quashed. The Court clarified that this holding is fact-sensitive; it does not decide merits of allegations, which remain for appropriate forums if sanction were validly granted.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

Where a public servant’s alleged conduct is connected with or traceable to the performance (or purported performance) of official duties, Section 197 CrPC bars cognizance without prior sanction by the competent authority; courts must respect this condition precedent. Judicial or administrative silence cannot be converted into a statutory “deemed sanction” absent clear legislative prescription.

When the competent authority, having reviewed records, refuses sanction, initiation of criminal proceedings is vitiated and summoning/chargesheet must be quashed insofar as they relate to the protected public servant. The factual inquiry at cognizance need not decide guilt; it must examine whether the acts are official in nature. If undisputedly official, denial of prior sanction is fatal to cognizance.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed by way of guidance that in cases where it is unclear whether an alleged act is connected to official duty, the Court may allow proceedings to continue to enable fuller fact-finding but where official nexus is manifest, Section 197’s protection must be enforced at the outset.

The Court rejected reading into the statute a concept of “deemed sanction” drawn from peripheral dicta or other statutes; parliamentary action would be required to alter the regime. The judgment reiterated that s.197 does not comment on the merits of allegations an accused public servant remains answerable if valid sanction is later granted.

c. GUIDELINES

i. At cognizance stage courts must ask whether the alleged offence arises out of acts done in discharge or purported discharge of official duty; if yes, insist on prior sanction.
ii. Administrative delay alone does not constitute sanction; courts should not create a “deemed sanction” doctrine absent statutory backing.
iii. If the sanctioning authority refuses sanction after examining materials, criminal proceedings (cognizance, summons, charges) against that public servant should be quashed insofar as predicated on absence of prior sanction.
iv. When the nexus to official duty is ambiguous, courts may permit proceedings to progress to permit fuller fact ascertainment; outcome is fact-sensitive.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s decision reaffirms the protective balance within s.197 shielding public servants from prosecution for acts connected to office unless competent authority permits prosecution, while not immunising officers from eventual criminal accountability where sanction is validly granted. The ruling properly distinguishes procedural timeframes from substantive statutory requirements and curtails prosecutorial expedience based on administrative delay or informal legal opinions treating silence as consent.

Practically, the judgment:

(a) places burden on investigating agencies to promptly approach correct sanctioning authority;

(b) requires sanctioning authorities to consider materials within reasoned timelines; and

(c) preserves the trial court’s and High Court’s jurisdiction to examine the threshold question of official nexus at cognizance.

For complainants the decision is a caution that procedural misrouting and delays can impede criminal redress against public servants; for public servants it protects against harassment by premature criminalization when official functions are involved. The ruling, grounded in established precedent, is fact-specific and leaves open trial court processes where sanction is later validly conferred.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. & Another, Crim. App. No. 975/2025, 2025 2 S.C.R. 918 (S.C.).

2. Amod Kumar Kanth v. Ass’n of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, [2023] 6 S.C.R. 669 (S.C.).

3. Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761.

4. Amrik Singh v. The State of PEPSU, AIR 1955 SC 309.

5. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889.

6. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s.197.

2. Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act).