A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The appeal challenges the Madras High Court order upholding the trial conviction and life sentence of the appellant for an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860. The prosecution case pleaded that on 12.09.2008 the appellant poured kerosene on his wife and set her alight; the victim succumbed to burn injuries thereafter. The trial conviction rested primarily on a statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on 18.09.2008 treated as a dying declaration, and on depositions of the deceased’s parents.

Material contradictions, however, appear on the face of the record: contemporaneous statements made on 12.09.2008 to the duty doctor and to the police indicated an accidental kitchen fire; the Judicial Magistrate did not elicit the reason for the change of statement nor examine the deceased about prior inconsistent statements; the medical evidence did not support an external assault before burning nor detect kerosene smell when the victim reached hospital; seizure witnesses turned hostile and the Observation Mahazar suffered delay and weaknesses.

Applying the settled principle that a dying declaration may convict alone only where its quality is unimpeachable and where corroboration exists when inconsistencies arise, the Supreme Court found the subsequent dying declaration unreliable in the factual matrix and held that the appellant must be given the benefit of reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed and the appellant acquitted.

Keywords: dying declaration, benefit of doubt, corroboration, observation mahazar, inconsistent statements.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal raises classic evidentiary tensions that arise when a dying declaration conflicts with earlier contemporaneous statements and where forensic and seizure evidence do not unambiguously support the later statement. The deceased first told the duty doctor and a police constable on 12.09.2008 that she had caught fire while cooking, describing the event as accidental. Later statements, culminating in the Judicial Magistrate’s account on 18.09.2008, attributed the act to the husband who allegedly poured kerosene and set her ablaze.

The prosecution’s trajectory moved from an initially registered accidental fire to an offence under Section 307 IPC, and ultimately to Section 302 IPC upon the victim’s death. The trial court convicted principally on the dying declaration and parental testimony; the High Court affirmed.

On appeal this Court examined whether the dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction in light of:

(a) prior inconsistent contemporaneous statements,

(b) lack of corroboration in medical and seizure evidence,

(c) deficiencies in the Observation Mahazar and hostile seizure witnesses,

(d) family acrimony that could motivate fabrication. The Court reiterated established law that a dying declaration enjoys high evidentiary value but must be scrutinised where inconsistencies exist, and that corroboration becomes essential to safely base a conviction upon such a declaration.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 12.09.2008 at about 6 PM the deceased caught fire at her residence in Tuticorin and was taken first to a private hospital and then admitted at the Government Hospital, Thoothukudi. The appellant resided with the deceased and their toddler. The deceased’s mother (PW-1) and father (PW-2) were neighbours and reached the scene after being informed by another child. At the hospital on the night of the incident the deceased reportedly told PW-9 (a police constable) that the fire occurred while she was cooking and that the appellant was asleep, and that on screaming the appellant tried to put out the flames.

On 15.09.2008 police visited the scene and seized a kerosene can and matchstick and registered the matter as an attempt to murder; but contemporaneously the statement attributed to the deceased to the doctor (PW-13) and to PW-9 remained that the incident was accidental. A Judicial Magistrate (PW-12) recorded a later statement on 18.09.2008, which attributed culpability to the appellant by alleging that he poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. The deceased thereafter died on 02.10.2008, and the charges were framed under Section 302 IPC.

Medical evidence established death from burn injuries without external injuries indicating pre-assault; the attending doctor denied any kerosene smell on the deceased when she first arrived. Seizure witnesses turned hostile and there were delays and weaknesses in the presentation of the Observation Mahazar. Family tensions were on record because of prior criminal litigation between relatives of the two families.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether a dying declaration recorded on 18.09.2008 can constitute the sole basis for conviction where the deceased had earlier made contemporaneous statements describing the event as accidental.

2. Whether medical evidence and the Observation Mahazar supplied satisfactory corroboration of the deceased’s later statement implicating the accused.

3. Whether inconsistencies in witness testimony and hostile seizure witnesses undermine the prosecution’s case to the extent of raising reasonable doubt.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant contended that the dying declaration recorded before the Judicial Magistrate is an afterthought inconsistent with the first statements made to the doctor and the police constable on the night of the incident. It was argued that the Magistrate did not test the deceased about her prior recitals nor record any reason for the change, and that the medical evidence negated the presence of kerosene odor. The appellant pointed to substantial family hostility and to hostile seizure witnesses and to procedural delays relating to the Observation Mahazar, submitting that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The prosecution maintained that the dying declaration is entitled to decisive weight and that the Observation Mahazar (seizure of kerosene can and matchstick) corroborated the dying declaration. It asserted that the deceased’s explanation for earlier silence that she had not revealed the truth in the appellant’s presence was plausible and that the Judicial Magistrate’s recording should be treated as reliable evidence of the deceased’s last words.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

1. Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (punishment for murder).

