A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others (1959) dealt with a profound constitutional dilemma involving the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955, and its compatibility with the subsequently enacted Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956. The appellants, who were private bus operators, challenged the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act which authorized the State Government to nationalize certain transport routes, excluding private players from operating on them. The case raised important constitutional questions about legislative competence under Articles 245, 246, and 254, interpretation of Article 13(2) and the doctrine of eclipse. The appellants contended that the enactment of the Central amendment Act rendered the State law void under Article 254 of the Constitution due to repugnancy. Additionally, they argued that the Uttar Pradesh Act violated their fundamental right to property under Article 31 as it stood before the Fourth Amendment. The Court, delivering a divided opinion, upheld the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act, applying both the doctrine of eclipse and the principle of repugnancy under Article 254. The majority held that while the Act remained operative for schemes framed before the Central Act, the General Clauses Act would preserve the schemes already implemented even if the State law were rendered void subsequently. The case remains a landmark exposition on constitutional law principles such as repugnancy, legislative competence, and constitutional invalidity.

Keywords: Legislative Competence, Repugnancy, Doctrine of Eclipse, Article 13(2), Article 254, Fundamental Rights, Article 31, Constitutional Amendment, Motor Vehicle Nationalisation, State and Central Legislation Conflict.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others

ii) Case Number:
Civil Appeals Nos. 380-385, 387-389, 391-399, 401, 429, 431-434 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date:
January 15, 1959

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
S.R. Das, C.J.; N.H. Bhagwati, B.P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, JJ.

vi) Author:
S.R. Das, C.J. (for himself and Sinha, J.) and Subba Rao, J. (for Bhagwati, Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ.)

vii) Citation:
[1959] Supp (1) SCR 8

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 13, 31, 245, 246, 254 of Constitution of India

• Section 11(5) of U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 (Act IX of 1955)

• Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act 100 of 1956)

• Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Transport Law, Statutory Interpretation, Conflict of Laws

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The litigation emerged from the Uttar Pradesh Government’s attempt to nationalize road transport services by enacting the Uttar Pradesh Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955. The law was designed to eliminate private bus operators from specified routes and replace them with state-run transport. While private operators had long held permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the new legislation sought to curtail their operations. The central conflict arose when Parliament subsequently enacted the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956, inserting Chapter IV-A to regulate nationalisation uniformly across India. The petitioners challenged the State law’s constitutionality, arguing repugnancy with the Central law, breach of Article 31’s protection on property rights, and conflict with Article 13(2)’s prohibition on infringing fundamental rights.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants were long-standing private stage carriage operators in Uttar Pradesh holding permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Uttar Pradesh legislature passed the U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 after receiving Presidential assent on April 23, 1955. Under Section 3 of the Act, the State Government issued a notification on May 17, 1955, reserving multiple routes exclusively for government-run buses. Objections were invited under Section 5, hearings were conducted, and a final notification under Section 8 was issued on June 23, 1956. Thereafter, the appellants were prohibited from plying buses on those routes and offered alternative routes instead.

Subsequently, Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956, which inserted Chapter IV-A into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, creating a uniform national framework for transport nationalisation.

The appellants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court challenging the validity of the U.P. Act and related notifications. The High Court dismissed the petitions. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court under Articles 132 and 133.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 became void due to repugnancy under Article 254(1) after the enactment of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956.

ii) Whether the scheme framed under the U.P. Act was rendered inoperative by Section 68B of the Central Amendment Act.

iii) Whether the U.P. Act violated Article 31 of the Constitution as it stood before the Fourth Amendment for failure to provide adequate compensation.

iv) Whether the doctrine of eclipse applied to a post-Constitution law infringing fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 13(2).

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that

The appellants contended that the U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 became wholly void after the enactment of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956, invoking Article 254(1). They argued that both enactments occupied the same legislative field—nationalisation of motor transport—and the latter, being a Central law, superseded the former, rendering it invalid to the extent of repugnancy.

Secondly, the appellants submitted that Section 68B of the Central Amendment Act overrode any previous schemes framed under the U.P. Act, as it explicitly stated that schemes inconsistent with Chapter IV-A shall not have any force.

