A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Vinod @ Nasmulla v. The State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No. 1931 of 2019; judgment dated 14 February 2025) examines whether conviction for dacoity under Section 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and for unlawful possession under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 can be sustained where:

(i) neither the FIR nor the Section 161 CrPC statements named the accused,

(ii) a Test Identification Parade (TIP) identifying the accused was conducted but the TIP-identifying witnesses were not examined,

(iii) dock identification by a single witness (a police personnel) was relied upon, and

(iv) there was no recovery of looted articles or forensic linkage between the seized country-made pistol and crime-scene evidence.

The Supreme Court re-affirms that a TIP is corroborative and not substantive; when TIP-identifying witnesses are not produced at trial the TIP report loses evidentiary value. The Court finds the dock identification by PW-9 unreliable given his doubtful presence on the bus and prior acquaintance with the accused, and it holds that the prosecution withheld best evidence (driver, conductor, khalasi) without justification.

The alleged arrest and recovery also suffer from infirmities delay in seizure memo, discrepancies in description, late forensic examination and absence of corroborative injuries, looted goods, or ballistic nexus. On cumulative appraisal, guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt; convictions set aside and appellant acquitted.

Keywords: dacoity; Test Identification Parade; dock identification; recovery of weapon; corroboration; benefit of doubt.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises from an alleged dacoity on board a running bus on 28 September 1993 where about eight armed persons are said to have looted passengers. The FIR was lodged at Ambikapur Police Station in the early hours of 29 September 1993 and, within hours, the prosecution contends an arrest of the appellant was effected at about 3:00 a.m. on 29 September 1993 with a country-made pistol allegedly carrying five cartridges. A Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted on 30 September 1993 and in investigation records two of three persons who participated in that TIP purportedly identified the appellant.

At trial, however, the prosecution did not produce the bus driver, conductor or khalasi all of whom had taken part in the TIP and only three passenger eyewitnesses were examined, none of whom had participated in the TIP. One witness, PW-9 (a police personnel), made a dock identification at trial. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant while acquitting the co-accused; the High Court affirmed. The appeal to the Supreme Court focused on the evidentiary sufficiency of the TIP, the reliability of dock identification, the circumstances of arrest and seizure, the absence of recovered looted property, and apparent investigative lapses such as delay in seizure memo and delayed forensic testing.

The Supreme Court re-evaluated the evidence on identification and recovery, applied established principles about TIPs being corroborative under Section 9 Evidence Act, and tested whether the prosecution had proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The essential facts are: a bus carrying 35 passengers was allegedly stopped at night when an assailant placed a pistol against the driver’s temple and demanded stoppage. Four persons already on the bus and four others who boarded proceeded to beat and loot passengers. One passenger sustained an injury from a shot. The driver reportedly brought the bus to the police station and FIR followed.

The prosecution’s investigative narrative records that in the night of 29 September 1993 PW-5 arrested the appellant near a pond at about 3:00 a.m. and recovered a country-made pistol with two live and three empty cartridges. A TIP on 30 September 1993 is recorded as having been conducted with the driver, conductor and khalasi; two of three participants allegedly identified the appellant. At trial only three passenger-eye witnesses were examined: PW-6, PW-9 and PW-12. None of the TIP participants were examined; the driver and khalasi who allegedly identified the appellant in TIP were not called.

PW-9 identified the appellant in dock. The prosecution produced a seizure memo (Exhibit P/11) prepared at 11:45 a.m. on 29 September 1993 and the weapon was sent for forensic examination only on 22 June 1994. No looted articles were recovered from the appellant or at his instance. The co-accused Mohd. Kalam Ansari was tried but acquitted. The trial court accepted PW-9’s dock identification and PW-5’s arrest-recovery story; the High Court upheld conviction. The appellant appealed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether conviction can rest primarily on a dock identification by a single witness when TIP-identifying witnesses who took part in the parade were not produced at trial?

2. Whether a TIP report loses evidentiary value when the witness who identified the accused in the TIP is not examined under oath and subjected to cross-examination?

3. Whether the alleged arrest and recovery of a country-made pistol can be relied upon as corroboration absent prompt seizure documentation, matching descriptions and forensic linkage to the scene?

