A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2022 (11 Feb 2025) examines whether the High Court rightly reversed an acquittal and convicted both the husband and the mother-in-law for setting the deceased wife on fire, invoking ss. 498A, 302, 504 read with s. 34 IPC and ss. 3, 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Supreme Court affirms conviction of the mother-in-law based primarily on a consistent oral dying declaration (recorded by the Tehsildar and a treating doctor) and corroborative medical opinion, while it sets aside the conviction of the husband for lack of cogent evidence of his individual participation or shared common intention within the meaning of s. 34 IPC.

The Court elaborates the twin requirements under s. 34 participation in the criminal act and sharing the common intention distinguishing it sharply from s. 149 (common object). The judgment underscores that mere presence, flight or omission does not automatically constitute participation unless foundational facts show active or passive conduct in furtherance of the criminal act; s. 106 Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service unless prima facie foundational facts of involvement are made out.

Dying declarations are held admissible here because medical evidence (and lack of meaningful cross-examination) support the victim’s fitness to speak. Result: conviction of appellant No.2 (mother-in-law) affirmed; appellant No.1 (husband) acquitted. 2025 3 S.C.R. 158 : 2025 INSC 221.

Keywords: dying declaration; common intention; s. 34 IPC; dying declaration — fitness to speak; dowry; participation; s. 106 Evidence Act.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The prosecution alleged that the deceased, Geetha, was doused with kerosene and set ablaze in her matrimonial home; she sustained ~90% burns and died after a week. FIR by her mother recorded harassment and dowry demands, naming husband and in-laws. Investigation produced a dying declaration (recorded by the Tehsildar) and medical opinion that the victim was fit to speak. Trial court acquitted accused persons for insufficiency of proof; on State appeal the High Court reversed and convicted both the husband and the mother-in-law under ss. 302, 498A, 504 read with s. 34 IPC and ss. 3, 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court’s interference before the Supreme Court.

The principal legal contest before the Supreme Court involved two intertwined strands:

(i) the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the dying declaration and medical support for its reliability, and

(ii) the legal reach of s. 34 IPC to fasten vicarious liability on the husband in absence of direct overt act or clear foundational facts indicating his sharing of common intention.

The Court analyzed precedent distinguishing s. 34 from s. 149, expounded the requisites of common intention (participation + shared intention), evaluated the import of s. 106 Evidence Act, and applied these tests to the record, concluding that only the mother-in-law could be sustained as guilty.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Geetha married appellant No.1 about eight years prior and bore three children. After a year, alleged harassment for dowry and household work began. On 2 Jan 2013 at ~8:00 p.m., the mother-in-law is alleged to have poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire; neighbours carried her to hospital; she succumbed after a week, cause being septicemia consequent to burns. FIR by complainant (mother) alleged demand for Rs.5,000 and deliberate attempt to kill. Investigation included recording of dying declaration by Tehsildar (Ex.P.46), medical opinions (Ex.P.30/31) and FSL report (Ex.P.54).

Trial court framed charges under ss. 498A, 302, 114, 323, 504 r/w s. 34 IPC and ss. 3, 4 Dowry Act; after evidence the trial court acquitted the accused. High Court reversed, convicting both; State appealed to Supreme Court. Key oral witnesses: Tehsildar (PW-21), treating doctor (PW-15); other neighbours had largely turned hostile at trial. Dying declaration explicitly named only the mother-in-law as perpetrator and stated the husband splashed water to extinguish the fire.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

i. Whether the dying declaration (Ex.P.46) was recorded when the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and if it can be relied upon to establish guilt?
ii. Whether s. 34 IPC can be invoked to convict the husband when the dying declaration and material evidence do not directly implicate him in the act of setting the deceased on fire?
iii. Whether mere presence, omission to act or subsequent disappearance can be construed as participation amounting to common intention under s. 34 IPC?
iv. Whether s. 106 Evidence Act supplies an evidentiary burden to infer involvement of the husband absent primary foundational facts?
v. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal where trial court had accepted defence and neighbours turned hostile?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The High Court erred in reversing a reasoned acquittal; appellate interference is permissible only if trial findings are perverse.
ii. Dying declaration cannot be relied upon — the deceased was too injured/unstable; medical evidence thus makes the declaration unreliable.
iii. The dying declaration and doctor’s oral testimony do not implicate the husband; on the contrary the victim stated that the husband splashed water to extinguish flames.
iv. No direct evidence of participation or pre-concerted plan to fasten s. 34 liability on appellant No.1; s. 106 cannot be used to fill gaps in foundational facts.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The dying declaration (Tehsildar and oral before PW-15) along with medical opinion of fitness is sufficient to prove culpability of the mother-in-law.
ii. Husband’s omission and conduct (presence, failure to take sufficient care) indicate shared intention; absence of plausible explanation under s. 106 Evidence Act supports appellate inference of guilt.
iii. High Court rightly applied s. 34 as the two accused were charged with common intention and evidence shows co-infliction of burn injuries.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. s. 34 IPC — acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
ii. s. 149 IPC — liability of members of unlawful assembly for common object (contrasted).
iii. s. 106 Evidence Act — burden to explain facts within party’s knowledge.
iv. ss. 3, 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — prohibition and punishment for dowry demands and harassment.
v. Dying declaration principles — admissibility and requirement of fitness to speak; supporting medical affidavit/witness evidence.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court carefully reviewed the dying declaration (Ex.P.46), the Tehsildar’s contemporaneous recording (PW-21) and treating doctor’s evidence (PW-15). Both medical opinion and Tehsildar narration indicate that Geetha was conscious, answered queries coherently and was physically able to communicate; the Tehsildar took a toe impression and the doctor had opined fitness (Ex.P.30/32). Cross-examination of these witnesses did not elicit material contradictions. Accordingly, the dying declaration is held reliable to establish that the mother-in-law poured kerosene and set the victim on fire; this supported conviction under ss. 302, 498A and Dowry Act provisions for appellant No.2.