2. Principles in criminal evidence law and procedure governing the dying declaration (as expounded in precedent such as Uttam v. State of Maharashtra).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed the dying declaration jurisprudence and reiterated that though a dying declaration is an important piece of evidence and can alone sustain a conviction, such reliance must be tempered by the quality of the declaration and the surrounding circumstances. The Court placed weight on the fact that the deceased had repeatedly given two earlier statements to the doctor (PW-13) and to the police constable (PW-9) on 12.09.2008 in which she consistently attributed the fire to an accident while cooking.

The subsequent statement before the Judicial Magistrate on 18.09.2008 attributing culpability to the appellant was inconsistent and unexplained on the record; the Magistrate admitted that he did not probe the deceased about her prior statements. The medical testimony (PW-13) negated the smell of kerosene on the deceased when she arrived at the hospital and the post-mortem (PW-11) did not disclose external injuries other than burns, thereby undermining the suspicion of a pre-burn assault. The Observation Mahazar relied upon by the prosecution was weakened by an inordinate delay in production and by seizure witnesses turning hostile.

The existence of documented family acrimony further rendered the possibility of tutoring or collusion a live consideration. Applying the guidance laid down in Uttam v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that where multiple dying declarations or inconsistent statements exist, corroborative material evidence is necessary to decide which account to accept. In sum, the cumulative defects in contemporaneous statements, medical evidence, seizure proof and witness credibility rendered the dying declaration unsafe as the sole basis for a conviction; reasonable doubt thus persisted and the appellant was entitled to acquittal. The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence set aside.

a) Ratio decidendi

The decisive legal principle applied is twofold:

(1) a dying declaration may be the sole foundation for conviction only when it is of unimpeachable quality and trustworthy in the context of the case;

(2) where a victim’s statements are inconsistent or contradictory, courts must seek corroborative material evidence to determine the correct narration. The Court applied this ratio to the present facts and found the dying declaration uncorroborated and inconsistent with earlier contemporaneous records, with medical and seizure evidence failing to support the prosecution’s version.

b) Obiter dicta 

The Court observed that the mere existence of an Observation Mahazar does not automatically corroborate a later declaration where the Mahazar’s creation, custody and witness testimony are doubtful. The judgment also emphasised judicial caution where familial disputes offer motive for manipulating post-incident statements. These comments, though ancillary, guide trial courts to assess the totality of evidence beyond the written label of “dying declaration.”

c) Guidelines 

1. Inconsistencies between contemporaneous statements and later-recorded dying declarations must trigger closer judicial scrutiny.

2. The Judicial Magistrate recording a dying declaration should inquire into prior statements and record reasons, if any, for change of account.

3. Where a dying declaration is an afterthought, courts should look for independent corroboration—medical, seizure, or other credible eyewitness testimony—before resting a conviction solely on that declaration.

4. Hostile seizure witnesses, delay in producing mahazars and family acrimony reduce the value of prosecution material and should be weighed when assessing the safety of conviction.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reaffirms the delicate balance courts must maintain between respecting the high evidentiary value of a dying declaration and guarding against wrongful convictions when the deceased’s statements display material inconsistency. The Court’s approach underscores the judiciary’s duty to test the quality of dying declarations in context: where contemporaneous statements, medical evidence and scene-seizure material do not cohere with the later recitation, the safer course is to accord the accused the benefit of doubt.

This judgment provides practical directions for trial courts to interrogate the provenance and content of dying declarations, to ensure Magistrates question the declarant about earlier versions and to insist on corroboration when conflicting accounts exist. The ruling therefore strengthens procedural safeguards in death cases and signals judicial skepticism against mechanically accepting later statements that contradict earlier, contemporaneous accounts.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Uttam v. State of Maharashtra, (2022) 8 SCC 576 (cited in judgment).

2. Suresh v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Criminal Appeal No. 540 of 2013, judgment dated 04 March 2025, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 317 : 2025 INSC 318.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 302).

2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (principles governing recording of statements and dying declarations).