Author- Vanshika Dhiman, Amity University, Haryana

KEYWORDS:

Section 376(2)(h) of the Indian Penal Code, the victim’s pregnancy, corroboration, penalties, rape.

CASE DETAILS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

“Rape as characterized under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 is to have been executed when a man had sexual intercourse with a female under the following conditions–

1. Against her will
2. Without the individual’s assent
3. With one’s assent which is achieved by posing fear of death or hurt
4. With her assent, in a circumstance wherein consent is given because she believes that he is a man to whom she is or believes herself to be legally wedded
5. With consent obtained due to unsoundness of mind or inebriation or the administration using any stupefying or unwholesome substance, which disables her to comprehend the nature and outcomes of that to which she gives”[4]

Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code outlines the penalties for rape, stipulating a minimum imprisonment of seven years, which can extend to life imprisonment or up to ten years, along with a fine. Notably, this provision does not apply when the victim is the man’s wife and over twelve years of age. Subsection (2) specifies aggravating circumstances that warrant a minimum sentence of ten years, including under Section 376(2)(h), which addresses rape committed against a woman known to be pregnant. In this case, the primary question is whether the accused had knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy and the importance of discussions regarding the necessity of corroborating the victim’s testimony in cases of rape and other sexual offences.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The police of Sursa arrested Ram Saran,(the victim’s husband) on March 9, 1985, and the challan was submitted to the court on the same day. The accused, Om Prakash, who was related to the victim’s parents, met them in the court. Jaipal, who was the brother of Ram, along with the victim, were discussing Ram Saran’s bail. After some time, Om Prakash sent Jaipal to check if the challan had arrived or not. It was around 3:00 p.m. when the accused forcibly subdued the victim and began to assault her in the veranda of the Zila Parishad near the court. When the victim screamed for help, Jaipal and Ram Lal rushed to the place of the incident, they intervened, and physically confronted Om Prakash, apprehending him in the act. The accused was then taken to the police station after the incident occurred. The victim also provided a real statement regarding the incident. The entry about the case was made in the general diary and the case was registered. The victim and accused underwent internal examinations as part of the investigation. Charges were framed against Om Prakash under Section 376 IPC. Chief Judicial Magistrate of Hardoi committed the case to the Sessions Court for further proceedings.

After the bench of Allahabad High Court, Lucknow heard the case, the accused filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of India for a review of the High Court’s judgment.

NOTE: The court did not disclose the ivictim’sidentity by Section 228-A of the IPC, which prohibits the identification of victims in certain sexual offences (specifically Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C, and 376-D). Therefore, throughout this judgment, the victim is referred to simply as ‘the victim’ to uphold this important principle.

LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 

The petitioner challenged the legal validity of the judgment issued by the learned single judge bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow. The judgment upheld the appellant’s conviction of the accused under Section 376(2)(h) of the IPC, 1860, as well as the sentence of 10 years imprisonment that was imposed on him.

PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

ACCUSED’S HAVE BEEN FALSELY IMPLICATED

1. It was submitted by the counsel for Petitioner that, the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). The accused alleged that he had been implicated due to enmity. He stated that he had come from the village along with the brother of the victim and other individuals to take certain steps. It was also mentioned by him that some attempts had been made at the police station during the night, and money had been taken for that purpose. When the challan arrived, they had gotten down at into a quarrel had occurred between the accused, Jaipal, and the father of the victim regarding the refund of money. The accused was assaulted, and he claimed that he had been implicated in the criminal case.

CHARGES FRAMED ARE BASELESS

1. It was submitted by the counsel for Petitioner that the charges against their client are baseless and non-justiciable. The petitioner, being a relative of the victim, was present at the Zila Parishad to assist the victim’s husband in securing bail for a challan case. It is not believable that he would have dared to commit such an act, especially in the presence of others and in broad daylight. The counsel deems it to be baseless to present such unsupported arguments before the court. In light of these circumstances, the elements required under Section 376(2)(e) have not been proven.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

CONVICTION BASED ON VICTIM’S TESTIMONY

1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that, in rape cases, the victim’s testimony alone is enough for conviction, and no further corroboration of evidence is needed.

ACCUSED WAS AWARE THAT THE VICTIM WAS PREGNANT

1. The counsel for Respondent submitted that it is beyond doubt that the accused was aware of the victim’s six-month pregnancy. Thus, the accused was in a position to overpower the victim’s will.

EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

• Jaipal, the brother of Ram Saran, was an eyewitness to the incident. As he was present during the occurrence of the incident, his statement should be considered essential in the conviction of the accused.

RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. “S.376(2)(h) of Indian Penal Code, 1860”
2. “S.228-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860”
3. “S.313 of Criminal Procedure code, 1973”
4. “S.114 Illustration (b) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872”

JUDGEMENT

The appeal is dismissed with the sentence modified, reducing it from 10 years to 7 years.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Sub-section (2) of Section 376 stipulates that certain cases of rape are punishable with more stringent punishment. One of the categories that attracts a more stringent punishment is rape committed on a pregnant woman. In such cases, it must be proved by the prosecution that the accused knew the victim was pregnant for Section 376(2)(h) to apply. In the present case, no such evidence was presented. It was concluded by the Trial Court that there was a “full possibility” that the accused knew of the victim’s pregnancy. However, a significant difference exists between possibility and certainty. In cases falling under Section 376(2)(h), what must be established is whether knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy was possessed by the accused. A mere possibility of knowledge is considered insufficient. Given the serious nature of the offence, which is prescribed to carry a more severe sentence, it must be conclusively proven, rather than inferred as a possibility. The language of Section 376(2)(h) is clear in requiring that it be established by the prosecution that the accused knew the victim was pregnant, as indicated by the phrase “knowing her to be pregnant.” This is conceptually distinct from the possibility or probability of knowledge. Positive evidence must be adduced by the prosecution to demonstrate the accused’s knowledge. In the absence of such evidence, Section 376(2)(e) cannot be applied. Therefore, the judgments of the Courts below are considered unsustainable in this regard. However, the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 376(1) IPC is deemed applicable.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This landmark case highlights two crucial perspectives. On one hand, sexual offences are among the most heinous crimes, causing irreparable physical and emotional harm to victims and society. Consequently, perpetrators must face stringent penalties.

On the other hand, the judiciary must remain vigilant about potential misuse of the law. The absence of medical evidence, in this instance, raises concerns about false accusations, which can have devastating consequences for the accused and hinder the judicial process. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on trusting the victim’s testimony, while requiring corroboration only when necessary, marks a significant milestone in India’s pursuit of justice for sexual offence victims.

ENDNOTES:

[1] Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), S.376(2)(h), S.228-A

[2] Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (2 of 1974), S.313

[3] Indian Evidence Act 1872 (1 of 1872), S.114

[4] Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), S.375