A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This case addresses the constitutional and legal validity of pre-Constitutional legislation introduced in the erstwhile princely state of Hyderabad, specifically the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli and the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli. The Supreme Court in Sarwarlal and Others v. The State of Hyderabad scrutinized the scope of legislative powers delegated by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the Military Governor post-Police Action and subsequently to the Chief Minister. The appellants, who were jagirdars, challenged the Regulations as confiscatory and alleged they were promulgated through a colorable and fraudulent exercise of legislative authority. The Court upheld the High Court’s findings, affirming the validity of the Farmans delegating legislative authority and ruling that the doctrine of colorable legislation did not apply to an absolute sovereign not bound by constitutional restrictions. The Regulations, being pre-Constitutional, were immune from challenge under Part III of the Constitution due to their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule and certification under Article 31(6).
Keywords: Hyderabad Jagirs, Delegation of Legislative Power, Farman, Article 31B, Article 31A, Ninth Schedule, Pre-Constitutional Laws, Colourable Legislation, Jagirdar Rights, Abolition of Jagirs.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Sarwarlal and Others v. The State of Hyderabad
ii) Case Number
Civil Appeals Nos. 392 of 1956 and 686 of 1957
iii) Judgement Date
March 16, 1960
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, J., K.C. Das Gupta, J., A.K. Sarkar, J., and Jaffer Imam, J.
vi) Author
Justice J.C. Shah
vii) Citation
(1960) 3 SCR 311
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Article 31(6), Article 31A, Article 31B, and Schedule IX of the Constitution of India;
Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli;
Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case
None reported
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Property Law, Administrative Law, Pre-Constitutional Legislation
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
Post-independence, the State of Hyderabad, ruled by the Nizam, faced integration challenges. Following the Police Action in 1948, the Indian Union assumed control over Hyderabad. The Nizam issued Farmans delegating full administrative powers, including legislative functions, first to the Military Governor and later to a Chief Minister. Leveraging these delegated powers, the Military Governor enacted the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, while the Chief Minister enacted the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli. These regulations aimed to dissolve the jagirdari system and compensate jagirdars. Sarwarlal, a jagirdar, contested the legality of the Regulations, asserting that they amounted to confiscation of property and a fraudulent legislative maneuver. The case thus examined the extent and legality of the Nizam’s delegation of legislative powers and their compatibility with constitutional guarantees post-1950.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant Sarwarlal held jagirs—Ramwarm, Chandam Palli, and Gulla Palli—in Taluq Sirsalla, District Karimnagar, Hyderabad. After the 1948 Police Action, the Nizam issued a Farman dated 19 September 1948, delegating complete administrative authority to the Military Governor, Major General J.N. Chaudhary. The Governor, under this authority, promulgated the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, effective from 15 August 1949. This Regulation mandated jagirdars to surrender their jagirs to the Jagir Administrator and deprived them of all associated rights. Section 6(4) particularly terminated the right to collect dues from tenants.
Subsequently, on 1 December 1949, another Farman replaced the Military Governor with Chief Minister M.K. Vellodi and vested him with identical powers. The Chief Minister then enacted the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli, prescribing the methodology for compensating jagirdars. On 25 April 1950, the President of India certified these Regulations under Article 31(6). Later, the First Constitutional Amendment (1951) added Articles 31A and 31B and inserted both Regulations into the Ninth Schedule, immunizing them from fundamental rights scrutiny.
Sarwarlal initially filed a writ in the Hyderabad High Court in January 1951. He amended it in August 1952 to challenge the constitutional validity of Sections 4(1)(c), 4(2) of the Commutation Regulation, and Section 6(4) of the Abolition Regulation, alleging them as colorable legislation and confiscatory. The High Court dismissed the petition, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether the Nizam validly delegated full legislative powers to the Military Governor and subsequently to the Chief Minister.
ii) Whether the impugned Regulations were enacted through a colorable and fraudulent exercise of legislative authority.
iii) Whether these Regulations violated the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution.
iv) Whether pre-Constitutional laws like the impugned Regulations can be challenged under the Constitution post-1950.
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:
They contended that the Farmans did not delegate legislative powers to the Military Governor and Chief Minister. The Regulations were, therefore, ultra vires and invalid. They argued that Section 6(4) of the Abolition Regulation and Sections 4(1)(c) and 4(2) of the Commutation Regulation amounted to direct and unjust confiscation of property without due process or compensation, which infringed upon Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. The counsel also claimed the enactments were colorable legislation—an unconstitutional exercise of authority under the garb of legislative form. The impugned laws, they contended, failed to provide fair compensation and amounted to fraud on the Constitution, especially as they were enacted before the Constitution but affected post-Constitution rights.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
They emphasized the Nizam’s status as an absolute sovereign, who had complete authority to delegate executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The Farmans clearly and explicitly conferred full legislative competence to the Military Governor and later to the Chief Minister. The Regulations, therefore, were legally enacted under plenary authority. Further, the impugned laws were pre-Constitutional and thus not subject to the fundamental rights scrutiny of the Constitution. Additionally, the subsequent certification under Article 31(6) and their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule via Article 31B rendered the challenge untenable. The counsel also denied that the laws were colorable legislation, asserting that sovereign authority cannot act fraudulently within its domain, particularly when no constitutional limitations existed at that time.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Article 31(6) of the Constitution: Protects laws relating to acquisition of estates, enacted before the Constitution.
ii) Article 31A and Article 31B: Validates laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule, insulating them from Part III challenges.
iii) Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli: Especially Section 6(4), extinguishes jagirdars’ rights.
iv) Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli: Sections 4(1)(c) and 4(2) prescribe methods and limits of compensation.
v) Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, (1951) SCR 228: Laid down the principle that the Constitution does not operate retrospectively.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Court held that the Nizam, being an absolute sovereign, possessed unrestricted legislative authority and validly delegated the entirety of his powers to the Military Governor and then the Chief Minister. The Farmans used unambiguous language conferring “all authority for the administration of the State,” which included legislative powers. Therefore, the Regulations were legally enacted. The Court ruled that the doctrine of colorable legislation applies only to legislatures bound by constitutional constraints, which did not apply to the Nizam’s administration. Moreover, as pre-Constitutional laws, the impugned Regulations were immune to challenge under Part III by virtue of Articles 31A and 31B and their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. The Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment and dismissed the appeals.
b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Court observed that even if the Regulations had been invalidly enacted, their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule via the First Constitutional Amendment insulated them from judicial scrutiny regarding fundamental rights violations. Furthermore, post-Constitution rights could not revive extinguished pre-Constitution rights, rendering the petition meritless.
c. GUIDELINES
Not applicable. The Court did not lay down prospective guidelines but restricted its ruling to the interpretation of historical legal delegations and constitutional immunities.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i) Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, (1951) SCR 228 [1]
b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli
ii) Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 Fasli
iii) Article 31(6), 31A, 31B, and Schedule IX of the Constitution of India
iv) Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