4. Whether the prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt in absence of recovered looted goods, independent corroboration and credible identification?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution withheld the best evidence notably the driver, conductor and khalasi who participated in the TIP without justification; that PW-9’s dock identification was unreliable because his presence on the bus was doubtful and he had prior acquaintance with the appellant; that no looted articles were recovered and the pistol produced was not linked by forensics to the crime;

that the arrest narrative by PW-5 was inherently improbable as a single constable allegedly overpowered an armed accused at 3:00 a.m. without injury or contemporaneous corroboration; and that the trial and High Court failed to properly test prosecution evidence on probabilities and corroboration.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The State relied on the factum of dacoity proved by passenger testimony, pointed to PW-9’s identification in court and the TIP record (proved by the Naib Tehsildar) as establishing identification, asserted prompt arrest and seizure by PW-5, and emphasized forensic evidence that the pistol was in working condition. The State argued there was no motive to falsely implicate the appellant and maintained that cumulative evidence sufficed to uphold conviction for Sections 395/397 IPC and Section 25 Arms Act.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 395 IPC (Dacoity).
ii. Section 397 IPC (Robbery or dacoity, with attempt to cause death).
iii. Section 25 Arms Act, 1959 (punishment for unlawful possession).
iv. Section 9 Evidence Act, 1872 (relevance of facts which support identity — TIP guidance).
v. Section 161 CrPC (statements to police) — uses and limits.

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It reiterated settled law that a TIP under Section 9 Evidence Act is not substantive evidence but corroborative. The Court held that where persons who identified the accused at TIP are not produced for trial, the TIP report loses value because the court cannot test by cross-examination the basis of identification. Applying this principle the Court found the TIP for the appellant had no evidentiary utility as the driver, conductor and khalasi were not examined.

The only substantive identification was dock identification by PW-9, a police constable whose presence on the bus was doubtful, who admitted prior acquaintance with the appellant and who was not used in the TIP though available. The Court held that withholding the best evidence without explanation gravely weakens the prosecution’s case. Regarding recovery, the Court observed long delay in preparing the seizure memo, discrepancies between seized articles and memo, delayed forensic testing, absence of looted goods and lack of ballistic link between pistol and scene.

The arrest narrative by PW-5 a single constable allegedly contriving arrest at 3:00 a.m. lacked plausibility and independent corroboration. Cumulatively, the Court found reasonable doubt and set aside convictions and sentences, discharging bail bonds.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is twofold.

First, a TIP is corroborative and not substantive; if TIP-identifying witnesses are not examined at trial the TIP report cannot be used to sustain identification by others. The rationale is that courts must be able to assess why an identifying witness pointed out a person a task requiring examination and cross-examination.

Second, dock identification by a solitary witness of dubious credibility cannot substitute for absent corroborative evidence, particularly when best witnesses (driver, conductor, khalasi) were not produced and when recovery and forensic linkage are lacking. Where identification and recovery both suffer material infirmities, guilt cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed (obiter) that investigative haste or pressure to solve an offence affecting public order may lead to reliance on weak evidence and “soft targets,” and courts should be alert to police stories that are uncorroborated and convenient. The judgment emphasises prosecutorial duty to call best available witnesses and to explain omissions.

The Court also noted the significance of prompt seizure documentation and forensic linkage; unexplained delays in seizure memos and sending exhibits for examination diminish the probative value of recovered articles. These remarks guide trial courts in assessing credibility of police narratives and procedural adherence.

c. GUIDELINES 

i. TIP is corroborative; identify and produce TIP witnesses at trial to preserve evidentiary utility.
ii. Dock identification by a single witness should be treated with caution, especially if that witness had prior acquaintance with the accused or was not part of TIP.
iii. Prosecution must produce the best evidence (those who directly witnessed the act of pointing the weapon) or explain their absence.
iv. Arrest and seizure must be promptly recorded; seizure memos prepared without undue delay and exhibits sent timely for forensic tests.
v. Absence of recovery of looted articles and lack of forensic linkage weaken the case; such lacunae call for acquittal if identification remains doubtful.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is a robust application of evidence law safeguards in criminal trials. It reinforces that identification procedures serve corroborative not standalone roles and underlines the prosecution’s duty to present the best available witnesses. The Court’s insistence on testing TIP-based identification by calling the identifying witnesses and on scrutinising police narratives about arrest and recovery is salutary for fair trial guarantees.

Practically, the decision cautions trial courts against mechanically accepting dock identifications and police testimony where procedural lapses (non-production of TIP witnesses, delayed seizure memos, delayed forensic examination) exist. For prosecutors, the case underscores the need for meticulous documentation and early forensic steps; for defence practitioners it provides potent ammunition to challenge identification and recovery where evidentiary holes persist.

Academically, the ruling harmonises with precedents that a TIP must be capable of being tested in court and that corroboration is essential to displace reasonable doubt. The acquittal on cumulative deficiencies demonstrates the Court’s fidelity to the principle that benefit of doubt must always go to the accused where proofs are equivocal.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1971) 2 SCC 715; [1972] 1 SCR 627.

2. Hari Nath & Anr. v. State of U.P., (1988) 1 SCC 14; [1988] 1 SCR 848.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 395, 397).

2. Arms Act, 1959 (Section 25).

3. Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 9 — on facts necessary to explain or introduce).