A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Khushi Ram [1960 AIR 1089, 1960 SCR (3) 427], examined the legality and procedural correctness of a Magistrate’s decision to commit a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to the Sessions Court, despite possessing the jurisdiction and statutory empowerment under Section 21 of the Act to adjudicate the matter himself. The case involved a repeat offender under Section 7 of the Act, convicted for selling adulterated milk and operating without a license. The Judicial Magistrate erroneously believed that Section 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 limited his sentencing powers and therefore referred the case to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge proceeded with the trial and conviction. However, the High Court quashed the conviction, asserting that the commitment itself was void. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision, holding that Section 21 is enabling, not disabling, and reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court to try cases even when the committing Magistrate is fully empowered to adjudicate. This case settled a pivotal procedural point concerning the interplay between special statutes and general criminal procedure, emphasizing judicial efficiency and jurisdictional clarity.

Keywords: Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Criminal Procedure Code, Jurisdiction, Commitment, Sessions Court, Magistrate’s Powers

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Khushi Ram

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 1959

iii) Judgement Date:
April 1, 1960

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice Jafer Imam and Justice A.K. Sarkar

vi) Author:
Justice A.K. Sarkar

vii) Citation:
AIR 1960 SC 1089; 1960 SCR (3) 427

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 7, Section 16, Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

• Section 32, Section 207, Section 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:
None

x) Case is Related to:
Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Statutory Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The dispute stems from an erroneous application of procedural law by the Magistrate in a case concerning the sale of adulterated milk under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The trial Magistrate had found the accused, Khushi Ram, guilty under Section 7 for both selling adulterated milk and for not holding a license. Because this was the third such offence, Section 16(1)(a)(iii) mandated a minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of ₹3,000. However, under Section 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, a Magistrate of the First Class could only impose a fine up to ₹2,000. Mistakenly believing he lacked sentencing authority, the Magistrate committed the case to a Sessions Court. This raised a central question: Can a Magistrate, even if statutorily empowered under a special law to impose a higher sentence, refer the case to the Sessions Court on grounds of misinterpretation of his sentencing powers?

The Allahabad High Court overturned the Sessions Court conviction, holding the commitment void and the Sessions Court’s trial without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s ruling addressed the broader implications of how enabling provisions in special statutes like Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act interact with the general code of criminal procedure. This case clarified that judicial empowerment under a special statute cannot be diluted by an erroneous reliance on general law, and procedural irregularities do not necessarily nullify jurisdiction unless they go to the root of the authority to try the case.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Khushi Ram was charged under Section 7(i) and 7(iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for two offences: (i) selling adulterated milk, and (ii) selling milk without a valid license. The case was heard by a Judicial Magistrate in Barabanki who found the offences proven. It was further established that this was the third time the respondent had committed such offences. Under Section 16(1)(a)(iii), a third conviction attracted a mandatory minimum of two years’ imprisonment and ₹3,000 fine.

Despite Section 21 of the Act authorizing First Class Magistrates to impose sentences beyond the usual limits of Section 32 CrPC, the Magistrate misunderstood his jurisdictional boundary and, acting under Section 347 CrPC, committed the matter to the Sessions Court for trial. The Sessions Judge confirmed guilt but treated the incident as the second offence and sentenced Khushi Ram to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 under the assumption that the Magistrate had erred in commitment.

Khushi Ram appealed to the Allahabad High Court, which set aside the conviction, ruling that the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction since the Magistrate had full authority under Section 21. It observed that committing the case to the Sessions Court, despite having power to try and punish, was not just an error but a jurisdictional overreach.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the commitment of the case by the Magistrate to the Sessions Court was legally valid despite the Magistrate having the power to impose the prescribed sentence under Section 21 of the Act.

ii) Whether the Sessions Court had jurisdiction to try and convict the accused in a case committed by a competent Magistrate under a misapprehension of the extent of his powers.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The State contended that the commitment to the Sessions Court was not illegal merely because the Magistrate had misinterpreted his powers. They argued that the Magistrate had both territorial jurisdiction and statutory empowerment under Section 21 of the Act, and his decision to commit the case, though perhaps unnecessary, was within his discretion.

They emphasized that Section 21 was enabling, not disabling. It expanded, rather than limited, the Magistrate’s powers to impose higher sentences under the Act. They argued that the High Court had wrongly construed Section 21 as disabling the Magistrate from committing the matter.

Moreover, Sections 207 and 347 of CrPC permitted commitment of cases to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court derived its jurisdiction from such commitments. Therefore, as long as the Magistrate lawfully committed the case, the Sessions Court had full authority to adjudicate.

They relied on the broader principles of procedural law, especially the doctrine that procedural irregularities that do not affect core jurisdiction do not vitiate trial—as laid down in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67[1].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

Khushi Ram’s counsel maintained that Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act not only enabled a Magistrate to award higher sentences but also implied that such matters should not be committed to the Sessions Court. They contended that the Magistrate’s act of commitment was not just erroneous but jurisdictionally invalid.

They relied on the reasoning of the High Court, which treated Section 21 as both enabling and disabling, arguing that allowing the Sessions Court to try such matters when the Magistrate had statutory authority would render Section 21 ineffective. According to them, the proper procedure should have been trial and sentencing by the Magistrate.

They also contended that the Sessions Court’s exercise of jurisdiction was based on an invalid commitment and was therefore without legal foundation, rendering the entire trial and conviction void ab initio.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

• Section 7: Prohibits sale of adulterated or misbranded food.

• Section 16(1)(a)(iii): Prescribes mandatory minimum punishment for repeat offenders.

• Section 21: Overrides CrPC to allow Magistrates to impose sentences exceeding their usual powers.

ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

• Section 32: Limits First Class Magistrates to fine of ₹2,000.

• Section 207: Deals with commitment proceedings.

• Section 347: Allows Magistrates to commit cases to the Court of Session.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court ruled that Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was purely an enabling provision. It did not prevent a Magistrate from committing a case to the Sessions Court. The commitment was valid under Section 347 CrPC, and therefore, the Sessions Court had full jurisdiction.

It clarified that the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court flows from the Code and is not affected by a special statute unless the statute explicitly excludes such jurisdiction. Thus, once a case is committed to the Sessions Court by a competent Magistrate, the Sessions Court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, regardless of whether the commitment was necessary.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court remarked that even if the Magistrate could impose the full sentence, his decision to commit the case to a higher court did not vitiate the trial. They emphasized that courts should not allow procedural misinterpretations to override substantive justice.

c. GUIDELINES 

The judgment did not issue formal guidelines, but the following procedural principles can be inferred:

• Magistrates empowered under special statutes must be cautious not to commit cases unnecessarily.

• Commitments made under a misapprehension of power do not necessarily invalidate Sessions Court jurisdiction.

• Special statutes enabling enhanced sentencing powers do not disable concurrent procedural powers under CrPC.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 – discussed principles of procedural irregularities not affecting jurisdiction[1].

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Sections 7, 16, 21
ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Sections 32, 207, 347