A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

In State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, the Supreme Court evaluated the decision of the Delhi High Court granting default bail to the respondent under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). This case pertains to the interpretation of provisions under Section 43D(2)(b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), which allows for an extension of the investigation period in cases involving terrorist activities. The primary issue was whether the Delhi High Court erred in granting bail based on a precedent under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) rather than applying the distinct standards under UAPA. The Supreme Court, emphasizing the legal distinction between UAPA and TADA, set aside the High Court’s order, reinstating the custody of the accused to facilitate further investigation. The Court highlighted procedural adherence under UAPA, particularly the requirements for extended detention due to the complex nature of terrorism investigations.

Keywords: Default Bail, Section 167(2) CrPC, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Terrorist Activities, Judicial Custody.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgment Cause Title: State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2024
iii) Judgment Date: 3 January 2024
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Hon’ble Justices Vikram Nath and Rajesh Bindal
vi) Author: Justice Vikram Nath
vii) Citation: [2024] 1 S.C.R. 73 : 2024 INSC 11
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 167(2) CrPC, Sections 13, 18, 20, 45(1), 45(2), 43D(2)(b) of UAPA; Sections 201, 120-B IPC; Sections 25, 54, 59 of the Arms Act, 1959
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None
x) Related Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Terrorism Law, Bail Law, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The case emerged from the ongoing criminal investigations involving alleged terrorism activities under UAPA, involving the respondent, Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely. Following his arrest under Sections 13, 18, and 20 of UAPA, along with sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Arms Act, the respondent’s bail application led to significant legal discourse on procedural requirements for default bail. The High Court granted bail citing a precedent under TADA, which the Supreme Court deemed inapplicable to UAPA’s procedural framework for terrorism-related cases. This case analysis addresses the Supreme Court’s reasoning and procedural clarifications under UAPA.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Arrest and Charges: On 18 June 2020, Raj Kumar was arrested following an FIR (No. 154 of 2020), filed on 16 June 2020 at the Special Cell, New Delhi. He was accused under UAPA, IPC, and the Arms Act for alleged terrorist activities.

2. Extension of Investigation Period: The initial 90-day investigation period was nearing expiration on 15 September 2020. On 11 September 2020, the Investigating Officer sought and obtained an extension of two months, extending the deadline to 11 November 2020.

3. Further Extension and Legal Challenges: Before the 11 November deadline, the Public Prosecutor requested another 30-day extension on 7 November 2020 under Section 43D(2)(b) of UAPA, which was granted by the Trial Court. Despite these extensions, Raj Kumar applied for default bail on 11 November, which the Trial Court denied on 17 November 2020. The Delhi High Court subsequently granted bail, leading to the present appeal by the State.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the Delhi High Court erred in granting default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC by relying on inapplicable TADA precedents rather than the specific provisions under UAPA?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

1. Misapplication of TADA Precedent: The appellant argued that the High Court erred by relying on the judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [(1994) 4 SCC 602], which was grounded in TADA, not UAPA. The UAPA allows for specific and broader grounds for extending the investigation period beyond the standard 90 days, unlike TADA.

2. Statutory Provisions Under UAPA: The State submitted that Section 43D(2)(b) of UAPA permits up to 180 days for investigation if justified by progress and specific reasons, which were duly presented in the application for extension.

3. Pending Sanctions and FSL Report: The extension was warranted due to pending sanctions under Section 45(2) of UAPA from GNCTD and results from the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), which were necessary for the investigation’s conclusion.

4. Gravity of Allegations and National Security Concerns: The State highlighted the serious implications of the alleged terrorism activities involving cross-border connections, which demanded thorough investigation without premature release of the accused.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

1. Delay in Investigation: The respondent’s counsel argued that the delay in investigation, despite two extensions, indicated a lack of progress and should entitle the respondent to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC.

2. Applicability of TADA Precedents: It was contended that TADA precedents should apply since both TADA and UAPA relate to terrorism and extraordinary offenses, thereby justifying reliance on the Hitendra Vishnu Thakur precedent.

3. Procedural Deficiency in Seeking Extensions: The defense claimed procedural deficiencies in the extension applications, arguing that the extensions were sought without adequate justifications and should not have been granted.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 167(2): Governs the period for investigation, beyond which default bail applies if no charge sheet is filed.
2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 43D(2)(b): Allows for up to 180 days for investigation if the court is satisfied with the Public Prosecutor’s report on progress and specific detention reasons.
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 201, 120-B: Punishes conspiracy and concealment of offenses.
4. Arms Act, 1959 – Sections 25, 54, 59: Governs offenses related to unauthorized possession and use of arms.

I) JUDGMENT

a. Ratio Decidendi

1. Inapplicability of TADA Precedents: The Court held that TADA precedents were irrelevant to UAPA, as Section 43D(2)(b) of UAPA allows extended detention with specific reasons. The High Court’s reliance on TADA-based cases like Hitendra Vishnu Thakur was misplaced.

2. Justification for Extended Investigation Period: The Supreme Court emphasized that the application for extension met UAPA’s criteria, with the Public Prosecutor citing valid reasons such as pending sanctions and essential FSL results.

3. Importance of Judicial Scrutiny in Terrorism Cases: The judgment reinforced that UAPA investigations often require prolonged periods due to their complex nature and national security implications, necessitating judicial discretion on extensions beyond the CrPC standard.

b. Obiter Dicta

The Court underscored the importance of procedural compliance and the necessity of balancing individual rights with collective security in terrorism cases. It noted that premature bail in such cases could adversely impact national security interests.

c. Guidelines (if any)

1. Distinct Approach for UAPA Cases: The Court clarified that UAPA’s procedural framework, particularly under Section 43D(2)(b), requires a distinct judicial approach and cannot be governed by precedents from TADA or other non-terrorism-specific statutes.
2. Judicial Oversight on Extension of Detention: Courts must diligently review the progress and necessity of investigation extensions in terrorism cases, given the high public interest in effective legal proceedings against terrorism.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 – Distinguished.
2. State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling, (2019) 5 SCC 178 – Applied.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 167(2).
2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 13, 18, 20, 43D(2)(b).
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 201, 120-B.
4. Arms