A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict concerning the procedural competence of police authorities in relation to offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The Court undertook an extensive statutory and constitutional analysis to determine whether police officers can register FIRs, investigate, and prosecute offences which are declared cognizable and non-bailable under Section 36AC of the Act. The Court held that despite the cognizable nature of such offences, Section 32 of the Act creates a complete code for prosecution, thereby excluding police officers from instituting prosecutions or registering FIRs under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The judgment harmonises the Drugs and Cosmetics Act with the CrPC by reaffirming the doctrine that special law prevails over general law. It recognises that the Act deliberately entrusts enforcement to Drugs Inspectors, who possess technical qualifications and statutory powers tailored to regulatory offences affecting public health. The Court further clarified that while police investigation and FIR registration are barred, the Act does contemplate arrest, and such power vests in the Drugs Inspector under Section 22(1)(d) as a necessary incidental power.

The ruling has significant implications for criminal procedure, personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, regulatory enforcement, and federal policing practice. It curtails unauthorized police action, strengthens statutory discipline, and preserves legislative intent.

Keywords: Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Section 32, FIR, Cognizable Offence, Police Powers, Arrest, Special Statute, CrPC

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose from increasing instances where police authorities registered FIRs and initiated criminal investigations for offences relating to sale and distribution of drugs under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The controversy deepened after the 2008 amendment introducing Section 36AC, which declared certain offences cognizable and non-bailable, leading enforcement agencies to assume that ordinary police powers under the CrPC stood automatically attracted.

The High Court had quashed the FIR registered against the respondent, holding that Section 32 of the Act exclusively governs prosecution and bars police-initiated proceedings. The Union of India challenged this interpretation, arguing that cognizability under Section 36AC necessarily attracts Section 154 CrPC and mandatory FIR registration as per Lalita Kumari.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to resolve a complex statutory interplay involving Sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC, Section 32 of the Act, and constitutional guarantees under Articles 21 and 22. The background reflects a regulatory statute designed to safeguard public health, where technical enforcement is preferred over traditional policing. The judgment addresses systemic misuse of police powers, arbitrary arrests, and procedural irregularities that directly impact personal liberty.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent was the owner of a licensed medical shop. An FIR was registered by the police for alleged violations under Sections 18(a)(i) and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, alleging sale of drugs in contravention of statutory standards. The police proceeded under the CrPC framework, registered the FIR under Section 154, and commenced investigation.

The respondent challenged the FIR before the High Court, contending that Section 32 of the Act restricts prosecution to specified authorities, namely Drugs Inspectors, authorised gazetted officers, aggrieved persons, or recognised consumer associations. It was argued that police officers lack statutory authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Chapter IV.

The High Court accepted this contention and quashed the FIR, holding that the entire police action was without jurisdiction. The Union of India appealed, asserting that once an offence is declared cognizable, police powers automatically apply.

The Supreme Court examined the entire statutory scheme, including investigative powers under Sections 22 and 23, procedural safeguards, the role of Special Courts, and the absence of police authority within the Act. The factual matrix thus squarely raised the legality of police intervention in regulatory offences.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether police officers are competent to register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC for offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?
ii. Whether Section 36AC overrides Section 32 of the Act?
iii. Whether the Drugs Inspector has the power to arrest without warrant?
iv. Whether the principle in Lalita Kumari applies to offences under the Act?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the appellant submitted that once offences are declared cognizable, the statutory duty under Section 154 CrPC is triggered. Reliance was placed on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh to argue that registration of FIR is mandatory. It was contended that Section 2 of the Act preserves the application of the CrPC and that excluding police powers would defeat effective enforcement.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsels for the respondent submitted that Section 32 constitutes a complete bar on police prosecution. It was argued that cognizability does not equate to police investigation where the special statute provides otherwise. Emphasis was placed on legislative intent, technical nature of offences, and the doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali.

H) JUDGEMENT 

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgment. It held that Section 32 of the Act expressly excludes police officers from prosecuting offences under Chapter IV. The Court observed that cognizability only affects arrest and bail, not the mode of prosecution.

A detailed examination of Chapters XII, XV, and XVI of the CrPC revealed that police investigation culminates in a Section 173 report, which is legally impermissible under the Act. The Court categorically held that registration of FIRs in such cases is unauthorised and void.

On arrest, the Court harmonised Section 22(1)(d) with constitutional safeguards and held that Drugs Inspectors possess implied arrest powers, subject to CrPC safeguards and reporting requirements. Police assistance may be sought only for effectuating arrest, not investigation.

a) RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio decisively affirms that where a special statute prescribes a distinct mechanism for prosecution, general police powers under the CrPC stand excluded. Section 32 overrides Section 154 CrPC. Cognizable status does not import police investigation. Arrest power vests in the Drugs Inspector by necessary implication under Section 22(1)(d).

b) OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that arbitrary arrests in regulatory offences undermine Article 21. It also emphasised the need for Central Government guidelines under Section 33P to regulate arrest powers exercised by Drugs Inspectors.

c) GUIDELINES

i. Police shall not register FIRs for offences under Chapter IV unless IPC offences are also disclosed.
ii. Complaints must be forwarded to the jurisdictional Drugs Inspector.
iii. Arrests by Drugs Inspectors must strictly comply with CrPC safeguards and D.K. Basu guidelines.
iv. Immediate reporting of arrest to superior officers is mandatory.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment restores statutory discipline and reinforces personal liberty. It prevents misuse of criminal process, respects legislative design, and clarifies enforcement roles. The decision is a landmark in harmonising regulatory law with criminal procedure and will serve as binding precedent across jurisdictions.

J) REFERENCES

a) Important Cases Referred

i. Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, [1994] 1 SCR 445
ii. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, [1996] 10 Supp SCR 284
iii. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, [2013] 14 SCR 713

b) Important Statutes Referred

i. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
ii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
iii. Constitution of India