A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1713–1720 of 2025) concerns the scope and exercise of the court’s power under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to summon persons not originally arraigned as accused where evidence produced during trial points to their complicity. The appellant (informant) alleged a brutal homicide of his brother; the FIR named several private persons as being present at the scene.

A Special Investigation Team (SIT) later reported no incriminating material against some private respondents, and the High Court set aside a Trial Court order summoning those private respondents under Section 319.

The Supreme Court, after reviewing authorities including Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, held that:

(i) the SIT’s negative findings do not fetter the court’s power under Section 319,

(ii) evidence given in examination-in-chief before the trial court even if untested by cross-examination is evidence for the purposes of Section 319 and may ground the exercise of the power where the court is satisfied that stronger-than-mere-possibility material points to complicity, and

(iii) discretionary exercise of Section 319 must be sparing but not mechanically fettered by investigative findings.

On the facts, eyewitnesses had named the private respondents as present at the occurrence; the Supreme Court found the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion not arbitrary and set aside the High Court’s order, directing fresh summons.

Keywords: Section 319 CrPC; summons of additional accused; SIT; eyewitness testimony; prima facie satisfaction.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal tests the boundary between investigative conclusions and the court’s independent duty under Section 319 CrPC to call persons who appear from evidence adduced before the court to be involved in the offence. The case arises from the murder of the appellant’s brother and an FIR which, in the informant’s account, identified several persons present “in the light of the car.”

Political undertones (alleged rivalry; the deceased was a sitting sarpanch) prompted a Special Investigation Team to examine the matter; the SIT reported no evidence against certain private respondents. The Trial Court, after receipt of evidence in examination-in-chief, issued summons under Section 319. The High Court, placing weight on the SIT’s negative findings and perceived lacunae in prosecution evidence, set aside the summons.

The Supreme Court granted leave, considered the competing positions and the established jurisprudence on Section 319, and reviewed whether a trial court may proceed to summon additional persons notwithstanding investigative exoneration, when witness testimony in the trial itself names such persons.

The Court emphasised the duty of an adjudicatory court to ensure judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitor does not subvert the administration of justice, while maintaining that Section 319 is extraordinary and must be exercised with care.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The deceased was allegedly abducted from a vehicle at about 8:30 pm, forcibly removed from the car and murdered. The FIR lodged by the appellant named a group of persons claimed to have arrived in three cars as being present at the location and involved.

Initially the complaint described the occupants of the vehicle as the informant and the deceased; later during trial the informant (PW-1) stated that a third person (PW-2) had been travelling with them, a variation that prompted defence contention of story-building.

Two eyewitnesses close relatives of the deceased testified in examination-in-chief and named the private respondents as persons present at the scene. Given the sensitive political background, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted which, on investigation including CCTV analysis and other witness inquiries, concluded that the private respondents had no role and could not have been at the scene.

The Trial Court, having examined the evidence led in court, issued summons under Section 319 against the private respondents. The High Court, on revision, set aside that order giving weight to SIT’s conclusions and perceived inconsistencies, leading to the present appeal invoking the Court’s power to examine whether the High Court was justified in interfering with a Trial Court’s summons under Section 319.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a trial court can exercise power under Section 319 CrPC to summon persons not originally charge-sheeted when a SIT or investigating agency has found no evidence against them?
ii. What is the nature and quantum of evidence before the court necessary to form the requisite satisfaction to invoke Section 319?
iii. Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Trial Court’s summons in reliance upon investigative material (SIT report) and perceived inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The Trial Court formed a tentative but legitimate prima facie view based on eyewitness testimony given in examination-in-chief; such evidence suffices for the limited purpose of Section 319 and merits summoning the private respondents for a fair opportunity to defend.
ii. The SIT’s exculpatory conclusions, in a matter with political sensitivities, cannot bind the court where trial evidence points to possible complicity; the court must ensure truth-finding and cannot abdicate that duty to the investigating agency.
iii. Interference by the High Court at this preliminary stage would deny victims an opportunity to have the full chain of evidence tested and additional accused confronted and cross-examined, prolonging or precluding a complete fact-finding exercise.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. Power under Section 319 is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly; the test is higher than framing of charge and requires stronger evidence than mere possibility.
ii. Discrepancies e.g., the informant’s shifting account on the number of vehicle occupants and the SIT’s cogent exculpatory material (witnesses and CCTV) negate the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in-court to summon additional accused.
iii. Relying solely on untested statements of closely related witnesses would be inadequate and risk injustice; hence High Court’s interference was warranted to prevent a casual exercise of discretion.

H) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order and restored the Trial Court’s power to summon the private respondents, directing fresh summons. The Court surveyed binding precedents, notably Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (5-Judge), which elucidates that Section 319 embodies the principle judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitor and permits courts to summon persons where evidence before the court (including examination-in-chief) indicates involvement.

The Court restated that the word evidence must be read broadly to include material produced before the court and that waiting for cross-examination is not mandated before exercising Section 319, though the power remains discretionary and extraordinary.

The Court reconciled later authorities (Brijendra Singh, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, Sukhpal Singh Khaira) underscoring that the degree of satisfaction required is more than a prima facie framing threshold yet short of being satisfied to the extent of conviction; strong and cogent evidence emerging from trial-record must exist.

Applying law to fact: although the SIT reported no evidence against the private respondents, that investigative conclusion does not operate as a fetter on the court’s independent duty because Section 319 relies on evidence led before the court. Witnesses in court named the private respondents as present at the scene.

Balancing the hardship of summons against the prejudice of permitting potential culprits to go untried, the Court observed that it is less harmful to summon and allow full testing of evidence at trial than to foreclose examination. The Court cautioned that the Trial Court could have better articulated reasons but concluded the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion was not capricious, arbitrary or mechanical.

The Supreme Court therefore set aside the High Court’s order and remitted for fresh summons and appropriate trial procedure. The Court left all merits open for trial and directed the Trial Court to make efforts to secure attendance of summoned persons if they fail to appear.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The controlling ratio is that a court may exercise the extraordinary power under Section 319 CrPC on the basis of evidence appearing before the court, including untested examination-in-chief, if such evidence read holistically and with supporting material is strong and cogent enough to indicate that another person not arraigned may be tried for the offence.

Investigative exculpation (e.g., SIT findings) does not automatically prevent the court from exercising Section 319, since the court’s duty to do justice requires independent appraisal of trial evidence. The quantum required lies between a mere possibility and near-certainty of conviction effectively a standard more exacting than framing of charge but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed in obiter that while Section 319 is discretionary and extraordinary, procedural fairness must be preserved: a person once summoned has statutory rights to a fresh trial and to cross-examine witnesses; where a superior court in revisional jurisdiction acts prejudicially, the proposed accused must be afforded hearing.

The Court also underscored the prosecutorial duty of the State and commented critically on State’s absence in the appeal. It reiterated the salutary principle that reason must be recorded for judicial conclusions and noted institutional pressures on trial judges without excusing inadequate reasoning.

c. GUIDELINES 

1. Section 319 power may be exercised only by a court (not an investigating officer) and must be grounded in evidence produced before that court.

2. The evidence basis may include examination-in-chief even if untested by cross-examination.

3. The threshold is higher than framing a charge — strong and cogent material is required, but it need not be proof warranting conviction.

4. Investigative exoneration (e.g., SIT report) does not automatically preclude exercise of Section 319; court must independently assess trial evidence.

5. Orders summoning additional accused must be accompanied by reasoned recording; judicial reasoning is essential.

6. If a superior court’s revisional order prejudices a proposed accused, opportunity of hearing must be afforded.

7. Summoning should be done before conclusion of trial (judgment/sentence) to preserve Section 319 power.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision reaffirms the central role of the adjudicatory court in criminal truth-finding and prevents mechanistic reliance on investigative reports where in-court evidence points to additional culpability. The Court strikes a principled balance: preserving the exceptional and cautious use of Section 319 while ensuring that exculpatory investigative findings do not operate as a legal bar when trial evidence says otherwise.

Practically, the judgment compels trial courts to carefully record reasons, evaluate in-court testimony in context, and, where justified, summon additional persons so that every link in the chain of culpability can be tested. The judgment is salutary for victims seeking comprehensive adjudication and preserves procedural protections for those newly summoned by ensuring their statutory trial rights.

The case will guide trial and revisional courts on the interface between investigation and judicial fact-finding under Section 319 and will likely temper premature quashing of summonses where trial evidence, properly appraised, points to other participants.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; [2014] 2 SCR 1.

2. Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706; [2017] 3 SCR 374.

3. Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 12 SCC 608; [2021] 6 SCR 219.

4. Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289; [2022] 10 SCR 156.

5. Ramkrishna Forgings Ltd. v. Ravindra Loonkar, (2024) 2 SCC 122; [2023] 16 SCR 672.

6. Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 506.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 319.