Thirdly, the appellants alleged a violation of Article 31. They argued that their permits represented property rights in commercial undertakings. The State Act effectively expropriated their business without providing compensation as mandated under Article 31(2) prior to its amendment by the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955.

Additionally, they contended that as the U.P. Act was passed post-Constitution, Article 13(2) applied squarely. Any law infringing fundamental rights was void ab initio and incapable of revival even if the Constitution was later amended to remove the violation. They relied on American constitutional jurisprudence discussed in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and Willoughby’s Constitution of the United States, which assert that unconstitutional laws are void from inception.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The State defended the constitutional validity of the U.P. Act by asserting that it was enacted with Presidential assent under Article 254(2). Therefore, even if there was any repugnancy with a Central law, it was valid at the time of its enactment.

The respondents argued that the constitutional limitation under Article 31(2) was removed by the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, before the scheme was finally notified. Therefore, the Act did not violate property rights as the scheme involved no transfer of ownership requiring compensation post-amendment.

They further argued that the doctrine of eclipse, as enunciated in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1955) 2 SCR 589], applied even to post-Constitution laws. The respondents contended that laws which initially infringed fundamental rights but became constitutional following an amendment could revive without fresh legislative action.

Relying on John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rahrer (1891) 140 U.S. 545 and Carter v. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1942) 66 C.L.R. 557, they emphasized that laws dormant due to constitutional limitations could operate once the impediment was removed.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India: Voidness of laws inconsistent with fundamental rights.

ii) Article 31 (before Fourth Amendment): Right to property and compensation for acquisition.

iii) Article 245 & 246 of the Constitution: Legislative competence.

iv) Article 254 of the Constitution: Repugnancy between State and Central laws.

v) Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897: Saving of rights and obligations upon repeal.

vi) Section 11(5) of U.P. Act IX of 1955: Compensation provision.

vii) Section 68B of Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956: Supremacy of Central schemes.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955. The majority, speaking through Subba Rao, J., held that:

• The State Act was not void under Article 254(1). Repugnancy arises only where both laws occupy the same field and conflict directly. Since the Central law was not retrospective, the schemes framed before the amendment remained valid.

• Even assuming repugnancy, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act protected schemes framed under the State Act before the Central law’s enactment.

• The U.P. Act did not violate Article 31, as the scheme involved no transfer of property ownership, thereby not attracting compensation provisions post-Fourth Amendment.

• Article 13(2) prohibits making laws infringing fundamental rights. Any law made contrary to this provision is void ab initio. However, by virtue of the Fourth Amendment, the infirmity was cured before the final scheme was notified, keeping the U.P. Act constitutionally intact.

b. OBITER DICTA 

Das, C.J., opined that the doctrine of eclipse could also apply to post-Constitution laws that infringe only citizens’ fundamental rights. Such laws remain operative against non-citizens and revive for citizens once the constitutional obstacle is removed.

He emphasized that “whether a post-Constitution law infringing rights of both citizens and non-citizens would revive remains open for future determination”.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Repugnancy under Article 254 requires:

  • Direct conflict between Central and State laws.

  • Legislative intent to cover the field exhaustively.

  • Occupation of the same legislative field.

• Doctrine of eclipse can apply to post-Constitution laws, particularly those infringing only citizens’ rights.

• Laws not offending constitutional rights at the time of notification cannot be declared void retrospectively.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Deep Chand judgment remains a seminal pronouncement on the nuanced interpretation of legislative competence, constitutional invalidity, and repugnancy. The Supreme Court’s analysis carefully balanced State autonomy with federal supremacy under the Constitution. The invocation of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws remains a landmark contribution to Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The case effectively harmonizes Articles 13, 31, 245, 246, and 254, setting enduring standards for future constitutional litigation.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1955] 2 SCR 589.

2. John M. Wilkerson v. Charles A. Rahrer (1891) 140 U.S. 545.

3. Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 613.

4. Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [1955] 1 SCR 707.

5. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951] SCR 228.

6. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [1951] SCR 682.

7. Carter v. Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1942) 66 C.L.R. 557.

8. Newberry v. United States (1912) 256 U.S. 232.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India, 1950 (Articles 13, 31, 245, 246, 254).

2. U.P. Transport Service (Development) Act, 1955 (Act IX of 1955).

3. Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act 100 of 1956).

4. General Clauses Act, 1897 (Section 6).