Tej Bahadur v. Shri Narendra Modi, [2020] 13 SCR 554

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment addresses the foundational requirement of locus standi in election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court examined whether a person whose nomination paper was rejected for non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements could maintain an election petition questioning the election of a returned candidate. The appellant, a former Border Security Force employee dismissed from service, challenged the election of the respondent from the Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency after his nomination was rejected due to non-submission of a mandatory certificate under Section 33(3) read with Section 9(2) of the Act. The Court analysed the statutory meaning of “candidate” under Section 79(b) and the scope of Section 81 governing who may present an election petition. The Court reaffirmed that compliance with nomination requirements is a condition precedent to claiming the status of a candidate. The absence of the certificate rendered the nomination legally non est. The Court further upheld the power of courts to summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 86(1) of the Act. The judgment reinforces strict statutory interpretation in election law and discourages frivolous or speculative election challenges.

Keywords:
Election Petition, Locus Standi, Duly Nominated Candidate, Rejection of Nomination, Representation of the People Act, 1951

B) CASE DETAILS

Particulars Details
Judgement Cause Title Tej Bahadur v. Shri Narendra Modi
Case Number Civil Appeal No. 2100 of 2020
Judgement Date 24 November 2020
Court Supreme Court of India
Quorum S.A. Bobde, CJI; A.S. Bopanna; V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.
Author S.A. Bobde, CJI
Citation [2020] 13 SCR 554
Legal Provisions Involved Sections 9(2), 33(3), 36(5), 79(b), 81, 83, 86(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951; Order VI Rule 16, Order VII Rule 11 CPC
Judgments Overruled Nil
Related Law Subjects Constitutional Law, Election Law, Civil Procedure

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arose from a challenge to the dismissal of an election petition by the Allahabad High Court at the threshold stage. The High Court had rejected the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked statutory standing to maintain the challenge. The dispute emanated from the 17th Lok Sabha elections held in April–May 2019 for the Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency. The appellant sought to invalidate the election of the returned candidate on the premise that his own nomination had been wrongly rejected and that the respondent’s nomination suffered from alleged defects.

Election law in India is governed by a rigid statutory framework. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 prescribes exhaustive conditions determining eligibility, nomination, scrutiny, and challenge mechanisms. The Supreme Court has consistently held that election rights are purely statutory and not common law rights. This case presented the Court with an opportunity to reiterate the consequences of non-compliance with mandatory nomination requirements.

The appellant’s service history as a dismissed government servant brought into operation the disqualification regime under Sections 9(2) and 33(3) of the Act. The central question revolved around whether a person, whose nomination stood rejected for non-production of a mandatory certificate, could still claim the status of a “candidate” for the purposes of filing an election petition. The Court was also required to examine whether the absence of cause of action justified summary dismissal under procedural law.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was formerly employed with the Border Security Force and was dismissed from service on 19 April 2017. The dismissal occurred within five years prior to the 2019 general elections. Under the statutory scheme, a dismissed government servant seeking election is required to produce a certificate from the Election Commission of India certifying that the dismissal was not on grounds of corruption or disloyalty to the State.

The appellant filed two nomination papers on 24 April 2019 and 29 April 2019 respectively. In the first nomination form, he admitted dismissal from service. In the second form, he contradicted this disclosure. Neither nomination was accompanied by the mandatory certificate under Section 33(3). During scrutiny, the Returning Officer issued notices highlighting the discrepancy and specifically directing the appellant to furnish the requisite certificate by the stipulated time permitted under Section 36(5).

The appellant failed to produce the certificate within the prescribed timeframe. Instead, he sought to justify the omission by asserting that his dismissal was not on prohibited grounds. Consequently, on 1 May 2019, the Returning Officer rejected both nomination papers.

Subsequently, the appellant filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent. The respondent moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Section 86(1) of the Act seeking dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of locus standi and absence of cause of action. The High Court allowed the application. The present appeal challenged that dismissal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a person whose nomination was rejected for non-compliance with Section 33(3) can claim to be a “candidate” under Section 79(b) of the Act?
ii. Whether such a person has locus standi to file an election petition under Section 81 of the Act?
iii. Whether the absence of a mandatory certificate renders the nomination legally void ab initio?
iv. Whether an election petition lacking statutory standing can be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that the rejection of the nomination was improper and violative of Section 36(5) of the Act. It was argued that the Returning Officer failed to grant adequate time to cure the defect. The appellant contended that he was entitled to claim that he was “duly nominated” as he had applied for the certificate and the delay was beyond his control.

It was further argued that the expression “may be allowed time” in Section 36(5) should be interpreted liberally to protect electoral participation. The appellant asserted that the High Court erred in rejecting the petition at the threshold without a full trial.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent submitted that the appellant was neither an elector of the constituency nor a candidate in the eyes of law. It was argued that Section 33(3) is mandatory and its non-compliance automatically disqualifies the nomination.

The respondent relied upon settled precedent to submit that a person cannot derive legal rights from statutory violation. The discretionary language of Section 36(5) was emphasised to argue that time extension is not a matter of right. The absence of cause of action justified summary dismissal.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 9(2), Representation of the People Act, 1951
ii. Section 33(3), Representation of the People Act, 1951
iii. Section 79(b), Representation of the People Act, 1951
iv. Section 81, Representation of the People Act, 1951
v. Section 86(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951
vi. Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

I) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the election petition. The Court held that Section 81 restricts the right to file an election petition exclusively to electors and candidates. Since the appellant was neither an elector of the constituency nor a legally recognised candidate, he lacked standing.

The Court interpreted Section 33(3) as mandatory. The statutory consequence of non-compliance is explicitly stated and leaves no scope for judicial dilution. The use of the term “shall not be deemed to be duly nominated” was held to be determinative and declaratory.

The Court rejected the argument based on Section 36(5), holding that discretionary time extension cannot override substantive statutory requirements. The appellant never possessed the certificate at any relevant stage.

The Court relied upon Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh and related precedents to reiterate that a claim of “duly nominated” must arise from compliance with law, not its breach. The absence of cause of action warranted rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The appeal was dismissed as meritless.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

A person whose nomination paper does not comply with mandatory statutory requirements cannot claim the status of a “candidate” and therefore lacks locus standi to maintain an election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that permitting non-compliant individuals to challenge elections would undermine electoral discipline and flood courts with speculative litigation.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Mandatory nomination requirements must be strictly complied with.
ii. Locus standi under election law is purely statutory.
iii. Courts must summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, [1984] 2 SCR 6
ii. Charan Lal Sahu v. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, [1978] 3 SCR 1
iii. Bolin Chetia v. Jogadish Bhuyan, [2005] 2 SCR 692
iv. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, [1978] 1 SCR 742

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Representation of the People Act, 1951
ii. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

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