A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in T.B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, [1953] SCR 290 addressed the validity and constitutionality of Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, as amended in 1950. The case revolved around whether the amended rule, empowering the Transport Authority to alter the starting points and termini for public service vehicles, was ultra vires the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and violated Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, who operated a private bus stand, challenged the shift of the bus terminus from his premises to a municipal stand as an unreasonable restriction on his trade. The Supreme Court upheld the rule, affirming the legislative competence of the State to regulate transportation under Sections 68(1) and 68(2)(r) of the Act and concluding that the alteration of bus-stands served the broader objective of traffic regulation and public convenience. The Court also held that the impugned action was not an unreasonable restriction on trade under Article 19(6) and fell within the permissible limits of state regulation in public interest. The Court reaffirmed the principle that administrative discretion exercised in good faith in furtherance of public interest is constitutionally valid.

Keywords: Rule 268 Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, Article 19(1)(g), Ultra Vires, Public Convenience, Reasonable Restriction, Bus Stand Regulation, Motor Vehicles Act, Administrative Law.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: T.B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date: 5th December 1953

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri, C.J., Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose, and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Ghulam Hasan

vii) Citation: [1953] SCR 290

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (as amended in 1950)

• Sections 76, 68(1), 68(2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

• Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India

• Sections 270(b), (c), (e) of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Transport Law, Municipal Law, Public Law, Fundamental Rights

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal arises from the decision of the Madras High Court in 1951 which rejected a writ petition by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant, who operated a private bus stand in Tanjore under a municipal license, challenged a decision by the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) to relocate the terminus for public buses to a new municipal site. The High Court dismissed the petition after upholding the validity of Rule 268 post its 1950 amendment. The case subsequently reached the Supreme Court on appeal, invoking the constitutional validity of administrative regulations and the scope of the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). The appellant alleged infringement of this right, asserting that the relocation decision was arbitrary, ultra vires, and based on mala fide considerations. The State defended its position as a regulatory measure in public interest. This case examines the limits of judicial review over administrative discretion, the interpretation of subordinate legislation under statutory schemes, and the scope of fundamental rights vis-à-vis state regulation in public services.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, T.B. Ibrahim, operated a bus stand on leased premises in Tanjore which had long served as the starting and terminal point for buses plying to and from the town. Initially licensed by the Tanjore Municipality, the stand was approved by local and district authorities. In 1950, however, the Municipality refused license renewal, prompting the appellant to secure a court decree mandating its renewal. Simultaneously, the Regional Transport Authority declared the stand unsuitable and issued a resolution shifting the bus stand to a municipal site, effective from 1 April 1950. The RTA cited public convenience as justification. The appellant challenged the RTA’s authority to pass such orders, initially securing relief from the Madras High Court, which found that the RTA lacked jurisdiction under Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The government, however, amended Rule 268 shortly after to authorize the RTA to alter starting places and termini. The RTA then reissued notices, held hearings, and passed a resolution finalizing the relocation. The appellant filed a fresh writ petition claiming the amended rule was ultra vires and unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(g), which the High Court dismissed. The matter was finally brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the amendment to Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 exceeded the rule-making powers granted under Section 68(2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

ii) Whether the amended Rule 268 infringed upon the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

iii) Whether the Transport Authority exercised its powers in a mala fide or arbitrary manner.

iv) Whether the appellant was denied natural justice or due process.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The RTA had no statutory authority to close or alter the bus stand prior to the 1950 amendment. They argued that Section 68(2)(r) only permitted prohibition of picking up or setting down passengers at specific places but not the power to alter established termini. They contended that the amended rule conferred legislative power not supported by the parent Act, thus rendering it ultra vires. They also maintained that Rule 268, even as amended, failed the test of constitutional reasonableness under Article 19(1)(g) as it severely hampered the appellant’s ability to operate his business, thus violating his right to carry on trade or profession. The counsel further alleged mala fide intent behind the relocation as the municipality was interested in promoting its own bus stand. The Collector’s role in both opening the new stand and presiding over the resolution’s passing was pointed to as evidence of bias and lack of impartiality. The appellant also argued that the consultation requirement under Rule 268 was not genuinely fulfilled as the Municipality was not a neutral party. They further asserted that the notice served and grounds given were vague, thus violating the principles of natural justice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The amendment to Rule 268 fell squarely within the State Government’s power under Section 68(1) to make rules for carrying into effect the objectives of Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which focused on control of transport vehicles. They emphasized that Section 68(2)(r), when read with Section 68(1), allowed framing rules to regulate bus stands, including closing and relocating them. The phrase “prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers” implied the power to close existing stands. The counsel contended that the restriction was reasonable and in public interest, aimed at improving convenience and traffic management, and therefore passed the test under Article 19(6). They further asserted that the decision was not mala fide; the Collector acted within the bounds of his official duty. Due notice was given and opportunity to be heard was provided to the appellant. Moreover, the Municipality, being a public body, had to be consulted under the Rule and the RTA had the discretion to choose any authority for consultation.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 – Authorized Transport Authority to fix or alter starting points and termini of public service vehicles after consultation and notice.

ii) Section 68(1) and (2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Empowered State to frame rules for transport control and restrict picking up or setting down at certain places.

iii) Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India – Right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

iv) Section 270(b), (c), (e) of Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920 – Related to control and licensing of cart-stands by municipalities.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that Rule 268 as amended was not ultra vires, as the power to prohibit picking up or setting down passengers implicitly included the authority to fix or alter stands. The Court ruled that such powers are integral to the control of transport vehicles under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act. Moreover, the restriction imposed was reasonable, pursuing the legitimate aim of ensuring public convenience. Therefore, it did not infringe the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g). The rule was thus held valid and enforceable.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that there exists no fundamental right to conduct business from any specific location, especially when public interest demands regulation. It also noted that administrative consultation requirements are discretionary unless expressly mandated. It reiterated that courts should not substitute their opinion for that of expert authorities on policy or local public convenience.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Administrative authorities may regulate transport routes and stands in public interest.

• Rules affecting business must pass the test of reasonableness under Article 19(6).

• Consultation requirements under rules are generally discretionary unless statutorily mandatory.

• Judicial review of administrative discretion must respect the domain expertise and policy considerations of such bodies.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reflects a critical balance between individual rights and public interest. It underscores the judiciary’s deference to administrative expertise in matters of policy. The Supreme Court rightly interpreted the wide ambit of the state’s power to regulate transport services under statutory and constitutional mandates. The ruling fortified the legality of subordinate legislation where supported by enabling provisions and public necessity. It also limited the misuse of fundamental rights as a shield against regulatory actions aimed at public welfare. The appellant’s loss was significant in a commercial sense but constitutionally justified in terms of democratic governance and urban planning. This case remains a landmark precedent for understanding reasonable restrictions under Article 19 and the scope of delegated legislation.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) T.E. Ebrahim Saheb v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, AIR 1951 Mad 419

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Sections 68(1), 68(2)(r), 76

ii) Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, Rule 268

iii) Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(g), Article 226, Article 136

iv) Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, Sections 270(b), (c), (e)