THAIVALAPPIL KUNJUVARU VAREED vs. THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.

Case Analysis

THAIVALAPPIL KUNJUVARU VAREED vs. THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.

April 22, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark decision in Thaivalappil Kunjuvaru Vareed v. The State of Travancore-Cochin, [1955] 2 SCR 1022, revolved around the legitimacy of a mercy petition filed to the former Maharaja of Cochin after India’s constitutional integration. The petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, challenged the denial of his mercy plea on the ground that the Maharaja of Cochin retained a sovereign prerogative under Article XXI of the Covenant of Merger between Travancore and Cochin, signed in 1949. The primary issue was whether such royal prerogative could survive the constitutional transition under the Indian Constitution, particularly under Articles 72, 161, and 238. The Supreme Court, while analyzing constitutional provisions, held that the power of pardon vested in Indian constitutional authorities had overridden and superseded the former ruler’s prerogative. It emphasized the supremacy of the Constitution and held that continuation of such pre-Constitutional prerogatives conflicted with India’s democratic framework. This judgment serves as a definitive interpretation of the extinction of erstwhile princely powers post-integration, reinforcing constitutionalism, sovereignty of the Republic, and centralization of clemency powers.

Keywords: Prerogative of Mercy, Article 72, Raj Pramukh, Constitutional Integration, Article XXI Covenant, Cochin Maharaja, Part B State, Article 238, Clemency Powers

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Thaivalappil Kunjuvaru Vareed v. The State of Travancore-Cochin

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date: 1st December 1955

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das (Acting C.J.), Vivian Bose, N.H. Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas, B.P. Sinha, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Jagannadhadas

vii) Citation: [1955] 2 SCR 1022

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Articles 72, 161, 238, 362, 372 of the Constitution of India; Article XXI of the Covenant dated 29th May 1949; Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951.

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Public International Law, Federal Relations, Integration of Princely States

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arose in the backdrop of India’s transition from a princely state framework to a unified constitutional democracy. The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court of Trichur, part of the former Cochin State. After exhausting judicial remedies and clemency petitions to the President of India and the Raj Pramukh, he filed a mercy plea to the Maharaja of Cochin, invoking the prerogative preserved under Article XXI of the 1949 Covenant. The issue hinged on whether such prerogative rights could coexist with the Indian Constitution, especially under Articles 72 (Presidential Pardon), 161 (Governor’s Pardon), and 238 (governing Part B states). The Court undertook a historical, legal, and constitutional analysis to resolve this tension, ultimately rejecting the appellant’s claim.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, Thaivalappil Kunjuvaru Vareed, was convicted in Sessions Case No. 10 of 1954 for murder by the Sessions Judge of Trichur, situated in the former princely state of Cochin. The High Court confirmed the death sentence. Petitions for clemency were submitted to the Raj Pramukh and the President of India, both of whom rejected them. After the rejection, the appellant submitted a mercy petition to the Maharaja of Cochin, asserting that the Maharaja retained the right to pardon under Article XXI of the Covenant of 1949 between the rulers of Travancore and Cochin. The Sessions Judge stayed execution upon learning of the fresh petition but later vacated the stay. The High Court upheld this, rejecting the petition, leading to the present appeal.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

**i) Whether the prerogative power of pardon vested in the Maharaja of Cochin under Article XXI of the Covenant continued after the enforcement of the Constitution of India.

**ii) Whether such power conflicted with the clemency powers vested under Articles 72, 161, and 238 of the Constitution.

**iii) Whether Article 372 permitted the continuance of such princely prerogatives as ‘laws in force’.

**iv) Whether Article 362, which protects privileges of former rulers, extended to powers of pardon.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The appellant contended that the Maharaja of Cochin retained his prerogative of clemency under Article XXI of the Covenant, signed during the merger of Cochin and Travancore in 1949. This provision explicitly preserved the power of commutation, remission, or suspension of death sentences by the respective rulers in their former territories. The appellant further argued that the Constitution did not expressly repeal this Covenant and that under Article 372, pre-existing laws and powers remained in force unless repealed. The prerogative was argued to be part of the criminal law in Cochin and thereby survived the constitutional transition. He also argued that such prerogative was protected under Article 362, which guaranteed the personal rights and privileges of the rulers.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The State opposed this contention, asserting that once the Constitution of India came into force, the entire legal and administrative framework transformed. The Constitution conferred the clemency powers upon the President under Article 72, and Governor or Raj Pramukh under Article 161, thereby extinguishing any princely prerogatives. The respondent stressed that Article XXI was inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore was superseded as per the Raj Pramukh’s 1949 Proclamation, which stated that the Constitution would abrogate all inconsistent provisions. It was further submitted that Article 362 did not cover political or sovereign powers like the prerogative of mercy, which was an attribute of sovereignty rather than a personal privilege.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 72 – Power of the President to grant pardons

ii) Article 161 – Power of the Governor or Raj Pramukh to grant pardons in Part A or B States

iii) Article 238 – Applicable provisions for Part B States

iv) Article 362 – Personal rights, privileges, and dignities of Rulers

v) Article 372 – Continuance of existing laws

vi) Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951 – Extended the CrPC to all Indian States

vii) Covenant dated 29th May 1949, Article XXI – Retention of clemency power by Maharajas

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the Constitution, being the supreme law, abrogated any inconsistent pre-Constitutional instruments, including princely prerogatives such as that in Article XXI of the 1949 Covenant. The integration of Cochin into the Union of India and the application of Articles 72, 161, and 238 implied a complete centralization of clemency powers. The Court also noted that Article 372 saved only laws that were consistent with the Constitution and were not repealed by competent legislative authorities. Since the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951 extended CrPC and its clemency provisions to Cochin, the Maharaja’s powers stood repealed. The Court rejected the application of Article 362, holding that political powers like clemency are distinct from personal privileges.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court observed that mercy petitions to defunct authorities create unnecessary legal hurdles and delay justice. It also hinted that continuance of such princely powers contradicts the democratic nature of the Indian polity.

c. GUIDELINES

Prerogatives under Covenants of Merger must align with the Constitution post-1950.
Articles 72, 161, 238 centralize the clemency power, rendering royal powers obsolete.
Article 372 saves only laws not inconsistent with the Constitution or repealed.
Article 362 pertains only to personal rights, not sovereign powers.
Legislative enactments like the CrPC Amendment Act can repeal erstwhile royal powers.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case cemented the principle that sovereignty in India rests with the Constitution and not with any pre-Constitutional entity. By decisively extinguishing the continued reliance on erstwhile princely prerogatives, it promoted constitutional supremacy and democratic uniformity. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Articles 72, 161, and 238 reiterates that clemency powers now vest exclusively with constitutional heads. This case played a foundational role in clarifying federal power structures post-integration, and reinforced the futility of archaic legal mechanisms rooted in monarchical rule. It remains a leading precedent in matters involving post-accession rights and sovereign transitions under Indian constitutional law.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred