A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India, in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi [1959] Supp. (1) SCR 733, examined the revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the context of jurisdictional facts. The dispute arose under the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, where the appellant landlord sought enhancement of rent based on alleged new construction after June 30, 1946. The House Allotment Officer initially fixed the rent. The tenant challenged the maintainability of the landlord’s suit for enhancement under Section 5(4), arguing no new construction occurred post the cutoff date. The High Court intervened, treating the existence of new construction as a jurisdictional fact, thereby dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction, clarifying that wrong decisions on jurisdictional facts result in courts assuming jurisdiction erroneously, warranting High Court interference under Section 115 CPC.

Keywords: Revisional Jurisdiction, Section 115 CPC, Jurisdictional Fact, U.P. Rent Control Act, House Allotment Officer, Reasonable Annual Rent, New Construction, Special Leave Appeal.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Chaube Jagdish Prasad and Another v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 153 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date
December 5, 1958

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
JAFER IMAM, S.K. DAS and J.L. KAPUR, JJ.

vi) Author
Kapur J.

vii) Citation
Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi [1959] Supp. (1) SCR 733

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Sections 2(a)(j), 3A, 5(4), 6, U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Civil Law, Rent Control Law, Jurisdictional Law, Revisional Jurisdiction, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment involves the nuanced intersection between substantive rights under rent control statutes and procedural jurisdictional questions under civil procedure law. The appellant landlord constructed a godown allegedly post-June 30, 1946. He sought enhanced rent through House Allotment Officer under Section 3A of the U.P. Act. The House Allotment Officer fixed rent at Rs. 40 per month. Dissatisfied, the landlord filed a civil suit under Section 5(4) claiming inadequacy of reasonable rent. The trial court enhanced the rent to Rs. 55-8-0 after determining the existence of new construction. However, the High Court revised this decision, holding that no new construction attributable to the tenant existed post-June 30, 1946. The High Court held that the question of whether there was new construction was jurisdictional, and since the trial court erred on this, it assumed jurisdiction improperly.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent took the disputed accommodation in 1938 on rent of Rs. 21-4 annas per month. It comprised a covered godown used for stacking timber. In January 1949, per the landlord’s assertion, a new godown measuring 80 x 25 x 11 feet was constructed upon the respondent’s request. The landlord spent substantial amounts and sought enhancement of rent to Rs. 165 per month. The House Allotment Officer fixed Rs. 35, later revised to Rs. 40, holding it was not newly constructed accommodation as the tenancy existed since 1938.

The landlord then filed a suit under Section 5(4), asserting inadequacy of reasonable rent. The respondent denied requesting any construction and argued that no new construction post-June 30, 1946, occurred, rendering the suit incompetent. The trial court found additional construction occurred, treating it as new accommodation, and increased the rent.

The respondent sought revision under Section 115 CPC. The High Court held the construction did not qualify as “new construction” under Section 3A, making the suit untenable. Thus, the High Court dismissed the landlord’s suit.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the trial court rightly assumed jurisdiction under Section 5(4) based on existence of new construction?

ii) Whether the High Court could exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC when the trial court’s finding involved a jurisdictional fact?

iii) Whether the House Allotment Officer’s determination under Section 3A was conclusive for civil court jurisdiction?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The trial court properly exercised jurisdiction under Section 5(4) upon determining existence of new construction. The landlord argued that once the House Allotment Officer fixed rent under Section 3A, the court acquired jurisdiction. The appellant contended that existence or non-existence of new construction was a pure question of fact. Therefore, even if the trial court erred, it did not warrant revisional interference under Section 115 CPC.

The appellant relied on Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 where Lord Esher distinguished between jurisdictional and factual determinations. It was urged that the trial court, being empowered to decide factual issues, retained jurisdiction even upon erroneous findings of fact.

Further reliance was placed on Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K. Shaw and Bros. [1951] SCR 145, arguing that revisional power could not correct mere errors in fact-finding where jurisdiction existed.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The High Court properly exercised revisional jurisdiction because existence of new construction after June 30, 1946, was a jurisdictional fact under Section 3A. Only if such new construction existed could the trial court proceed under Section 5(4). Since no such construction occurred, the trial court acted without jurisdiction.

The respondent relied on Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1949) LR 76 IA 131 where erroneous findings on jurisdictional facts entitled superior courts to intervene.

They argued that by erroneously concluding existence of new construction, the trial court illegally assumed jurisdiction barred under law. The High Court, therefore, rightly corrected this under Section 115 CPC.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947

• Section 2(a) defined “accommodation” expansively.

• Section 2(f) categorized reasonable rent depending on construction date.

• Section 3A empowered District Magistrate to fix rent for constructions after June 30, 1946.

• Section 5(4) permitted suits for enhancement based on inadequacy of reasonable rent.

ii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

• Section 115 CPC empowered High Courts to revise decisions where subordinate courts exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that existence of new construction post-June 30, 1946, was a jurisdictional fact. The trial court wrongly found that such construction existed. This error led the court to assume jurisdiction not vested under Section 5(4).

ii) When jurisdiction depends upon existence of certain facts, courts must correctly ascertain them. Erroneous decisions on jurisdictional facts allow revisional interference under Section 115 CPC as held in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1949) LR 76 IA 131.

iii) The House Allotment Officer’s determination under Section 3A was not conclusive on the civil court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(4).

iv) The High Court correctly exercised revisional jurisdiction and dismissed the landlord’s suit.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court distinguished between jurisdictional facts and mere findings of fact. Errors on jurisdictional facts directly affect jurisdiction. Superior courts can correct such errors to prevent subordinate courts from exceeding jurisdiction.

ii) The Court clarified that decisions under rent control statutes must strictly adhere to statutory conditions conferring jurisdiction.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Jurisdictional facts must be correctly determined to invoke Section 5(4) of the Rent Act.

• High Courts can interfere under Section 115 CPC if lower courts assume jurisdiction based on erroneous jurisdictional facts.

• Findings by administrative authorities (House Allotment Officer under Section 3A) do not preclude civil courts from examining jurisdiction.

• Distinction between jurisdictional errors and errors within jurisdiction remains vital for revisional scope.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment decisively clarifies the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. It affirms that jurisdictional facts form the gateway for courts to exercise substantive jurisdiction. Errors in such determinations confer revisional powers upon High Courts. The judgment strikes a balance between preserving lower courts’ factual autonomy and ensuring that jurisdictional boundaries remain inviolable. The ruling stands as a key precedent on the interface between rent control laws and procedural jurisdiction.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury (1949) LR 76 IA 131

2. Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313

3. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras (1949) LR 76 IA 67

4. Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria [1953] SCR 136

5. Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K. Shaw and Bros. [1951] SCR 145

6. The Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417

7. Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (1884) 11 IA 237

8. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (1917) 44 IA 261

9. Babu Ram v. Munnalal (1927) ILR 49 All 454

10. Hari Bhikaji v. Naro Vishvanath (1885) ILR 9 Bom 432

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act III of 1947)

2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908)