A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Sushila & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 2020 of 2025 (dated 16 April 2025), with focus on the correctness of quashing proceedings when relatives of a husband are roped into a dowry/498A complaint long after an ex-parte divorce decree.

The bench considered whether the High Court erred in disposing of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. without adjudicating merits and whether there was a prima facie basis to continue proceedings against five relatives where the factual matrix prima facie implicated only the husband.

The Supreme Court, drawing on prior precedents such as Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. and Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr., underscored well-settled principles that vague, bald or generalised allegations against the husband’s family in matrimonial cases cannot sustain criminal process absent specific, particularised allegations of active participation.

Where the marriage stood dissolved by a decree dated 31.05.2012 and the complaint was filed years later, the Court found no reasonable basis for the relatives to have caused cruelty or demanded dowry during the subsistence of marriage; the only solitary mention of relatives related to an incident on 16.08.2015 after divorce.

The Supreme Court therefore held that continuing trial against those relatives would be vexatious and an abuse of process and accordingly quashed the complaint against the appellants. This headnote is based on the Court’s reasoning and the judgment record.

Keywords: quashing of summoning order; Section 498A IPC; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; ex-parte divorce decree; bald allegations; abuse of process.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from a complaint treated under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceeded to issuance of summons under Section 498A IPC along with offences under Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The factual core: the marriage between Kumar Saurabh and Smt. Charusmita took place on 17.06.2010; after a short cohabitation the wife left the matrimonial home in October 2010. The husband filed for divorce before the Family Court at Kota, which proceeded ex-parte on the wife’s non-appearance and passed a decree of divorce on 31.05.2012. Some three years after that decree, the wife filed a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking criminal investigation into alleged dowry demand and cruelty; the Magistrate after recording statements issued summons on 23.04.2018 against five relatives of the husband (mother, brothers, sister-in-law, sister) along with the husband.

The appellants challenged the summoning order before the High Court by way of Section 482 Cr.P.C. petition which the High Court dismissed the appellants then obtained special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court, mindful of an established line of authority warning against the mechanistic roping-in of husband’s relatives where allegations are general, time-displaced or non-particularised analysed whether the complaint contained specific allegations showing active participation by each relative in conduct amounting to cruelty or dowry demand.

The Court applied precedents that require careful threshold scrutiny of matrimonial FIRs to prevent process misuse, particularly where family members are named merely by virtue of relationship rather than acts. The judgment thus situates itself as an exercise of protective judicial supervision under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent vexatious trials when prima facie absence of incriminating material is shown.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Between 17.06.2010 and October 2010 the parties lived together in Varanasi and then Kota. The complainant left the matrimonial home in October 2010, taking stridhan and other possessions, and returned to parental home. The husband initiated matrimonial proceedings Family Court, Kota resulting in an ex-parte divorce decree dated 31.05.2012 due to the wife’s non-appearance despite service.

No material in the record suggests cohabitation or continuing marital relationship after the decree. Nearly three years after the decree, the complainant moved the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Gautam Budh Nagar under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking a criminal probe. The Magistrate recorded statements of the complainant and witnesses and issued summons on 23.04.2018 against five relatives of the husband Sushila (mother), Shailendra Dablu (elder brother), Seema (sister-in-law), Kulshreshtha Upadhyay (elder brother), Kanak (sister) primarily under Section 498A IPC and allied sections and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act.

The complaint narrative, as reflected in Annexure P-2, is largely devoted to alleged ill-treatment by the husband during the subsistence of marriage. The only express reference to the relatives is a claimed visit to the complainant’s house on 16.08.2015 when, it is alleged, the relatives demanded dowry, threatened the complainant and snatched her Mangalsutra.

That alleged visit, on the face of the complaint, occurred after the marital status had been terminated by the earlier ex-parte decree dated 31.05.2012. The appellants’ position was that they were dragged-in solely by familial relation, there were no specific averments about their active participation during the marriage period, and no plausible motive for reconciliation or for demand/harassment post-divorce. The Magistrate nonetheless issued summons and the High Court declined to quash. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the proceedings against the appellants ought to continue or be quashed as vexatious.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the summoning order when the complaint against the husband’s relatives contained only bald, generalised, and non-particularised allegations without prima facie material to show their active involvement?

