A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This analysis examines The State, Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 2024) focusing on territorial competence of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) post-bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and the interplay between the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act), the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and the Andhra Pradesh Re-Organisation Act, 2014.

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s quashing of FIRs and related proceedings against Central Government employees accused under Section 7, PC Act, holding that:

(i) general consent granted by the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh in 1990 and extended by subsequent government orders continued to operate after bifurcation under the circular issued under Section 3 of the Re-organisation Act;

(ii) statutes and executive instruments in force immediately before the appointed day are to be presumed to continue in each successor State until repealed or adapted; and

(iii) where the accused are Central Government or Central undertaking employees charged under a Central Act, CBI’s power to register and investigate is saved and supported by the 1963 MHA Resolution establishing CBI functions.

The Court relied on precedents including Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar and Fertico Marketing & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI to reject the High Court’s view that absence of fresh state consent or fresh notification of a Special Court fatally vitiated proceedings. The result restored criminal proceedings and remitted trials to the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Kurnool.

Keywords: DSPE Act; general consent; PC Act; Andhra Pradesh Re-Organisation Act, 2014; territorial jurisdiction.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This litigation arises from two FIRs under Section 7, PC Act registered by CBI (ACB) Hyderabad against Central government employees posted in districts that after 02.06.2014 remained in the State of Andhra Pradesh (Kurnool and Anantapur). The accused challenged prosecution by way of writ petitions before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, contending that post-bifurcation the CBI at Hyderabad (in Telangana) lacked power to register or investigate offences in the newly constituted Andhra Pradesh without fresh consent under Section 6, DSPE Act and that no fresh Section 4, PC Act notification designated the Hyderabad Special Court to try offences post-reorganisation.

The High Court accepted these pleas, quashed FIRs and further proceedings, and concluded that lack of state consent and absence of a valid Special Court notification were jurisdictional defects going to the root of proceedings. The CBI appealed to the Supreme Court which examined whether executive instruments and prior general consent continued to apply after state bifurcation, how Section 3 of the Re-Organisation Act and the attendant circular dated 26.05.2014 operate, and whether prosecutorial competence could be sustained for offences under a Central Act committed by Central/central undertaking employees.

The Court also interrogated the legal effect of pre-bifurcation government orders (including G.O.Ms. dated 14.05.1990 and subsequent G.O.Ms. extending consent) in light of the defined term “law” in the circular and relevant precedents on DSPE consent jurisprudence. Ultimately the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, restored FIRs and trial files to the Special Judge at Kurnool, and clarified the continuing force of pre-existing laws and consents unless altered.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 09.05.2017 a Superintendent, Central Excise at Nandyal (Kurnool) allegedly demanded and accepted ₹10,000; FIR No.10(A)/2017 under Section 7, PC Act followed. On 20.11.2017 an Accounts Assistant in South Central Railway (Guntakal) allegedly demanded ₹15,000; FIR RC22(A)/2017–CBI/HYD was registered. Investigations were conducted by CBI, chargesheets were filed in late 2017/early 2018 before the Court of Principal Special Judge for CBI cases at Hyderabad which took cognizance and registered criminal cases (CC Nos.2/2018 and 6/2018).

Administrative re-definition of CBI territorial jurisdiction and court allocations followed: CBI policy division order dated 28.03.2019, High Court of Telangana ROC No.334/E-1/2008 dated 03.09.2019, and subsequent G.O.Ms. relocating Special Judge to Kurnool resulted in renumbering as CC Nos.35/2020 then CC Nos.13/2022 and 15/2022. The accused challenged the proceedings on jurisdictional and consent grounds before the High Court which quashed them.

CBI appealed. The central factual matrix therefore combines alleged corruption by central employees, pre-existing government consents and notifications predating the 2014 reorganisation, and subsequent administrative steps that reallocated cases between CBI benches and courts.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether CBI could register and investigate offences alleged to have been committed within Andhra Pradesh after the State’s bifurcation without fresh consent from the successor State under Section 6, DSPE Act?

ii. Whether notifications/designations of Special Judges under Section 4, PC Act issued pre-bifurcation continued to be valid for regions falling in successor States absent fresh notification?

iii. Whether absence of a fresh State consent or notification vitiates FIRs, investigation and cognizance to the extent of destroying jurisdiction?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The CBI (appellant) submitted that Circular Memo No.13665/SR/2014 (26.05.2014) under Section 3, AP Re-Organisation Act preserves all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in each successor State until adaptation or amendment, and therefore pre-bifurcation general consent (G.O.R.T. No.1247 dated 14.05.1990 and subsequent G.O.Ms.) continued to empower CBI action. It argued that where accused are Central Government or Central undertaking employees charged under a Central Act, CBI’s jurisdiction is reinforced by the 1963 MHA Resolution and precedents (Kanwal Tanuj, Fertico). It urged that the High Court misread the G.O.Ms. and erred in treating them as confined to Andhra Pradesh alone, thereby producing a legal vacuum. The appellant maintained that subsequent administrative transfers only regularised forum, not cured jurisdictional defect, and that trial should continue.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondents contended that after 02.06.2014 the Hyderabad CBI office lay in Telangana and therefore CBI could not, without express consent of the successor State of Andhra Pradesh, register or investigate offences inside Andhra Pradesh. They argued that the Special Court notification under Section 4, PC Act was not issued post-bifurcation so Hyderabad courts lacked jurisdiction to try Rayalaseema offences. The respondents maintained that these are fundamental jurisdictional defects going to the root of proceedings and warrant quashing.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding the High Court’s quashing untenable. The Court analysed Circular Memo dated 26.05.2014 (issued under s.3 of the Re-organisation Act) which defines “law” to include orders, notifications and instruments in force immediately before the appointed day and mandates continuation of such laws in successor States until altered. Applying the doctrine from Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Swarn Rekha Cokes & Coals the Court held continuation of pre-existing instruments is the ordinary rule to prevent vacuum.

