The case of W.H. King v. Republic of India and Another (1952 SCR 418) addresses the crucial interpretational scope of Section 19 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The appellant, W.H. King, was convicted under Section 19(2) for allegedly receiving “pugree” money in exchange for relinquishing possession of his rented flat. However, the core issue revolved around whether such a transaction amounted to a “relinquishment” of tenancy as prohibited under Section 19(1). The Supreme Court underscored the principle of strict construction in penal statutes and clarified the conceptual distinction between assignment and relinquishment of tenancy. It held that King’s act did not amount to relinquishment since the possession was not returned to the landlord, but handed over to a third party under an assignment-like agreement. Hence, it acquitted the appellant, stating that the essential element for invoking penal liability under Section 19(2) was missing. The Court’s judgment offers rich legal insights on landlord-tenant jurisprudence, strict statutory interpretation, and the evolving scope of tenancy transfer laws.

Keywords: Relinquishment of Tenancy, Assignment of Lease, Bombay Rent Act, Penal Statutes, Pugree, Section 19, Supreme Court, Strict Construction, Landlord-Tenant Law, Transfer of Tenancy

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: W.H. King v. Republic of India and Another

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1951

iii) Judgement Date: 1st February, 1952

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, and N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vii) Citation: AIR 1952 SC 156, 1952 SCR 418

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 19(1) & 19(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: Judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1950

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Tenancy Law, Interpretation of Statutes, Property Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment in this case marks a significant exposition of the interpretative approach to criminal liability under rent control legislation. The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 was introduced as a welfare statute to protect tenants from unscrupulous practices, including illegal demands for “pugree” as a condition to vacate rental premises. The criminal prosecution of W.H. King, a tenant alleged to have received such a payment, brought into question the scope of the term “relinquishment” in Section 19. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether handing over possession to a third party for consideration without landlord’s involvement constituted relinquishment warranting penal action. The decision eventually reversed the High Court’s conviction and clarified that penal laws must be narrowly construed, with an emphasis on legislative precision rather than presumed intent[1].

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

W.H. King was a tenant of Flat No. 3 in Ganga Vihar, Marine Drive, Bombay. He intended to travel to the United Kingdom for medical treatment and negotiated with one Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia to allow him to occupy the flat. It was alleged by the prosecution that King demanded Rs. 29,500 as “pugree” for vacating the premises and an additional Rs. 2,000 for the furniture. The transactions were confirmed through a sting operation executed by the police on 4th December 1948, in which the complainant, Bhatia, and a disguised Sub-Inspector handed over the money to King. King also handed over keys, possession of the flat, and documents including a typed letter of possession and furniture receipt.

He was charged under Section 18(1) and Section 19(2) of the Act. The Presidency Magistrate convicted him under Section 19(2), sentencing him to a day’s imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 30,000. The Bombay High Court upheld the conviction, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court[2].

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether handing over possession to a third party for consideration amounts to “relinquishment of tenancy” under Section 19(1) of the Bombay Rent Act?

ii. Whether a criminal conviction under Section 19(2) is sustainable in absence of relinquishment to the landlord?

iii. How should penal statutes be interpreted — narrowly or broadly?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that King’s act constituted an assignment and not a relinquishment. They stressed that relinquishment, by definition and legal understanding, required surrender to the landlord. They relied on Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and emphasized that relinquishment could not be unilateral or in favour of third parties. King’s letter (Exhibit D) indicated no surrender to the landlord but a transfer of possession and rent obligations to the third party, i.e., the complainant. Thus, no offence under Section 19(1) could be made out[3].

They further argued that the penal nature of Section 19(2) demanded a strict construction. The definition of relinquishment must not be expanded beyond its plain and literal meaning. They also emphasized the principle from Tuck v. Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629, which mandates strict interpretation of criminal statutes[4].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that King’s act, in substance, was a relinquishment cloaked as an assignment. They argued that the purpose of Section 19 was to prevent profiteering through eviction, regardless of formal labels. The term “relinquishment” must be interpreted broadly to include any act of vacating for a consideration. They emphasized legislative intent to curb exploitation of tenants, referencing Section 18 and 19’s place in the broader statutory scheme.

They contended that the difference between relinquishment and assignment was technical and should not obstruct justice. They also cited the object of the Act and invoked the doctrine of purposive interpretation, referring to Heydon’s Rule, urging the Court to interpret the statute in light of the mischief it sought to prevent[5].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 19(1) – “It shall not be lawful for the tenant or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the tenant to claim or receive any sum or any consideration as a condition for the relinquishment of his tenancy of any premises.”

ii. Section 19(2) – “Any tenant or person who in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) receives any sum or consideration shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment…”

iii. Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – regarding lessee’s right to transfer lease.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that there is a vital distinction between assignment and relinquishment. Relinquishment involves surrender to the landlord, which was absent here. In relinquishment, tenancy rights are extinguished and the lessor regains possession. In contrast, assignment allows transfer to another without the lessor’s involvement.

The Court emphasized that penal statutes like Section 19 must be strictly construed. Legislative language alone binds courts — not assumptions of intent. The Act criminalized relinquishment for money, not assignments. Therefore, no offence under Section 19(1) was made out, and King’s conviction under Section 19(2) failed. Thus, the Court reversed the conviction and ordered refund of the fine[6].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court observed that relinquishment does not occur unless possession returns to the landlord. Even if abandonment occurs, it is not relinquishment unless formal surrender takes place. Additionally, misuse of criminal law under regulatory statutes should be avoided through precise interpretation.

c. GUIDELINES 

The judgment did not lay down formal guidelines. However, it clarified interpretative principles:

• Penal laws must be strictly construed.

• Assignment and relinquishment are not synonymous.

• Words in penal statutes must reflect actual legislative language, not inferred legislative objectives.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case is a landmark in the criminal interpretation of tenancy laws under welfare statutes. It affirms the rights of tenants and ensures that only conduct strictly within the prohibited ambit of the law incurs penal consequences. By drawing a firm distinction between relinquishment and assignment, the Court protected tenants from undue criminal liability based on loosely interpreted statutes. It reinforced that intention alone cannot create criminal culpability in absence of precise statutory language. The decision remains a foundational authority on statutory construction, especially in criminal cases involving landlord-tenant relationships.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Tuck v. Priester, (1887) 19 QBD 629
[2] State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318
[3] Heydon’s Case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637
[4] W.H. King v. Republic of India and Another, AIR 1952 SC 156; 1952 SCR 418
[5] R v. Peters, (1886) 16 QBD 636
[6] Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., p. 529

b. Important Statutes Referred

[1] Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, [Section 19(1) & 19(2)] – Link
[2] Transfer of Property Act, 1882, [Section 108(j)] – Link
[3] Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Principles of criminal jurisprudence indirectly relevant
[4] Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Relevance of circumstantial evidence and documentary evidence