A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark decision explores the complex interplay between judicial and quasi-judicial bodies under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an award issued by an Industrial Tribunal constituted a determination appealable to the apex court. The justices were sharply divided on whether such tribunals discharged functions akin to courts and whether the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction extended to such determinations. A majority comprising Kania C.J., Fazl Ali and Mahajan JJ. held that the Industrial Tribunal does perform judicial functions, even if it is not a court in the traditional sense, and therefore its awards may be appealed under Article 136. The dissenting judges—Mukherjea and Patanjali Sastri JJ.—argued that these tribunals lack judicial character and should not fall within the appellate sweep of the Supreme Court. Despite jurisdiction being upheld by the majority, the Court ultimately refused to interfere with the Tribunal’s award on the merits, citing a lack of compelling injustice or exceptional circumstances. This decision remains a cornerstone in understanding the judicial review of administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, influencing administrative law, industrial law, and constitutional interpretation in India.

Keywords: Article 136, Industrial Disputes Act, appellate jurisdiction, quasi-judicial bodies, industrial tribunal, judicial review, special leave, tribunal functions

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title:
The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and The Bharat Bank Employees’ Union, Delhi

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeal No. XXXIV of 1950

iii) Judgment Date:
26 May 1950

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Harilal Kania C.J., Saiyid Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and B.K. Mukherjea JJ.

vi) Author:
Opinions authored individually by Kania C.J., Fazl Ali J., Mahajan J., and Mukherjea J. (with Sastri J. concurring in dissent)

vii) Citation:
[1950] SCR 459

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 136 of the Constitution of India

• Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

• Sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

• Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any):
None mentioned.

x) Law Subjects Involved:
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Industrial Law, Labour Law, Appellate Jurisdiction

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

This case arose from a labor dispute between The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and its employees, who were represented by their union. Following a strike and subsequent retrenchment of several employees by the bank, the Central Government referred the dispute to the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Upon the Tribunal issuing an award unfavorable to the Bank, the Bank approached the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, seeking special leave to appeal.

The threshold question before the Court was not merely the merits of the dispute, but the deeper constitutional question of whether the Industrial Tribunal’s award constituted a “determination” by a “tribunal” under Article 136, and thus amenable to appellate jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.

This gave rise to significant jurisprudential dialogue within the Bench on the nature and legal status of industrial tribunals, the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Article 136, and the constitutional scheme of judicial review over non-judicial bodies. The matter was further complicated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act that required the award to be published and made binding by government order, raising questions of whether such awards were mere recommendations or enforceable decisions.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi had faced labor unrest in early 1949 when employees initiated a strike to press for certain demands. Following non-compliance by employees with notices to return to work, the Bank terminated the services of several employees. The dispute that arose—centering on retrenchment and alleged victimization—was referred by the Central Government to the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

The Tribunal issued its award on January 1, 1950, determining in favor of the employees on certain issues. This award, made by a three-member tribunal (though signed by only two members), was later declared binding by the Government of India under Section 15 of the Act. The Bank challenged the award before the Supreme Court by filing a petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution.

ii) Whether the Tribunal performs “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” functions akin to a court, making its decisions appealable under Article 136.

iii) Whether the Tribunal’s award, requiring government declaration to be binding, constitutes a final “determination” for the purposes of appeal.

iv) Whether the Tribunal’s adjudication suffers from procedural or substantive infirmities warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The Industrial Tribunal’s award amounted to a judicial determination, albeit by a non-traditional court. They contended that the powers, procedures, and legal framework under which the Tribunal operated closely resembled those of a civil court, especially given that the Tribunal could administer oaths, summon witnesses, admit legal representation, and issue enforceable orders. These elements, they argued, conferred the necessary judicial character to bring it within the scope of Article 136.

They further argued that the Industrial Tribunal’s adjudication directly impacted the legal rights and liabilities of the parties, particularly in matters of employment and contractual terms, which are traditionally justiciable issues. As such, the Tribunal’s award was not merely advisory but binding in nature, notwithstanding the requirement of government notification for enforceability.

The counsel for the Bank also contended that denial of the right to adduce evidence on key issues amounted to a breach of natural justice, and that the award was therefore vitiated on procedural grounds.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The Tribunal, while performing an adjudicatory function, did not amount to a court under the constitutional framework. The respondents relied on the argument that Industrial Tribunals are not bound by strict rules of evidence or substantive law, and their function is to resolve disputes in the larger interest of industrial harmony, often by creating new rights or modifying existing ones.

They emphasized that the Tribunal’s award did not attain binding force unless and until it was declared binding by the appropriate Government under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act. This, they claimed, rendered the award non-final and non-appealable, as its enforceability lay in the discretion of the executive and not in the adjudicatory body itself.

They also argued that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction should not be extended to include quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals such as this, as it would open floodgates for challenges against all forms of executive and statutory decisions, thereby distorting the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.

H) JUDGMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

Kania C.J., Fazl Ali J. and Mahajan J. delivered majority opinions, holding that the Industrial Tribunal, though not a court strictly so-called, exercised judicial functions in resolving disputes. They emphasized the judicial nature of its proceedings, procedures, and binding effect.

The Court held that Article 136 was broadly worded and intentionally encompassed appeals from both courts and tribunals performing adjudicatory functions. The lack of technical “finality” in an award did not rob it of its judicial character, particularly where statutory procedures ensured government’s mechanical compliance with the Tribunal’s decisions.

They also held that no substantial procedural error or grave injustice had been committed by the Tribunal, and as such, no interference on merits was warranted.

b. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)

Mukherjea J. and Patanjali Sastri J. (dissenting) opined that the Tribunal was not a judicial body, but a quasi-administrative authority. They stressed that its decisions were often not grounded in law, but in social and economic considerations, thereby making appellate judicial review inappropriate. Their dissent remains significant in delineating limits on judicial activism in administrative adjudication.

c. GUIDELINES (IF ANY – WRITE IN DETAIL AND IN POINTERS AS THE CASE MAYBE)

• Article 136 jurisdiction is not confined to traditional courts; it extends to tribunals with judicial characteristics.

• Industrial Tribunals under the 1947 Act exercise judicial powers, although they are not courts.

• Supreme Court should exercise restraint in interfering with Tribunal awards unless grave injustice or procedural impropriety is evident.

• Government’s role under Section 15 is not discretionary in cases where it is not a party; its duty is ministerial.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case remains a seminal judgment on constitutional interpretation, specifically on the extent of the Supreme Court’s appellate powers under Article 136. It clarified that industrial tribunals, although non-judicial in nomenclature, could be brought under the Court’s jurisdiction if their functions were judicial in nature.

It also laid a delicate balance between judicial review and respect for legislative intent in administrative adjudication. The differing judicial philosophies seen in this case between majority and dissenting judges still influence debates over administrative law and tribunal reforms in India.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Pritam Singh v. The State, [1950] SCR 453

2. Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 KB 171

3. Cooper v. Wilson, [1937] 2 KB 309

4. Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, [1931] AC 275

5. Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, (1949) FCR 321

6. Moses v. Parker, [1896] AC 245

7. Minister of Health v. The King, [1931] AC 494

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India, Article 136

2. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19

3. Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Sections 480, 482

4. Indian Penal Code, Sections 193, 228