The G.O.R.T. No.1247 (14.05.1990) granting general consent under Section 6, DSPE Act and subsequent G.O.Ms. (including G.O.Ms. No.88/07.08.2012 and later extensions) were therefore operative in the successor States until specifically altered. The Court emphasised that those G.O.s conferred consent to exercise DSPE powers in respect of private persons and public servants (including central employees) and could not be read to deny reach of CBI to Central Government employees.

Independently, the Court relied on Kanwal Tanuj and Fertico to hold that where offences under Central Acts are involved and public servants are central employees, CBI retains competence to investigate notwithstanding territorial postings, and State consent cannot be invoked to frustrate investigation into central servants. The Court further noted the 1963 MHA Resolution describing CBI functions where public servants under Central Government control are involved.

On the point of Special Court notifications under Section 4, PC Act, the Court held that prior notifications and administrative orders operating immediately before reorganisation continued until adapted, and subsequent ROC/G.O.Ms. transferring territorial jurisdiction and reallocating courts (including relocation to Kurnool) regularised trial forums. Therefore absence of a new stand-alone notification did not render proceedings void. Considering the factual sequence, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, restored the FIRs and trial files to the Special Judge, Kurnool and directed trial to proceed in accordance with law.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The dispositive reasoning is twofold. First, laws, orders and notifications in force immediately prior to the appointed day under the Re-organisation Act continue in the successor States until altered, preventing a legal vacuum and preserving pre-existing consents (Circular dated 26.05.2014 analyzed with Swarn Rekha). Second, jurisprudence under DSPE Act (notably Kanwal Tanuj and Fertico) establishes that consent under Section 6 cannot be invoked to undermine CBI investigation into offences committed under Central Acts by Central Government servants; the statutory and policy architecture contemplates CBI jurisdiction in such circumstances. Combined, these principles removed the predicate for quashing.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that construing Section 6 to require fresh consent in circumstances that would create enforcement vacuums would be undesirable and invite lawlessness. It warned against narrow readings of executive orders that would isolate central public servants from accountability. The Court also underscored the administrative utility of ROC and G.O.Ms. in re-allocating judicial work post-reorganisation as legitimate measures to preserve prosecutorial continuity.

c. GUIDELINES 

The Court effectively directed that :

(i) successor States will be presumed to carry forward pre-existing laws, notifications and orders until expressly altered;

(ii) CBI may proceed against Central/central undertaking employees charged under Central Acts notwithstanding supervening territorial reorganisations so long as pre-existing consent or statutory scheme covers such situations;

(iii) administrative transfers of cases between CBI benches and designated Special Judges effected under ROC/G.O.Ms. are valid mechanisms to maintain prosecutorial continuity;

(iv) courts should avoid technical constructions that produce enforcement vacuums.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This decision reinforces a purposive approach in interpreting reorganisation statutes and executive instruments so as to preserve legal continuity and enforcement capability. The judgment reconciles federal structural change with the imperatives of criminal accountability by safeguarding CBI’s investigatory reach over central public servants under Central statutes.

It affords clarity that general consents and designations made pre-reorganisation retain operative force until adapted by competent authority, thereby offering administrative predictability. Practically, the ruling curtails procedural challenges that seek to derail prosecutions on narrow territorial or notification technicalities after structural state changes.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of:

(i) tracing the provenance and operative scope of pre-existing G.O.s and circulars when contesting investigative competence, 

(ii) invoking DSPE jurisprudence (notably Kanwal Tanuj and Fertico) where accused are central servants.

Finally, while the Court protected investigatory continuity, it also preserved the scope for successor States to adapt or repeal pre-existing instruments a balance between continuity and sovereign competence.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. The State, Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 898 of 2024, Judgment dated 02.01.2025.
ii. Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2020) [2020] SCC OnLine SC 395.
iii. Fertico Marketing & Investment Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2020) 12 SCR 956 : (2021) 2 SCC 525.
iv. C.B.I., A.H.D., Patna v. Braj Bhushan Prasad, (2001) Supp. 3 SCR 627 : (2001) 9 SCC 432.
v. State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh & Ors., (1976) 2 SCR 115 : (1976) 3 SCC 242.
vi. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi v. Swarn Rekha Cokes & Coals (P) Ltd., (2004) Supp. 2 SCR 633 : (2004) 6 SCC 689.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (ss.5,6).
ii. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (ss.4,7).
iii. Andhra Pradesh Re-Organisation Act, 2014 (s.3).
iv. Resolution, Ministry of Home Affairs, Establishment of CBI, No.4-31-61-T dated 01.04.1963.