2. Whether relatives of a husband can be prosecuted under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 for acts alleged to have occurred after a legally effective dissolution of marriage by decree dated 31.05.2012?*

3. Whether allowing trial to continue against appellants, given the factual matrix that the complaint is primarily against the husband and the only mention of relatives relates to an incident dated 16.08.2015 post-divorce, would amount to an abuse of process and warrant exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.?*

4. What is the threshold of specificity and particularisation required in a matrimonial complaint to sustain cognizance and summons against non-resident or non-cohabiting relatives?

5. Whether precedent authorities such as Geeta Mehrotra and Dara Lakshmi Narayana mandate quashing when the Ramsay of allegations against relatives are vague and prima facie unrelated to acts committed during subsistence of marriage?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the summoning order was devoid of any specific, actionable averments against each appellant; the record showed only a bald, general statement that relatives “also” participated in harassment or dowry demand.

They argued that criminal process cannot be allowed to proceed on the basis of omnibus names appended merely because of familial link to the husband. The appellants stressed the dispositive fact of the ex-parte decree dated 31.05.2012 dissolving the marriage, which rendered any alleged visit on 16.08.2015 the sole incident mentioning relatives logically implausible as an act done in aid of matrimonial cruelty under Section 498A IPC because the relationship had ceased.

Counsel relied on settled authorities warning against the routine roping in of the husband’s family and urged the Court to exercise Section 482 Cr.P.C. powers to prevent harassment and vexatious trials. They emphasised the evidentiary absence of allegations of sustained participation by relatives during the cohabitation period (June–October 2010 in Kota) and pointed to the absence of residence and visits by the named relatives during the marriage.

The appellants also contended the High Court’s dismissal without adjudicating merits on the quashing petition was procedurally inappropriate and did not consider the absence of prima facie materials as required by judicial precedent. Relief sought was quashing of Complaint Case No. 2789 of 2015 insofar as it named the five relatives.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State/complainant contended that the Magistrate was correct to issue summons because the complaint, on its face, contained allegations that warranted an investigation and test of truth at trial. Learned counsel argued that whether allegations are bald or otherwise is a matter to be tested in trial and the court should not curtail prosecution at the threshold unless there is manifest abuse of process.

The respondent emphasised that relatives who visit and participate in dowry demand or harassment can attract liability under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, and averments that relatives came to the complainant’s house on 16.08.2015 and removed the Mangalsutra and threatened her could not be summarily dismissed without investigation.

The respondent further argued that the ex-parte nature of divorce does not automatically immunise relatives from criminal proceedings if new offences or offences continuing beyond the decree are alleged. Finally, the respondent submitted that the High Court’s exercise in refusing to quash properly preserved the complainant’s right to have allegations investigated and that the truth would surface in the criminal trial, resisting pre-trial termination.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the complaint against the five relatives. The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three connected strands:

(i) temporal and factual incongruity the alleged acts said to implicate the appellants occurred after a valid divorce decree;

(ii) absence of particularised allegations against each appellant during the subsistence of marriage the complaint is largely about the husband’s ill-treatment and contains only a bald averment against the relatives;

(iii) jurisprudential caution consistent application of precedents which deprecate the routine inclusion of husband’s relatives on the loose theory of collective family culpability in matrimonial disputes.

The Court analysed the complaint narrative (Annexure P-2) and observed that after the marriage in June 2010 the complainant left in October 2010; the husband obtained an ex-parte decree on 31.05.2012; the only significant date referencing the relatives is 16.08.2015 at the complainant’s house in Noida.

Given the timing, the Court found no plausible explanation why relatives would seek reconciliation or to exert matrimonial pressures in 2015 when the marriage had been legally dissolved in 2012. The Court emphasised that mere mention of names in a matrimonial complaint without specific allegations of active participation would not justify criminal process against non-resident or non-participating family members.

Citing Geeta Mehrotra and Dara Lakshmi Narayana, the Court reinforced that courts must guard against misuse of Section 498A by coin-operating generalities and should exercise Section 482 Cr.P.C. where necessary to prevent abuse and harassment.

