A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment examines the scope and limitations of the State Government’s power to supersede a Waqf Board under Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995, particularly in light of the second proviso inserted by the 2013 amendment. The dispute arose from the supersession of the Tamil Nadu Waqf Board on the ground that the number of elected members had fallen below nominated members, allegedly rendering the Board incapable of functioning. The Supreme Court closely scrutinised whether such a situation, arising without any fault or misconduct of the Board, could justify supersession.

The Court interpreted Section 14 holistically, emphasising that the statutory obligation to maintain a democratic composition of the Board rests with the State Government. It clarified that cessation of membership due to expiry of tenure of an elected representative does not amount to inability or misconduct attributable to the Board. The judgment reinforces that Section 22 safeguards the validity of Board actions despite vacancies or defects in constitution.

A significant contribution of the ruling lies in its interpretation of the second proviso to Section 99, holding that supersession is impermissible in the absence of prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct, or statutory violation by the Board itself. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision declaring the supersession illegal while approving the limited relief granted due to procedural posture and parties before the Court.

This decision strengthens democratic governance of Waqf institutions, limits arbitrary executive interference, and reiterates accountability of the State in constituting statutory bodies lawfully.

Keywords: Waqf Board, Supersession, Section 99 Waqf Act, Democratic Governance, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Law

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case arose from executive action taken by the Government of Tamil Nadu superseding the State Waqf Board constituted in October 2017. The Board was a statutory body under the Waqf Act, 1995, entrusted with supervision and management of auqaf properties. The supersession was justified by the State on the ground that the number of elected members had become fewer than nominated members following cessation of tenure of a Muslim Member of Parliament in May 2019.

The High Court of Madras held the supersession illegal but limited relief to members of the Mutawalli category, considering the pleadings before it. The State appealed, asserting absolute power under Section 99 and arguing that imbalance in composition rendered the Board “unable to perform”.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether structural imbalance without Board fault could justify supersession, and how Sections 14, 22, and 99 interact. The decision situates itself at the intersection of democratic governance, statutory accountability, and executive restraint.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Tamil Nadu Waqf Board was reconstituted on 10.10.2017 after expiry of the previous Board’s tenure. It consisted of eleven Muslim members representing different statutory categories, including elected Members of Parliament, Members of Legislative Assembly, Mutawallis, and nominated members such as senior advocates and scholars. Two senior Muslim advocates were nominated under the proviso to Section 14(1)(b)(iii) due to absence of Muslim members in the Bar Council.

In May 2019, one elected Member of Parliament ceased to hold office, reducing elected members from five to four. The State sought legal opinion and concluded that nominated senior advocates could not be treated as elected members. Based on this interpretation, the State issued a show cause notice and subsequently superseded the Board on 18.09.2019 under Section 99(1), stating that the Board had become unable to perform its functions.

Several writ petitions were filed challenging the supersession and subsequent reconstitution process. The High Court held that the supersession was contrary to law but limited relief to two Mutawalli members due to procedural constraints. The State challenged this partial invalidation before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether imbalance between elected and nominated members constitutes “inability to perform” under Section 99(1)?
ii. Whether the State can supersede a Waqf Board without prima facie evidence of misconduct under the second proviso to Section 99?
iii. Whether vacancies or defects in constitution invalidate the Board’s functioning in light of Section 22?
iv. Whether partial setting aside of supersession order by the High Court was legally permissible?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the State submitted that Section 14(4) mandates elected members to outnumber nominated members at all times. Upon cessation of the MP’s tenure, this statutory condition stood violated, rendering the Board incapable of functioning. It was argued that the State had no option but to invoke Section 99.

The appellants contended that the High Court erred in partially setting aside the supersession, as such orders are indivisible. Delay, laches, and prior judicial approvals were also invoked to challenge maintainability.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondents argued that the imbalance was a consequence of State’s own failure to conduct elections or invoke Section 14(3). They emphasised that Section 22 protects Board actions despite vacancies.

Crucially, reliance was placed on the second proviso to Section 99, contending that absence of financial irregularity or misconduct barred supersession. The respondents asserted that the State cannot benefit from its own statutory lapse.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s conclusion that the supersession was illegal. The Court analysed Section 14 to hold that democratic composition is an obligation upon the State. The Court observed that nomination under Section 14(3) operates as an exception and was not invoked.

The Court relied on Section 22 to affirm that vacancies or defects do not invalidate Board functioning. It categorically held that cessation of an elected member’s tenure is beyond Board control and cannot be construed as inability or misconduct.

Interpreting Section 99, the Court held that the second proviso acts as a substantive restriction on executive power. Supersession must be preceded by prima facie evidence of misconduct attributable to the Board. Structural imbalance alone does not satisfy this threshold.

The High Court’s partial relief was upheld due to the limited scope of writ petitions before it. The Court declined to interfere with subsequent elections except regarding Mutawalli members.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The State Government cannot supersede a Waqf Board under Section 99 merely because elected members fall below nominated members, when such imbalance arises without fault, misconduct, or statutory violation by the Board, and in absence of prima facie evidence as mandated by the second proviso to Section 99.

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court emphasised that democratic governance is the legislative soul of the Waqf Act. Executive authorities must act as facilitators of elections rather than substituting democratic processes through nomination or supersession.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Supersession powers must be exercised sparingly.
ii. State must exhaust alternatives under Sections 14(3) and 14(4).
iii. Structural defects must not be equated with misconduct.
iv. Second proviso to Section 99 is mandatory and restrictive.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces rule of law in governance of religious endowments. It curbs executive overreach and restores legislative intent of democratic control in Waqf administration. The ruling ensures stability of statutory bodies and strengthens minority institutional autonomy.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. M.H. Jawahirullah v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 3 MLJ 688

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Waqf Act, 1995