A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai and Others (AIR 1953 SC 228) deliberated upon the legal sanctity and necessity of issuing a notice in writing under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in the context of a lease executed prior to the enforcement of the Act. The case revolved around a clause in a pre-1882 lease, which provided that the lessee’s rights would automatically terminate upon default in payment of rent. The appellant-lessee, having defaulted multiple times in paying rent, sought relief against forfeiture under Section 114 of the same Act. The core legal questions were whether a notice of forfeiture was necessary in such a context, and whether equitable relief against repeated defaults could still be granted.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement of a written notice under Section 111(g), introduced through the 1929 amendment, does not embody a principle of justice, equity, or good conscience, and therefore, is not applicable to leases executed before 1st April 1930. The Court ruled that the lease had determined automatically upon breach, and the institution of a suit for ejectment sufficiently demonstrated the lessor’s intention to enforce forfeiture. The appeal was dismissed as the lessee had chronically defaulted, and the lower courts rightly refused equitable relief.

Keywords: Forfeiture of lease, Section 111(g) TPA, Notice of termination, Justice equity and good conscience, Relief against forfeiture, Pre-1930 leases

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai and Others

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1952

iii) Judgement Date: 27 February 1953

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Mehr Chand Mahajan, S.R. Das JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan

vii) Citation: AIR 1953 SC 228; 1953 SCR 1009

viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 111(g) and Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Pre-1930 leases; Equity principles

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): Disapproved decisions include Umar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther (AIR 1947 Mad 68), Brahmayya v. Sundaramma (AIR 1948 Mad 275), and Tatya Savla Sudrik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay (52 Bom. L.R. 909)

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Civil Law, Property Law, Contract Law, Equity and Estoppel

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The origins of the dispute trace back to a permanent lease executed in 1863 by Ramabai, who leased two parcels of land in Mundhava, Poona, to Ladha Ibrahim Sheth, who then assigned the lease to Girdhari Balaram Lodhi in 1870. The terms of the lease included an automatic termination clause upon failure to pay rent. The legal conflict arose over repeated non-payment of rent by Girdhari’s descendants, especially Namdeo Lokman Lodhi, culminating in a suit for eviction filed in 1941, marking the fifth such legal episode over defaults.

The pivotal issue was whether, despite the clause of nullity in the lease, a formal notice under Section 111(g) was necessary to determine the lease. The appeal to the Supreme Court followed concurrent rulings by the Trial Court, the District Judge, and the High Court of Bombay, all of whom had held against the lessee, affirming the termination of the lease and denying equitable relief.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On 1st July 1863, Ramabai executed a permanent lease of two inam lands—later known as Survey Nos. 86/1 and 86/2—to Ladha Ibrahim Sheth for a lump sum and annual rent. The lease had an explicit forfeiture clause stating that upon non-payment of rent, the tenant would forfeit all rights to the property.

On 18th August 1870, Sheth sold his lease rights to Girdhari Balaram Lodhi. Girdhari executed a rent note, which reaffirmed the forfeiture clause. From 1913 onwards, the lessee, now represented by his descendants, repeatedly defaulted on the rent. In at least five separate instances, suits were filed for eviction and arrears, including suits in 1913, 1928, 1931, 1934, and 1938. In each case, despite established default, the courts granted equitable relief, allowing the tenant to continue occupancy.

Finally, in 1941, another default led to the institution of Suit No. 858 of 1941, seeking possession and removal of the tenant’s structures. The Trial Court and both appellate courts held in favour of the landlord, stating that the lease had determined by breach, and no written notice was needed.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a notice in writing as contemplated under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary to terminate a lease executed prior to 1st April 1930?

ii) Whether equitable relief under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act should be granted to a tenant with a long history of defaults in rent payment?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Section 111(g) requires a notice in writing from the lessor before enforcing forfeiture. They contended that this rule reflects principles of equity and fair play, and must apply even to leases executed before 1930, relying heavily on Umar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther (AIR 1947 Mad 68).