On appellant No.1 (husband), the Court undertook an extended exegesis of s. 34 jurisprudence, relying principally on Om Prakash v. State (Allahabad HC) as locus classicus, and on decisions such as Barendra Kumar Ghosh (Privy Council), Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli (SC) and subsequent High Court benches.

The Court reiterated the twin pillars of s. 34:

(a) the accused must have participated in the criminal act (doing or omission) however slight which forms part of the offence; and

(b) he must share the common intention with others.

This contrasts with s. 149, where individual intention is not essential. Mere presence at scene, or failure to prevent the crime, or flight, cannot by themselves convert non-participation into participation unless there are foundational facts prima facie indicating active or passive contribution in furtherance of the criminal act. The Court held that the High Court relied disproportionately on appellant No.1’s alleged omission and hypothesized motive rather than demonstrable participation; there was no dying declaration naming him as assailant, no medical or eyewitness evidence attributing any active role to him, and the victim’s statement actually recorded that he splashed water to help.

Section 106 Evidence Act was inapplicable because prosecution failed to first establish foundational facts indicating husband’s involvement. Consequently, the Court affirmed conviction of appellant No.2 but set aside the conviction of appellant No.1 and ordered his release if not required in other matters.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The decisive legal proposition is that s. 34 imposes liability only where each accused both participates in the criminal act (by act or omission) and shares the common intention that animates the act; the presence of a person on the scene or subsequent conduct cannot substitute for participation absent foundational facts. Dying declarations recorded when the declarant is fit to speak carry substantial probative value and may ground conviction where corroborated by medical opinion and absence of meaningful cross-examination.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court reiterated the classic observation from Barendra Kumar Ghosh that those who “only stand and wait” may still be principals where their presence furnishes encouragement or security but clarified that such inference requires evidence of purposeful presence to facilitate the crime. The judgment cautions against appellate courts reversing acquittals without demonstrating perversity or lack of evidence supporting trial findings, but accepts reversal where High Court’s assessment is supported by reliable evidence (as in the case of mother-in-law).

c. GUIDELINES

i. For application of s. 34, prosecution must show:

(a) some act/omission by accused forming part of the criminal act and

(b) meeting of minds proof of common intention.

ii. Dying declarations should be assessed against contemporaneous medical opinion and the quality of cross-examination; absence of material contradiction strengthens admissibility.

iii. s. 106 Evidence Act cannot be used to fill a vacuum; it requires prima facie foundational facts of involvement within accused’s knowledge.

iv. Appellate courts should be cautious in upsetting acquittals and must point to demonstrable legal or factual error or perverse conclusions before interference.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s approach balances evidentiary sanctity of dying declarations against doctrinal strictures of joint liability. Affirming the mother-in-law’s conviction justice is anchored in direct statements of the victim corroborated by medical opinion. Acquitting the husband underscores the Court’s insistence on positive material showing participation or shared intent before invoking s. 34; speculation from omission or inadequate rescue effort cannot substitute for proof of participation.

The judgment is instructive for prosecution strategy in domestic violence/dowry deaths: secure contemporaneous medical evaluations on declarant’s fitness, ensure foundational evidence of each accused’s role before invoking s. 34, and cautiously rely on s. 106 only when prima facie facts demand explanation. For courts, the decision clarifies the limits of constructive liability and reaffirms evidentiary rigour in capital or severe penal consequences.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Om Prakash v. State, 1956 CrLJ 452.

2. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1.

3. Emperor v. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, AIR 1924 Cal 257 (FB).

4. Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287.

5. Bashir v. State, AIR 1953 All 668.

6. Faiyaz Khan v. Rex, AIR 1949 All 180.

7. Aydrooss v. Emperor, AIR 1923 Mad 187.

8. Abdul Kader v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Cal 452.

9. Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. The State of Maharashtra, 2012 (referenced).

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 — ss. 34, 302, 498A, 504, 149.

2. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — ss. 3, 4.

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (provisions on recording dying declarations and committal).

4. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 106.