The cumulative effect of these findings was that continued trial against the appellants would be vexatious; in the absence of prima facie material, the quashing remedy was proper. The appeal was allowed and Complaint Case No. 2789 of 2015 as against appellants was quashed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle (ratio) is that where the complaint against relatives in a matrimonial dispute is grounded only on general, non-particularised and belated averments, and where core allegations of cruelty or dowry demand pertain to the husband during the subsistence of marriage while the relatives either did not reside with the couple or are only tangentially mentioned for a post-divorce occurrence, the court must exercise the protective jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings as an abuse of process.

The Court held that prima facie scrutiny is necessary to prevent needless trials of innocents and to uphold the balance between protecting victims of cruelty and preventing misuse of criminal law for extraneous motives. The presence of an ex-parte divorce decree dated 31.05.2012 and the complaint’s delayed filing reinforced the requirement for circumspection before proceeding against non-resident relatives.

Precedents such as Geeta Mehrotra and Dara Lakshmi Narayana were applied to demonstrate that mere recitation of names cannot be the basis for summons — the prosecution must show sufficient particularisation linking each accused to specific acts constituting the offence. This is the operative rule which the Court applied.

b. OBITER DICTA

In its observations, the Court reiterated broader judicial cautions that have consistently been sounded in matrimonial jurisprudence: courts must guard against the weaponisation of Section 498A IPC as a tool of vengeance and against the social tendency to implicate extended family en masse.

The judgment reiterated that matrimonial litigation is often fraught with recrimination where parties may drag unrelated family members into the criminal process. The Court noted the importance of distinguishing between acts done during subsistence of marriage (where Section 498A and Dowry Prohibition Act may apply) and post-marital events which may not bear the statutory character unless supporting facts are specifically pleaded.

While not expanding or overruling existing law, the Court commented that investigative agencies and magistrates should exercise prudence and not treat complaints as a carte blanche to subject family members to trial absent minimal particularised allegations. These observations, though not essential to the decision, serve as guidance and cautionary dicta.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Where a complaint emanates from matrimonial discord, the magistrate should examine whether allegations specific to each accused are made; mere naming due to relationship is insufficient.

2. If the complaint arises after dissolution of marriage, courts should scrutinise the plausibility of alleged matrimonial cruelty or dowry demand as a continuing offence; temporal inconsistencies must weigh in favour of exercising protective jurisdiction.

3. Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an available and appropriate remedy when continuation of criminal proceedings against relatives would be vexatious and an abuse of process due to lack of prima facie material.

4. Precedents such as Geeta Mehrotra and Dara Lakshmi Narayana provide illustrative parameters and should be relied upon to determine whether allegations fall into categories warranting quashing.

5. Investigating officers must differentiate between allegations that require full trial and those that are merely omnibus assertions; exercise of caution in framing charge sheets and taking cognizance is necessary to avoid needless harassment.

6. Courts must balance complainant’s right to remedy with the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary deprivation of liberty by ensuring that criminal process is not used as a tool of oppression.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sushila & Ors. is a reaffirmation of the safeguards against mechanical criminalisation of familial relationships in matrimonial disputes. It underscores that Section 498A IPC and allied provisions, designed as protective statutes, must not be converted into instruments for grinding private vendettas.

The Court rightly applied a contextual, fact-sensitive approach weighing the ex-parte decree of 31.05.2012, the chronology of alleged events, and the paucity of particularised allegations to determine that proceeding against the appellants would be vexatious. The decision aligns with the trajectory of precedents that emphasise threshold scrutiny and the protective scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent misuse.

Practically, the judgment signals to trial courts and magistrates to insist on at least minimal particularisation linking each accused to concrete acts before taking coercive steps. For practitioners, this case is a reaffirmation that careful drafting of complaints and pre-trial articulation of specific roles played by each accused is vital; and for complainants, the ruling clarifies the limitations of prosecutorial reach against relatives without supporting facts.

While the judgment does not curtail the right of genuine victims, it preserves procedural fairness by preventing criminal process from becoming a blunt instrument against innocent kin.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

• Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741.
• Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr., 2024 INSC 953 : [2024] 12 SCR 559.
• G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693.
• Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667.
• Bhajan Lal.

b. Important Statutes Referred

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506.
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 156(3); Section 482 (inherent powers).
• Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 4.