A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 92 : 2025 INSC 80, examines whether a High Court, when confronted with a second appeal under Order XLI r/w Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may grant a temporary/ad interim order (for example, directing maintenance of status quo) before it has satisfied itself that the appeal involves a substantial question of law and before it has formulated such question as mandated by Section 100(4).

The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal is predicated on the High Court being satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and upon formulation of that question; until those steps are taken the High Court lacks jurisdiction to pass an interim order that has the effect of preserving or altering rights in the dispute. The Court reiterated existing precedents (notably Ram Phal v. Banarasi; Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt; Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar; Hemavathi & Others v. V. Hombegowda) that a second appeal cannot be admitted, heard on merits or accommodated by interim relief unless the statutory gateway existence and formulation of a substantial question of law is traversed.

The order impugned (limited status quo directed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court without framing questions under Section 100) was set aside. The judgment stresses that the High Court’s inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to circumvent or nullify the mandatory scheme of Section 100.

Keywords: Section 100 CPC; Second appeal; Substantial question of law; Interim order; Status quo; Section 151 CPC; Ad interim relief.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arises from an interim order dated 20.09.2024 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in SA No. 518/2023 in a second appeal filed by the plaintiff (Respondent No.1) from an appellate decree that had set aside a trial court decree granting a permanent injunction. The plaintiff had initially obtained a decree in the trial court; the first appellate court allowed an appeal filed by the defendants and set aside that decree. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal under Section 100 CPC. At a preliminary hearing the High Court, without framing any substantial question of law, directed the parties to maintain status quo till the next date; that ad interim order was later extended.

The legal heirs of one defendant and other defendants challenged the interim order before the Supreme Court, contending that interim relief in a second appeal may not be granted before the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and before such question is framed under Section 100(4). The Supreme Court considered the settled statutory scheme of Section 100, the purpose of requiring formulation of substantial questions at admission, and an established line of precedents which restrict the High Court from entertaining second appeals (or passing interim orders that affect the subject matter) unless the statutory pre-condition is met. The Court analyzed whether the High Court’s invocation of inherent powers (Section 151) or ordering short notice/notice of motion practices can justify such ad interim protection in the interregnum.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The suit concerned land belonging to a cooperative housing society which had earlier acquired several survey numbers. A parcel measuring 0.61 acres (the scheduled property) was alleged to have been sold by the society and later developed into plots which were sold to members/defendants. The plaintiff procured mutation in revenue records in her favour (ex parte order dated 13.04.2010) and filed OS No.48/2011 for permanent injunction. The trial court decreed the suit on 05.02.2016 in favour of the plaintiff on perceived possession/ownership.

On appeal, the First Appellate Court allowed the defendants’ appeal by judgment dated 11.11.2022, holding that a suit for bare injunction without a declaration of title was not maintainable and reversing the decree. The plaintiff filed a Regular Second Appeal (SA No. 518/2023) before the High Court. The High Court, after adjourning on multiple occasions for service issues, on 20.09.2024 without framing substantial questions of law as mandated by Section 100(4) directed the parties to maintain status quo till 25.09.2024; that interim arrangement was later extended to 17.10.2024. Several respondents had not been served. Aggrieved defendants moved the Supreme Court to set aside the interim order on the ground that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to pass such an ad interim order before satisfying itself about the existence of a substantial question of law and framing it.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a High Court can pass an ad interim or status quo order in a second appeal before it has formulated a substantial question of law as required by Section 100(4), CPC?
ii. Whether the inherent power under Section 151 CPC authorises the High Court to grant interim protection in the interregnum so as to preserve the subject matter, even if Section 100‘s requirements are not yet satisfied?
iii. Whether admission or interim relief in a second appeal can be allowed where not all respondents have been served?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The High Court lacked jurisdiction to pass interim relief without framing a substantial question of law under Section 100(4); precedents (e.g., Ram Phal v. Banarasi) compel formulation of questions before any substantive exercise of second appellate jurisdiction.
ii. A second appeal is maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises; absent that, the appeal should be dismissed at admission stage.
iii. Revenue mutation/order alone cannot determine title; trial court had erred in relying on revenue records — reliance on Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co. to underline the limited probative value of mutation.
iv. Granting interim relief on mere representation without service on all parties and without framing questions prejudices appellants’ substantive rights.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary/ad interim orders to preserve the subject matter and protect the ends of justice in exigent circumstances, citing Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal.
ii. The impugned order was only an ex parte, short-lived arrangement to maintain status quo until the next hearing and did not create or divest substantive rights or stay the decree.
iii. The factual matrix (plaintiff’s pleaded share/right and mutation) warranted preservation of possession pending hearing; hence interim relief was justified.
iv. Precedents relied upon by appellants are factually distinguishable and did not bar the High Court from issuing ad interim arrangements.

H) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the interim order. The Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is conditioned upon the existence of a substantial question of law; the High Court must be satisfied of such a question at the admission stage and must formulate that question per Section 100(4). The Court held that only after formulating that question can the High Court proceed to hear and, where justified, pass interim orders incident to entertaining the second appeal.

The Court reviewed a consistent line of authorities Ram Phal v. Banarasi (2003), Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt (2016), Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001), Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000), State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal (2008), Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB (2010), Umerkhan v. Bismillabi (2011), Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar (2023), and Hemavathi & Others v. V. Hombegowda (2023) all underscoring the mandatory nature of the Section 100 gateway and the duty to frame questions before exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the legislative design: second appeals are not a re-hearing of facts but a narrow legal review; hence procedural safeguards (formulation of substantial questions) cannot be by-passed.

The Court also examined the contention that Section 151 or inherent jurisdiction can be used to preserve the subject matter but concluded that inherent powers cannot be invoked to nullify express statutory mandatory provisions of the Code. The Court observed that while the High Court may, in exceptional situations, pass ex parte orders under Order XLI Rule 5(3) where justified, even then the language and postulates of Section 100 must be borne in mind admission must satisfy Section 100’s requirement. On facts, given that several respondents were not served and no substantial question had been framed, the High Court had no jurisdiction to pass the interim order directing status quo; accordingly the impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed. No costs were imposed.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal principle is that a High Court acquires jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC only when it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and it has formulated that question under Section 100(4). Until such formulation and satisfaction, the High Court’s power to admit, hear or pass interim orders in relation to the second appeal cannot lawfully be exercised. Section 151 CPC or inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent or frustrate this statutory mandate. The effect is that any interim order made before satisfying and recording the existence of a substantial question is liable to be set aside.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court noted procedural practices in some High Courts (such as ordering Notice of Motion or granting short notice) and clarified that such procedural flexibility cannot be used to bypass the statutory scheme. The judgment observes that if a High Court is prima facie of the view that a substantial question of law exists and the question is short and amenable to quick disposal, it should frame the question at the admission stage and then proceed on short notice. The Court also remarked that ex parte orders under Order XLI Rule 5 must be carefully employed and remain subject to Section 100’s requirements.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. At the admission stage of a second appeal, the High Court must first satisfy itself whether a substantial question of law is involved.
ii. If satisfied, the Court must formulate that substantial question under Section 100(4) before proceeding.
iii. Interim orders affecting the subject matter (including status quo or stays that preserve or alter possession) should not be passed prior to formulation; any such order made earlier is liable to be set aside.
iv. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to circumvent the express requirements of Section 100. Inherent powers are supplementary and cannot nullify specific statutory provisions.
v. If the High Court concludes that a substantial question exists but the matter requires brief time, it should frame question(s) and then proceed on shortened notice rather than defer formulation.
vi. Where respondents are unserved, High Courts must exercise caution before making interim arrangements; service-related lacunae weaken the basis for immediate protective orders.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reinforces the strict statutory gatekeeping role of Section 100 CPC. The Supreme Court, by a clear restatement of precedent, prevents procedural evasions whereby High Courts might, in practice, preserve contested subject matter without first invoking the statutory threshold that justifies second appellate interference. The judgment balances the need for temporary protective measures against the risk of circumventing the legislative limitation on second appeals.

Practically, the ruling mandates disciplined practice in High Courts: admission under Section 100 must be preceded or accompanied by formulation of substantial questions, and interim reliefs, particularly those which preserve or affect possession or the operative effect of subordinate courts’ decrees, should ordinarily follow such framing. For litigants and practitioners, the judgment underscores vigilance: to obtain interim protection in a second appeal the applicant must ensure that the High Court records satisfaction of Section 100’s precondition and frames the requisite question(s); conversely, opponents can move promptly to challenge any ad interim orders made prior to such formulation. The decision thus fortifies the statutory architecture of appellate review and curbs ad hoc invocation of inherent powers to displace express procedural mandates.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Ram Phal v. Banarasi, (2003) 11 SCC 762.

2. Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt, (2016) 11 SCC 235.

3. Bhagyashree Anant Gaonkar v. Narendra @ Nagesh Bharma Holkar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1236.

4. Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179.

5. Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708.

6. State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92.

7. Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216.

8. Umerkhan v. Bismillabi, (2011) 9 SCC 684.

9. Hemavathi & Others v. V. Hombegowda and Another, 2023 INSC 848.

10. Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527.

11. Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191.

12. Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100, Order XLI, Section 151.