They further argued that the clause in the lease was not self-executing and needed a formal act of determination, as highlighted in English cases such as Roberts v. Davey (110 E.R. 606). They invoked justice, equity, and good conscience, contending that the amendment of 1929 to Section 111(g) should be applied retrospectively, or at least as a declaratory principle.

Lastly, they argued for relief under Section 114, citing decisions like Debendralal Khan v. F.M.A. Cohen (ILR 54 Cal 485) and Appaya Shetty v. Mohamed Beary (ILR 39 Mad 834), which held that courts must lean in favour of equitable relief where rent was tendered before judgment.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the lease itself contained a clause of nullity upon default in payment of rent, and hence no further notice was required. They emphasized that Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, as amended in 1929, applied only to leases executed post-April 1930, by virtue of Section 63 of the Amending Act, and hence was not applicable.

They relied on English and Indian precedents that recognised institution of the suit itself as a valid expression of the landlord’s intention to determine the lease, including Toleman v. Portbury (LR 6 QB 245), Prakash Chandra Das v. Rajendra Nath Basu (ILR 58 Cal 1359), and Rama Aiyangar v. Guruswami Chetty (35 MLJ 129).

They argued that the lessee was a chronic defaulter, with a pattern of deliberate non-compliance. They emphasized that courts had previously granted equitable relief thrice, and continued leniency would defeat the very essence of contractual and property rights.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Termination of lease on breach and lessor’s written notice (applicable only post-1930):
Read provision on Indian Kanoon

ii) Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent:
Read provision on Indian Kanoon

iii) Section 63 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 – Savings clause restricting retrospective operation of the amendment.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the requirement of written notice under Section 111(g) is purely statutory and not a principle of equity or justice, and therefore does not apply to leases executed prior to 1st April 1930. The clause of nullity in the lease stood by itself, and institution of the suit was sufficient to indicate the lessor’s intention to enforce forfeiture.

ii) The Court noted that principles of equity are constant, and cannot vary on a legislative date. Therefore, the 1929 amendment cannot be applied retrospectively on the pre-TPA leases.

iii) The Court reiterated that equitable relief under Section 114 must be judged case-by-case and refused to grant such relief to a tenant with habitual defaults and false defences.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court warned against applying every provision of the Transfer of Property Act as an embodiment of equity. Some provisions are procedural or technical and cannot be enforced retroactively or in areas excluded from the Act.

c. GUIDELINES (IF ANY)

• A tenant under a pre-1930 lease cannot claim a right to notice in writing before forfeiture.

• Institution of the suit is sufficient to show the lessor’s intention.

• Relief under Section 114 is not automatic; the Court retains full discretion and must assess the tenant’s conduct and past litigation history.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Namdeo Lokman Lodhi serves as a cornerstone decision on the interpretation of Section 111(g), particularly regarding retrospectivity and equitable applicability. It underscores a strict interpretation of forfeiture clauses in pre-TPA leases, upholding the contractual sanctity of lease terms, while reserving equity-based relief only for those who demonstrate clean conduct and good faith. The decision disapproves of judicial leniency in the face of chronic defaulters, and reinforces that legal rights must be exercised with responsibility.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred:

1. Toleman v. Portbury, LR 6 QB 245 [1]

2. Prakash Chandra Das v. Rajendra Nath Basu, ILR 58 Cal 1359 [2]

3. Rama Aiyangar v. Guruswami Chetty, 35 MLJ 129 [3]

4. Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto, ILR 42 Mad 654 [4]

5. Umar Pulavar v. Dawood Rowther, AIR 1947 Mad 68 (Disapproved) [5]

6. Brahmayya v. Sundaramma, AIR 1948 Mad 275 (Disapproved) [6]

7. Tatya Savla Sudrik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay, 52 Bom. L.R. 909 (Disapproved) [7]

8. Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratanlal, 57 I.A. 173 [8]

9. Muhammad Raza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi, 59 I.A. 236 [9]

10. Roberts v. Davey, 110 E.R. 606 [10]

11. Debendralal Khan v. F.M.A. Cohen, ILR 54 Cal 485 [11]

12. Appaya Shetty v. Mohamed Beary, ILR 39 Mad 834 [12]

b. Important Statutes Referred:

1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 111(g) and 114

2. Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 – Section 63